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ABSTRACT 
 
The protracted and persistent nature of poverty in many rural households of developing countries 
has been linked to the lack of finance needed to undertake profitable investments. The provision 
of credit therefore has been enthusiastically identified and championed as an important 
instrument for improving the welfare of the poor directly and for enhancing productive capacity 
through financing investment by the poor in their human and physical capital. Another crucial 
issue is the limited availability of funds for credit to those that really need it. 
  
Strategies aimed at poverty alleviation need to identify factors that are strongly associated with 
poverty and are amenable to modification by policy. Cross sectional data from a household 
survey was used for this study. The study employs a household welfare function, approximated 
by household expenditure per adult equivalent to explain the incidence of poverty and its 
correlates. It also investigates the individual and household characteristics that influence credit 
market access in South Africa. The aim is to provide a better understanding of the households’ 
characteristics, not only because they influence household’s demand for credit but also because 
potential lenders are most likely to base their assessment of borrowers’ creditworthiness on such 
characteristics. The effect of credit constraints on household welfare was also examined by 
identifying credit-constrained households based on direct elicitation of their credit-constrained 
status from survey questions about restrictions on credit, and an endogenous switching 
regression model was used to analyse the effect of credit constraints on household welfare. 
 
The Foster, Greer, and Thorbecke (FGT) poverty index was used to analyse the extent and 
severity of poverty with the results indicating that nearly 44 percent of the sampled households 
live below poverty line of R220.56 per adult equivalent per month, with average poverty gap of 
xvii 
 
0.097. The Tobit regression estimates shed light on the determinants of poverty; the results show 
that rural poverty is strongly linked to household head’s gender, age, education, occupation and 
land ownership. Dependency ratio, credit availability and assets ownership are also important 
determinants of rural poverty. 
 
The results of the logistic regression suggest that credit market access was significantly 
influenced among other variables by gender, monthly income, assets value, savings, dependency 
ratio, repayment capacity and social capital, indicating that security and guarantee is the main 
criterion lenders use in granting credit. In other words, clients’ credit risk profile plays a 
determining role in household credit accessibility.  
 
The switching regression model in the first stage used the probit regression to estimates the 
determinants of households credit constrained conditions. The result shows that gender, age, land 
and asset ownership, strength of previous relationship and social capital are significant in 
determining whether a household is credit constrained. The effect of credit constraints on 
household welfare was estimated in the second stage. Credit constrained households are found to 
have lower welfare outcomes compared to the unconstrained households. 
 
The results presented in this study therefore support the claims that credit policies still have an 
important role to play in rural development, and additional rural finance can enhance 
productivity and household welfare, thus contributing to pro-poor growth. 
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  CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 
1.1 Background  
According to new estimates of poverty generated by the Human Sciences Research Council, the 
percentage of the populace in South Africa still living in poverty has not changed significantly 
since the advent of democratic governance in 1994 (HSRC, 2004). The gap between rich and 
poor rather than abating has continued to widen, thus, many households have sunk deeper into 
poverty. 
 
In per capita terms, South Africa is an upper-middle-income country with the year 2006 estimate 
of Gross Domestic Product per capita around $13 300 (CIA, 2008). In spite of this relative 
wealth, most South African households are living in outright poverty or at the very least are 
vulnerable to being poor. Furthermore, the income and wealth distribution in South Africa is 
among the most unequal in the world, the country’s Gini coefficient by expenditure was 0,65 in 
2000 (UNDP, 2005). This figure is higher than the Gini coefficient of 0,58 in the mid-1990s. 
Many South African households today still have little or no access to education, health care, 
clean water and energy. Accordingly, this situation will possibly affect not only the country’s 
social and political stability, but also the economic development path it follows (May, 1998). 
 
Poverty, according to its primary meaning, implies a lack or deprivation of certain minimal 
income necessary to attain a decent standard of living. There is a large body of evidence to 
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suggest that income poverty is increasing. According to Leibbrandt et al. (2005) and Hoogeveen 
and Özler (2006), the headcount index of poverty between 1995 and 2000 has increased from 32 
to 34 percent nationally, or from 26 to 28 percent between 1996 and 2001. Using a different 
dataset on a $2 per day poverty line, where the average poor household earned 11 percent below 
this line in 1995 and which by 2005 had increased to 13 percent (Hoogeveen and Özler 2006). 
 
South African population, according to the mid-2006 estimates from Statistics South Africa, is 
about 47,9 million people and, of these, almost half continues to live below the minimum living 
standard (Adelzadeh, 2006). Poverty is endemic in the rural areas of South Africa, particularly in 
the former homelands. About 65 percent of the poor are found in the rural areas and 78 percent 
of those vulnerable to being chronically poor are those who live in rural areas (Leibbrandt and 
Woolard, 2006). The poverty rate1 for rural areas in South Africa is 71 percent. Accordingly, the 
poverty gap2 was also estimated to be R28 billion in 1995, and the rural areas accounted for 76 
percent of this (May, 1998). 
 
According to May (1998), poverty is persistent in rural areas because of the contraction in the 
South African economy, and the erosion of the rural economic base due to expansion in 
population. The dearth of infrastructure and outright dispossession of assets, especially land; 
have caused many households to now find themselves with neither the income, nor the assets 
from which to generate an adequate income. Another reason alluded to the persistence of poverty 
in the rural areas is what the report called ‘poverty traps’, which it defined as “a lack of 
                                                 
1
 Defined as the proportion of people in a particular group or area falling below the poverty line, and which 
measures the prevalence of  poverty 
 
2
 Defined as the annual amount needed to uplift the poor to the poverty line by means of a perfectly-targeted transfer 
of money, and which measures the intensity of  poverty  
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complementary assets and services resulting in ‘poverty of opportunity’, whereby individuals are 
unable to take full advantage of the few assets to which they have access” (May, 1998:7). 
 
Von Pischke (1983) has recognized that the lack of finance needed to undertake productive 
investments by resource-poor people might cause them to remain trapped in poverty. The 
provision of credit to poor households has been widely perceived as an effective strategy for 
poverty alleviation (Robinson, 2001). It is believed that increased access to financial services, 
especially credit, relaxes the liquidity constraints that impoverished households face, as well as 
through the boosting of household’s risk bearing ability. It may equip them to shift from coping 
strategies, such as those involving self-insurance and mutual insurance, to cope with ex-post 
risks of negative-income shocks to protect their level of consumption and to activities that 
generate dynamic growth (Alderman and Paxson, 1992; Besley, 1995; Murdoch 1995; 
Rosenzwieg, 2001). Based on this, expanded access to credit has been enthusiastically canvassed 
in the development community for its ability and potential to generate sustainable economic 
growth that greatly favours the poor (Murdoch, 2000; Robinson, 2001). 
 
Provision of financial services especially credit and savings facilities, can help poor rural 
households manage and often augment their otherwise meagre resources and income and acquire 
adequate food and other necessities. According to Zeller and Sharma (2000), credit facilities help 
poor households to tap financial resources beyond their own and take advantage of profitable 
investment opportunities. Accordingly, households can invest in land improvements or 
agricultural technology such as, motorised farm tools and equipments, high-yielding seeds and 
fertilizer that increases incomes (while sustaining the natural resource base). Incentives to build 
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up funds for future investment or consumption can also be facilitated by provision of financial 
services especially investment credit to impoverished households. It can help landless rural 
households establish or expand family enterprises, potentially making the difference between 
abject poverty and an economically secure life. When household income is temporarily on the 
decline, for example, between agricultural seasons after or a bad harvest, short-term borrowing 
or savings are often used to maintain consumption of necessities. 
 
In South Africa, the formal financial sector is well developed and highly concentrated in urban 
areas in terms of both available services and the volume of transactions (Mashigo, 2006). The 
main providers of financial services, especially credit, are the banks. These banks often target 
clients with ownership of relatively high value mortgage-able property and people who possess 
pay slips as proof of employment and collateral for loans, which many poor households lack. 
Collateral for the commercial financial sector plays an important role because it insures 
repayment if the client’s income is insufficient. This carries with it the transaction and 
administrative costs, interest rates, and the costs of acquiring information about the borrower 
(Baumann, 2001).  
 
Income distribution and economic structure in South Africa is also highly skewed, thereby 
creating in a large number of so-called “unbankable” households who cannot be profitably 
served and are marginalised. They therefore depend largely on state transfer payments, such as 
pensions, and affective transfers from employed relatives for their cash income (Baumann, 
2001). Unfortunately, most commercial financial institutions are not favourably disposed to 
lending to the poor rural households, and where they do, it is usually short term financing. This is 
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based on the faulty perception that the poor, who are mostly earning less than $1 per day, are not 
creditworthy, neither do they save, or able to afford insurance against the risks they face (Zeller 
and Sharma, 2000). 
 
1.2 Problem Statement 
Policymakers have the long held belief that poor households in the developing countries lack 
access to adequate financial services for efficient inter-temporal transfers of resources and risk 
coping (Diagne, 1999). The reason being that without well functioning financial markets, poor 
households do not have much prospect for increasing in any significant and sustainable way their 
productivity and living standards. Also, due to the fact that traditional commercial banks usually 
have no interest in lending to poor rural households, because they lack viable collateral and the 
high transaction costs associated with the small loans that suit them (Zeller and Sharma, 2000).  
 
It is a common notion that credit constraints and other credit market imperfections may severely 
limit the investment and operations of household firms. Credit constraints limit the size of 
household firms, as well as their growth, profits, activations and liquidations, and possibly their 
scope of operations (Monge-Naranjo and Hall, 2002).  
 
Nonetheless, in South Africa, as in most developing countries, rural financial services are sadly 
inadequate. The poor with no access to formal sector credit have to revert to the informal 
financial sector to meet their credit demand (Montiel et al. 1993), for both productive investment 
(Binswanger and Khandker, 1995) and consumption smoothing (Heidhues, 1995; World Bank, 
1989). Ardington et al. (2003) further argued that poor households’ limited access to formal 
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financial risk management instruments (savings, credit and insurance) constrains their ability to 
cope with shocks and further increases vulnerability to poverty. 
 
The tasks of providing credit and saving opportunities, at a reasonable cost to those who have 
only meagre assets, have been neither straightforward nor easy. Most micro-credit schemes are 
designed to help the underprivileged and marginalized poor have access to credit to develop and 
finance productive income generating activities, including farming.  
 
While making credit available has been the universal policy prescription to alleviate poverty, the 
fact that credit may not easily be accessible to everybody in the real world is a significant issue. 
There are factors prevailing in the market that make the provision of credit to everybody difficult 
and/or impossible to obtain, foremost of which is the fact that there are borrowers who are just 
not credit worthy and hence do not qualify for loans. Asymmetric information can also hinder 
financial institutions from providing credit to everyone because of adverse incentive effects 
(Stiglitz and Weiss, 1981).  
 
Transaction costs for both lenders and borrowers can prevent equilibrium in the credit market. 
Since lenders behave with the profit motive in mind, they will lend to borrowers who are the 
most creditworthy. More often than not, these borrowers can offer collateral or other substitutes 
that are deemed acceptable by the lenders such as retained earnings or savings characteristics of 
the borrowing households (Lapar, 1988; Nagarajan, 1992; Esguerra, 1993). On the other hand, 
borrowers also incur transaction costs in their search for credit. If such costs become too 
prohibitive for them, they are more likely not to borrow at all (Abiad and Graham, 1988). 
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Recognizing that credit may not be easily accessible to everyone has further compounded the 
effects of credit constraints on the economic behaviour of rural households and their enterprises. 
Lack of access to credit (or credit constraint) may be an important reason why rural household 
enterprises face binding liquidity constraints. This has been suggested in the results of a survey 
of small enterprises in Ghana. Duggleby et al. (1992) found that lack of access to finance is 
perceived to be an important constraint on the ability of small enterprises in Ghana to fulfil their 
potential for dynamic growth under the Economic Recovery Program.  
 
While liquidity constraints may arise due to factors like inadequate internal funds or inefficient 
management and, therefore, are within the control of the household, credit constraints are the 
result of factors beyond the control of the household. This makes it even more important to 
recognize the degree to which a binding credit constraint contributes to the loss in potential 
productivity and economic welfare of households.          
 
In view of the above, this study intends to provide answers to the following research questions: 
 
i) What are the poverty statuses of the rural households and the determinants of 
poverty? 
ii) What factors influence household access to credit? 
iii) What factors contribute to households being credit constrained in the credit market? 
iv) What is the effect of credit-constraints on the welfare of the rural households? 
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1.3 Objectives of the Study 
The broad objective of the study is to examine household credit accessibility and the effect of 
credit constraints on household welfare in the Eastern Cape Province. 
 
The specific objectives are to: 
 
i) estimate the poverty status and the determinants of poverty of the rural household; 
ii) identity the factors influencing household access to credit in the credit market; 
iii) identify the factors that influence credit constrained households; and 
iv) assess the effect of credit-constraints on the poverty status of the rural households 
in the study area. 
 
1.4 Thesis Statement 
In light of the above stated research problem and objectives, the thesis of this study is that 
household socio-economic characteristics are the major determining factor for credit 
accessibility. 
 
Access to credit market enhances household welfare through the provision of investment credit 
to boost household income (Adugna and  Heidhues, 2000)  as well as consumption smoothing 
(Zeller, 1994), with the net effect of enabling households to move out of poverty (MFPED, 
2001). However, some households have constrained access to credit markets due to market 
imperfections, institutional and household level factors (Nwanna, 1995). At the institutional 
level, formal lenders in the credit markets incur high costs in assessing the creditworthiness of 
small borrowers with low returns due to the small loan amounts involved. For this reason, formal 
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lenders adopt strict collateral requirements as a screening mechanism to minimise default risk, 
hence keeping small borrowers out of formal credit markets or rationing their credit. At the 
household level, low levels of income and asset accumulation, widespread poverty and highly 
skewed income and asset distribution gives poor rural households a high risk profile which 
makes them less attractive to formal lenders (Hoff and Stiglitz, 1990). It has been reported that 
even lenders in the informal credit markets have designed non-price mechanisms for screening 
and rationing borrowers (Zeller, 1994). 
 
A survey of empirical literature shows that other socio-economic variables that influence the 
probability of a borrower’s credit being rationed include the borrower’s age, gender, household 
wealth and/or asset values (Zeller, 1994), education level and income and access to network 
information (Vaessen, 2001). Men mainly control household resources and are perceived by 
lenders to be more credit worthy than women are. Household wealth and/or asset values are 
important as collateral, hence control of these reduces the man’s probability of credit rationing. 
Education level enhances human capital in the form of skills, which is associated with effective 
utilisation of credit and minimisation of default risk. Access to network information enables the 
screening of potential clients and reduces default risk, as only those with good reputation are 
likely to be recommended for credit. 
     
The overarching argument of this research therefore, is that credit market accessibility by poor 
rural households in the Eastern Cape Province of South Africa is highly influenced by their 
household level socio-economic factors, which has hindered their attainment of a better 
economic and welfare outcomes hence poverty has remain pervasive in these rural areas.    
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1.5 Hypotheses 
The hypotheses put forward for this study are: 
 
i) Access to credit is not influenced by the household socio-economic factors; 
ii) Household credit constraint condition is not affected by the hypothesized household 
socio-economic factors; 
iii) Credit constraint does not influence the household welfare.  
 
1.6 Motivation and Significance of the Study 
Increasing global attention is been given to the study of household access to credit and its effect 
on various aspects of human life especially in alleviating poverty. Although access to credit has 
been shown to be of crucial importance in the reduction of household poverty, policy for micro-
finance in South Africa appears to be underdeveloped and lacking in coherence (May, 1998). 
 
Recent data available from the annual Fin Scope survey (FinScope, 2005) revealed that 53 
percent (16,4 million) of the South African adult population is excluded from formal financial 
services and does not have a bank account. These 16,4 million people are marginalized or 
formally excluded from credit. Of those without access, 99 percent are black, 49 percent live in 
rural areas and 55 percent are women. Placing these statistics in context, the unbanked populace 
in South Africa are the marginalized poor black people that form part of the 20 percent of South 
Africa’s population that earns less than US$1 a day, with many being part of the 30,5 percent 
officially unemployed (DBSA, 2005). 
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In practice, households apply for credit, but lenders determine how much credit is allocated to 
them, based on their perception of the household’s creditworthiness. This often results in 
household being credit constrained, which reflects the lender perception of the household risk 
profile. Therefore understanding the factors that influence households to be credit constrained 
will highlight specific interventions that may raise the creditworthiness of households, both to 
the advantage of lenders and households. Improved creditworthiness of borrowers, from the 
lender’s perspective, will reduce risk of default and improve profitability and financial 
sustainability. From the household’s side, increased creditworthiness means increased access to 
credit, which may provide a possible escape route from poverty.  
 
While credit constraints are widely seen as pervasive, little is known about its incidence or 
importance. For example, while few poor rural households borrow, there is considerable debate 
whether this is due to their low demand (as claimed by lenders) or to these households more 
often being denied access to credit.  
 
The failure of households to gain access to credit is frequently used as an explanation of many 
important economic phenomena. Accordingly, many studies have been conducted to investigate 
the determinants of household access to credit and its effects on a different range of issues in 
South Africa. However, despite the large number of studies on credit accessibility, there has been 
relatively little empirical work devoted to understanding why households are credit constrained 
in the credit markets in South Africa, particularly the determinants of credit constraints and its 
effects on household’s economic outcomes in the Eastern Cape Province. 
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There is need for empirical research on access to credit and effects of credit constraints on 
household welfare and poverty in order to generate sustainable information that would serve as a 
tool or guide for policy makers in their quest to improve welfare, reduce poverty and achieve the 
objective of government towards better rural livelihoods. Results from this quantitative study, 
would be of use in forming a link between concepts and reality. It will also facilitate the 
proposition of relevant policy interventions and/or reforms that would lead to improved welfare 
and practical alleviation of the level of poverty in the Eastern Cape and other regions of the 
country. 
  
The importance of the study, therefore, is its potential in filling some gaps in literature on access 
to credit and the effect of credit constraints on households welfare and poverty alleviation in the 
Eastern Cape Province. It attempts to identify reasons for the limited access to formal and 
semiformal financial services by rural informal enterprises, by looking at demand and supply 
behaviour. This study is also expected to contribute both to the growing knowledge on credit as a 
tool for poverty alleviation and rural development in the academic world; and information input 
relevant to government, policy makers and implementers towards an improved welfare status for 
rural dwellers. 
 
1.7 Delineations and Limitations of the Study 
This study is limited to rural financial markets and it concentrates more on the micro aspects of 
rural finance. In terms of financial services, only credit components are analysed while other 
services such as savings are not considered. The focus in this dissertation was households’ access 
to the credit market through the provision of investment/production credit. In addition, only a 
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relative poverty measure was used in the analysis. Household consumption expenditure per adult 
equivalent was used as a proxy for household welfare. 
 
One major limitation of the study is that the accuracy of the data depends on the information 
given by respondents. Most households do not keep records of their operations and finances, 
hence the dependence of the research on verbal information from respondents, who depend on 
memory recall. Any bias on their part would affect the results. However, all the appropriate 
scientific approaches to ensure that the confidence levels are high enough were implemented.  
 
It is also worth noting that one of the limitations of empirical analysis is that the behaviour of 
only 150 households in a random sample is under consideration and generalised to the rest of 
poor rural households in the Eastern Cape Province. Due to the different contexts of the 
provinces, the findings of this study cannot be generalised to rest of South Africa. Therefore, 
there is need to complement the result of this study with similar studies in other provinces in 
order to broaden the scope of application of the result of this study.  
 
1.8  Chapter Overview 
In Chapter 2, a review of literature related to the nature of poverty in South Africa is presented. 
The objective is to give an overview of the different approaches and concepts of defining 
poverty, as well as its indicators, the categories of poor people and the different poverty 
measures in South Africa are presented here.  
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Consideration is given to the features of rural credit markets and their relationship to credit 
accessibility in Chapter 3. Features that distinguish rural credit markets from other markets are 
also discussed. Some of the major constraints to credit accessibility in the formal financial 
markets are highlighted, while in Chapter 4, an overview of microfinance in the South African 
context and of the role of microcredit as an intervention for poverty alleviation in developing 
countries in achieving economic development and growth is presented. 
 
The theoretical framework within which this study is situated is discussed in Chapter 5. A 
concise definition of credit rationing and credit constraint is provided. A review of the existing 
approaches for measuring access to credit and credit constraints is presented. The weakness in 
the simple versions of the life-cycle/permanent income hypothesis (LC/PIH) as an approach for 
detecting credit constraint is exposed. The chapter concludes by suggesting a credit constraint 
framework for the classification of borrowers to be used in this study.  
 
In Chapter 6, a socio-economic profile of the study area and a detailed description of the survey 
methodology and analytical technique used in this study were presented. In Chapter 7, empirical 
tests of the hypotheses are conducted and the results discussed. It covers three major analyses, 
namely, the poverty profile and the determinants of household poverty in the study area, 
differential accessibility of credit to poor rural households, and the effects of credit constraints 
on household’s welfare. In Chapter 8, the summary and conclusions of the major empirical 
findings, implications for policy and recommendations for future research were presented. 
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  CHAPTER 2 
 THE NATURE OF POVERTY IN SOUTH AFRICA   
 
2.1 Introduction 
There is a consensus that poverty is one of the most urgent social and economic factors that need 
to be addressed in South Africa. However, there is little agreement about how to define poverty, 
let alone measure it. This poses questions about government’s ability to develop policies and 
programmes that are able to address the causes and the effects of poverty in the absence of 
universally acknowledge empirical data. This lack of knowledge also retards understanding and 
knowledge about different kinds of poverty, which, in turn, affects the appropriateness of 
government interventions. This chapter present an overview of the diverse aspects of poverty in 
South Africa. It explores the different concepts and definitions of poverty and its major 
indicators, i.e. the salient facts regarding the incidence and nature of poverty. Then, it discusses 
qualitative/experiential aspects of poverty, making the point that poverty is not simply a question 
of not having enough money. In this chapter, the categories of people who are especially 
vulnerable to becoming stuck in poverty were identified. Finally, a review of how poverty in 
South Africa had been measured in the past was presented. 
 
2.2 Concepts and Definitions of Poverty 
The concept of poverty is not so easy to describe in view of the fact that no universally 
acceptable definition is available. However, disagreements over the definition of poverty run 
deep and are closely associated with disagreements over both the determinants and solutions to 
it. In practice, all these issues of definition, measurement, determinants and solution are bound 
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up together, and an understanding of poverty requires an appreciation of the interrelationship 
between them all. Nevertheless, some logical distinctions can be made, and they will have to be 
if researchers are to make any progress in analysing the range of theoretical and empirical 
material these debates have produced. 
   
According to Townsend (2000), a critical issue on the understanding and definition of poverty, is 
the interrelatedness and interconnectedness of concepts, definitions, explanations and policies. 
Ravillion (1992) has also observed that poverty measurement and policies are often inseparable. 
Bradshaw (2000) makes a related but contestable point, that in poverty research the measure 
determines the result. Therefore, it is clear as Magasela (2005) argues; the definitions and 
measurements of poverty ought to inform programmes and policies aimed at poverty alleviation 
and/or eradication. 
 
2.2.1 Approaches to Defining Poverty 
The difference between the concept, definition and measurement of poverty has been critically 
highlighted by Noble et al. (2004). They use the concept to refer to the general parameters out of 
which definitions are developed, while definitions are what are used to distinguish the poor from 
the non-poor and measurements operationalise the definition. This clarity of approach is very 
useful in unpacking how poverty can be addressed.  
 
According to Gumede (2008), there are two contrasting approaches to the meaning and 
understanding of poverty. These are what he referred to as the “narrow” and “broad” definitions. 
Narrow definitions are seen as minimalistic and are based on subsistence, an example is the 
17 
 
World Bank’s definition of poverty as “the inability to attain a minimal standard of living” ( 
World Bank, 1996) measured in terms of basic consumption needs or income required to satisfy 
those needs is indicative of a narrow poverty approach. Broad definitions of poverty on the other 
hand, are seen as ideal, as it emphasises social inclusion, involvement and participation specific 
to a given society at a specific time. In this approach, the standard of living and quality of life of 
an individual, household or family is assessed in the context of or in relation to socio-economic 
and resource profile of the society. An example is the Townsend (1979) definition of poverty. He 
contends that individuals, families and groups in the population can be said to be in poverty 
when they lack the resources to obtain certain types of diet, participate in certain activities and 
have the living conditions and amenities that are customary, or at least widely encouraged or 
approved, in the societies to which they belong. 
 
In economic literature in particular, there are also the absolute and relative definitions of poverty. 
Absolute poverty is a condition characterised by severe deprivation of basic human needs, 
including food, safe drinking water, sanitation facilities, health, shelter, education and 
information. It depends not only on income but also on access to social services (UN, 1995). In 
general, absolute poverty means that a person’s basic subsistence needs (for food, clothing, and 
shelter) are not being met. Absolute poverty is defined by reference to a certain quantitative 
measure, which is used to define the poor from the non-poor. It is usually based in the cost of 
purchasing a minimum “basket” of goods required for human survival. Absolute definition of 
poverty as shown in literature, tend to be minimalist and are based on subsistence and attainment 
of physical efficiency. Subsistence is concerned with the minimum provision needed to maintain 
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health and working capacity. Its focus is the capacity to survive and to maintain physical 
efficiency (Townsend, 1979; 2000). 
 
Relative poverty, on the other hand, is a more subjective or social standard in that it explicitly 
recognises that some judgement is involved in determining poverty levels (Sen, 1981). 
Judgement is required because a relative definition of poverty is based on a comparison between 
the standard of living of the poor and those of the other members of the society who are not poor, 
usually involving some measure of the average standard of living of the whole society in which 
poverty is being studied.  
 
It typically means that a person’s needs are not being met in comparison to the rest of his or her 
society. It attempts to understand inequality in terms of distributions of resources in a society. It 
can also emphasise social inclusion, involvement and participation. According to Townsend 
(1979), individuals, families and groups in a population can be said to be in poverty when they 
lack the resources to obtain the types of diet, participate in the activities and have the living 
conditions and amenities, which are customary, or at least widely encouraged or approved, in the 
societies to which they belong. Their resources are so seriously below those commanded by the 
average individual or family that they are in effect, excluded from the ordinary living patterns, 
customs and activities. 
 
2.2.2 Poverty Definitions 
There has been a continued debate about the meaning of poverty. Poverty to different people 
means different things; perhaps the first concept that comes to mind is that poverty is the lack of 
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certain minimal income necessary to attain a “decent” standard of living (Sen, 1992). Poverty 
may also have wider meaning, encompassing malnutrition, illiteracy, unemployment, 
substandard housing and other dimension of a low standard of living (UN, 1995). 
 
Giving a concise and universally accepted definition of poverty, therefore, is elusive principally 
for the reason that it affects several aspects of the human circumstances, which includes the 
physical, moral and psychological. Therefore, different criteria have been used to conceptualize 
poverty.  
 
According to the European Economic Community (EEC) (1985), the poor can be defined as 
those individuals, families or groups of persons, whose material, cultural and social resources are 
so seriously below those commanded by the average individual, family or group, that they are in 
effect excluded from the minimum acceptable way of life in the member state they belong. The 
United Nations (UN) on the other hand defines poverty as “ a condition characterised by severe 
deprivation of basic needs, including food, safe drinking water, sanitation facilities, health, 
shelter, education and information” (UN, 1995:57). The World Bank (1996) gives a broad 
definition of poverty as being unable to meet “basic needs” - physical and nonphysical- 
requirements for a meaningful life. The physical needs include food, health care, education, 
shelter and the non-physical includes participation and identity. 
 
Sen (1983) relates poverty to entitlements that are taken to be the various bundles of goods and 
services over which one has command, taking cognizance of the means by which such goods are 
acquired, and the availability of needed goods. While, according to Ravallion (1992), poverty 
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can be said to exist in a given society when one or more persons do not attain a level of material 
well-being deemed to constitute a reasonable minimum standard of society. Blackwood and 
Lynch (1994) use the criteria of the levels of consumption and expenditure to identify the poor.   
 
Several attempts by economists and social scientists to conceptualise the phenomenon of poverty 
abound in social science literature. Mostly they refer to different dimensions of standards of 
living. These include a material well-being, basic human needs, and a more comprehensive ‘way 
of life’. Broadly speaking, poverty can be conceptualised in four ways; these are lack of access to 
basic needs/goods; a result of lack or impaired access to productive resources; outcome of 
inefficient use of common resources; and a result of “exclusive mechanisms” i.e. a certain level 
of social participation.  
 
Poverty that is perceived as a lack of access to basic needs/goods is fundamentally economic or 
consumption oriented. It explains poverty in material terms, and explicitly uses consumption-
based categories to describe the extent and depth of poverty and ascertains who is poor and who 
is not. Consequently, in a particular society, the poor are perceived as those individuals or 
households incapable of purchasing a specified basket of basic goods and services. According to 
Streeten and Burki, (1978), these basic goods are nutrition, water, shelter/housing, health care, 
access to productive resources including education, working skills and tools and political and 
civil rights to participate in decisions concerning socio-economic conditions. Necessary for 
survival are the first three basic needs/goods. Impaired access to productive resources in form of 
agricultural land, physical and financial assets often leads to low income, unemployment and 
under nourishment.  
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Five dimensions of poverty have been distinguished by Chambers (1988) to include: 
 
• ‘Poverty proper’ being lack of adequate income or assets to generate income; 
• Physical weakness due to under-nutrition, sickness or disability; 
• Physical or social isolation due to peripheral location, lack of access to goods and 
services, ignorance or illiteracy; 
• Vulnerability to crisis and the risk of becoming even poorer; and  
• Powerlessness within the existing social, economic, political and cultural structure. 
 
Illustrated in the Participatory Poverty Assessment is another approach to defining poverty. This 
consists of asking the poor themselves how they would define poverty. As such, it has both an 
absolute and a relative aspect as it includes the poor’s own needs, how they view these needs 
against the canvas of the community in which they live. From the report of the South African 
Participatory Poverty Assessment (SA-PPA) (May, 1998), South Africans from the various 
studies defined poverty in the followings ways: 
 
• Isolated from the community; being unable to mix easily with other people. 
• The children are malnourished and the food that is served is of poor quality. 
• The homes are crowded and are not maintained. 
• The most basic forms of energy are used and the family is frequently energy insecure.  
• Nobody in the family is employed. 
• Families are split, with fathers not present, and children living elsewhere. 
 
 
22 
 
2.3 Proximate Indicators of Poverty  
Proximate indicators of poverty are factors linked with poverty. These factors are ‘proximate’ 
because they are contemporaneous with poverty, i.e. they are found in association with poverty. 
In literature, they are often referred to as proximate determinants of poverty. According to 
Coudouel et al. (2002), there are two classifications of the indicators of poverty, namely, the 
monetary and non-monetary indicators respectively. The monetary indicator is based on either 
income or consumption expenditure while the non-monetary indicators include health, education, 
assets or a composite of these.  
 
2.3.1 Monetary Indicators 
Income and expenditure are important variables in the analysis of poverty. According to May 
(1998), from the report of the South African Participatory Poverty Assessment (SA-PPA), South 
Africans defined poverty as the lack of income and the inability to meet basic needs among many 
other definitions. 
 
The major source of income in the urban areas of South Africa is wage employment, while in the 
rural areas because of the lack of access to productive resource, the rural dwellers are almost 
totally dependent on state transfer payments, such as pensions, disability  and childcare grants, 
inter- and intra-household transfer and informal microenterprise for their cash incomes 
(Baumann, 2004). Income from wages is very important in enabling households to escape 
poverty; a low level of income is an indicator of poverty. According to Woolard (2002), of the 
estimated 42 million people living in South Africa in 2002, eight million are surviving on less 
than $1 per day, and 18 million were living on less than $2 per day. 
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A low level of economic wealth is another monetary indicator of poverty. Economic wealth is 
derived from assets that generate income, capital gains or liquidity when strapped for cash. In the 
event of adverse shocks (such as drought or loss of a wage worker or pensioner), assets like oxen 
can play an insurance role, helping for consumption smoothing in areas where households do not 
have access to efficient insurance and credit markets (Little, 2002). It has been demonstrated in a 
study by Little (2001) that households deplete their livestock herds and consume their seed stock 
(de-accumulation) after the debilitating effects of drought in rural Ethiopia to postpone 
malnutrition and disease. 
 
Also being poor means devoting insufficient resources to consumption. In a welfare monitoring 
survey in Kenya, the result shows that the poor spend a larger part of their expenditure on food 
as compared to the non-poor (Kimalu et al. 2002). This agrees with the Engel’s Law, which 
states that relative to the non-poor, the poor spend a higher proportion of their income on food. 
 
2.3.2 Non-monetary Indicators 
Examples of non-monetary indicators of poverty include the following: 
 
• Unemployment:  The incidence of poverty is closely related to unemployment, under-
employment, and unremunerative forms of employment. Employment is a crucial 
determinant of poverty. Access to employment is important for an individual to earn 
income, achieve sustainable livelihoods and escape from “income” poverty. 
Unemployment levels are highest amongst people who lack education (Woolard, 2002). 
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In South Africa, almost 60 percent of adults with no formal education are poor, whereas 
the incidence of poor people is 15 percent amongst matriculants and about 5 percent 
amongst those with tertiary education (Woolard, 2002). The poor are faced with problems 
of structural employment due to lack of skills or extremely low educational levels, 
medical problems, geographical isolation and discrimination based on race or other 
attributes, which are largely the legacies of the apartheid era. 
 
• Location:  The rural areas in South Africa suffer from legacy of inappropriate production 
and investment decisions. For many rural people in the former homeland areas, economic 
and social decisions remain conditioned by their unequal and distorted access to markets, 
services and opportunities. Rural poverty is more common than urban poverty. According 
to the Income and Expenditure Survey of 1995, 62 percent of rural dwellers were poor, 
compared to 32 percent of people living in small towns, 25 percent of those in secondary 
cities, and 13 percent in major metropolitan areas (Woolard, 2002). 
 
According to Woolard (2002), the incidence of poverty still reflects apartheid geography, 
with over 74 percent of the poor live in rural areas, and only 7 percent live in the 
metropolitan areas, notwithstanding the large size of the latter. Poverty is concentrated in 
former homelands, which accounts for the fact that the provinces that are home to the 
poorest people – Eastern Cape, Limpopo, and KwaZulu-Natal – are those that encompass 
the most populous former homeland areas. Asset ownership and distribution patterns 
remain those formed by apartheid; in particular, landlessness, overcrowding and a huge 
backlog in rural infrastructure persists (May, 1998). This problem is manifest in poor 
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natural resources and high transaction costs in remote areas where physical infrastructure 
and services are inadequate (White and Killick, 2001). According to Adeyeye, (1987), 
impaired access to resources usually shifts the focus on poverty and it curtails the 
potential of individuals to convert available productive resources to a higher quality of 
life. 
 
• Female-headed Households: Female-headed households are more likely to be poor than 
male-headed households. According to the 1993 South African Labour Development 
Research Unit (SALDRU) data, de jure, female-headed households have a 48 percent 
chance of being poor, and a de facto female-headed household has a 53 percent chance of 
being poor. By contrast, a male-headed household has a 28 percent chance of being poor. 
A number of factors contribute to this asymmetry. For example, female-headed 
households are more apt to be in rural areas where there is little economic opportunity, 
gender discrimination in wage levels, etc. (Woolard, 2002). 
 
• Childhood Poverty: A disproportionate number of poor people are children living in poor 
households. Fifty-eight percent of children live in poverty, and two thirds of children in 
the Eastern Cape live in poverty (Woolard, 2002). Childhood poverty is also revealed by 
the appallingly high incidence of visible malnutrition among children; around 23 percent 
of children, less than 6 years old are stunted, indicating a protracted period of under-
nutrition (Steyn, 2000). The most seriously affected children are those in rural areas 
whose mothers have relatively little education. In addition, the infant mortality rate is 8 to 
10 times higher for blacks than for whites. 
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• Health and nutrition poverty: Good health is basic to human welfare and a fundamental 
objective of social and economic development. The household members’ health status 
can be taken as an important indicator of well-being. The nutritional status of children as 
a measure of outcome as well as the incidence of specific diseases (diarrhoea, malaria, 
and respiratory diseases) or life expectancy for different groups within the population has 
been the focus of analysts (Coudouel et al. 2002). High levels of morbidity and infant 
mortality are often the result of poor nutrition and inadequate health care. The incidence 
of HIV/AIDS in South Africa has compounded these problems. According to the South 
Africa Data Profile (2002), the Development Resource Centre has projected that the 
HIV/AIDS death toll will increase to about 5,5 million by 2011. The infant mortality rate 
in South Africa in 2001 was more than ten times higher than the rate in high-income 
countries, and, in 1998, the average life expectancy had fallen to 47 from 61 years. 
  
If data on health outcomes are unavailable, the number of visits an individual makes to 
hospitals and health centres, the extent to which children receive vaccinations in time as 
an input for their future health status, or access to specific medical services (such as pre- 
and postnatal care), are input proxies that could be used as indicator of poverty 
(Coudouel et al., 2002). 
 
Access to health care has long being considered as crucial in helping people attain core 
capabilities that help them escape poverty. Ill health is seen as an indicator of poverty. 
Poverty perpetuates ill health, because the poor, as compared with non-poor, are less 
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likely to report health problems and seek medical treatment in the event of illness 
(Kimalu et al. 2002). Poor health shackles human capital, reduces returns to learning, 
impedes entrepreneurial activities and holds back growth and economic development 
(Ajakaiye and Adeyeye, 2002). 
 
• Education poverty: The level of literacy could be used in the field of education as the 
defining characteristic and some level judged to signify the threshold for illiteracy as the 
poverty line. In countries where literacy is widespread, specific test scores in schools 
might be opted for as the relevant outcome indicator to distinguish among different 
population groups. Another method would be to compare the number of years of 
education completed to the expected number of years that should be completed in 
principle (Coudouel et al. 2002). 
 
Education is considered a vehicle for poverty reduction. Education is expected to lead to 
increased earning potential and improved occupational and geographical mobility of 
labour. Higher levels of educational attainment will provide higher levels of welfare for 
the household. It has been demonstrated in a study by Mwabu et al. (2000), that poverty 
is highest among people without any schooling. Their results further show virtually no 
incidence of poverty among households headed by university graduates. Mukherjee and 
Benson (2003), in a study in Malawi, showed that raising the maximum level of 
educational attainment by one step as the case may be, for example from Standard 4 to 8, 
from Standard 8 to JCE, or JCE to MSCE. This will raise household per capita 
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consumption on average by 22, 19, 11.5 and 17 percent in southern rural, central rural, 
northern rural and urban centres respectively.    
 
• Poor Standards of Housing: In South Africa, inadequate housing in urban townships and 
rural settlements has reached crisis proportions, with an estimated 7 million people living 
in squatter camps (Brew, 2002, cited by Shinns and Lyne, 2005). However, according to 
May et al. (1995), it is not only the type of dwelling (formal or informal) that is 
important, but what the dwelling is constructed of, the density of occupation, and whether 
or not sanitation is hygienic and water is safe to drink. In 1999, only about 47 percent of 
the poor in South Africa had access to reticulated water and 38 percent to adequate 
sanitation (Woolard, 2002). Access to safe water and sanitation varies by poverty status 
and locality. Sanitation and waste disposal services are scarce in most cases for the poor 
in rural and urban areas.  
 
• Energy Poverty: Energy poverty is the condition of having less than certain level of daily 
energy consumption necessary to maintain a minimum standard of living. This often has 
a range of negative impacts on nutrition, hygiene, health and comfort. In addition, energy 
poverty limits households’ ability to engage in different economic activities such as small 
and micro-enterprises (May, 1998).  
 
The type of cooking fuel a given household uses is an important indicator of its standard 
of living. The use of electricity and gas instead of firewood, for example, saves time that 
households can spend on other productive ventures (Kimalu et al. 2002). There is an 
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overwhelming dependence by the rural poor on collected firewood as source of 
household energy, whereas the urban poor have access to both charcoal and paraffin. In 
South Africa, most of the rural poor meet their energy demand by using biomass fuel, or 
a combination of biomass and hydrocarbon fuels or sometimes electricity, this multiple 
fuel use or fuel-switching is peculiar to low-income households (May, 1998).     
  
• Insecurity and Vulnerability: Poverty entails more than inadequate consumption, poor 
health or lack of education. According to the World Bank (2000), it also means dreading 
the future and knowing that crisis might descend any time that one might not cope with. 
This type of risk and insecurity is a common feature of the poor people’s life and of 
poverty today, especially in the developing countries. The most insecure in any society 
are the poor because they are the most exposed to a wide range of risks that make them 
vulnerable to income shocks and losses of social welfare benefits.  Income shocks are the 
more frequent and severe where people have poor access to health care and rely on 
agriculture for livelihoods (White and Killick, 2001). Insecurity among the poor 
manifests itself in forms such as ill health and injury, crime and domestic violence, the 
problems associated with old age, harvest failure, fluctuations in food prices and low 
demand for labour (World Bank, 2000). Farming is particularly vulnerable to natural 
disasters such as drought, floods, pests and diseases. 
 
Poor people are vulnerable to a number of harmful and potentially devastating threats, 
which they may not have the resources or power to avert. Among such threats are:  
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• fire (e.g. shack fires, which destroy one's home and possessions);  
• floods (because poorer people often end up erecting their shelters in flood-prone 
areas);  
• job loss; crime (theft of money and possessions, and bodily harm);  
• poor agricultural conditions (e.g. for those who rely in part on food production for 
sustenance); and  
• illness and death in the family (often with no resources to seek medical care). 
 
The experience of vulnerability is an aspect of poverty in and of itself, that is, a palpable 
disturbance to one's 'peace of mind'. In the SA-PPA, this sense of vulnerability was 
articulated in a number of different ways. For example, many participants expressed 
concern for their ability to cope with unpredictable crises. Bedford (1995), cited in May 
et al., (1997), notes the extreme stress and anxiety suffered by street children, who are 
exposed to constant threats of violence and sexual abuse. Chopra and Ross (1995, cited in 
May et al., (1997) also indicate that African women in northern KwaZulu-Natal were 
particularly aware of the threat of children falling ill during certain times of the year. 
 
• Crime and Violence: According to May (1998), violent crime is one of the more severe 
shocks that can cause vulnerable households to become impoverished. Crime and 
violence contribute to the experience of poverty at two levels. On one level, the exposure 
to crime and violence directly detracts from the quality of life of its victims and those 
fearful of being victimized. On another level, the high incidence of crime and violence 
that forms a salient feature of everyday life in South Africa is symptomatic of a profound 
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social malaise, wherein the cycle of poverty and violence are indistinguishable. A steady 
increase in crime and violence has degraded the quality of life to a varying extent in most 
countries of the world. There have been instances of shootings, gang killings, rape etc. 
Although individuals of all socioeconomic groups are affected, the urban poor are 
particularly vulnerable to these social problems (Ajakaiye and Adeyeye, 2002).  
 
South Africa has among the highest rates of violent crime in the world today and the poor 
people are far more at risk from personal crime than the affluent. Crimes such as burglary 
and robbery can result in poor people losing what little assets they have (May et al., 
1997), the prevalence of violence adds to people's sense of vulnerability and oppression. 
While state-sponsored violence ended with apartheid and political violence has greatly 
subsided, violence among people who know one another in poor communities is rife, and 
is often linked to substance abuse. A 1996 study of homicide in the Eastern Cape found 
that 93 percent of all cases were linked to alcohol and drugs, while in the Northern Cape, 
research had similar findings, and found as well that most cases were related to family 
disputes (CIAC, 1997, cited in Hamber and Lewis, 1997). 
 
Violence and crime are increasing in rural areas (Hamber and Lewis, 1997). In fact, 
homicide rates are higher in South Africa's rural areas than in its urban centres (Hamber, 
1999). That poor people are more likely to be victims of violent crime is borne out by the 
statistics, which show that a poor person is 80 times more likely to be injured or killed 
through violent crime than a wealthy person (Steinberg, 1999, cited in Hamber, 1999). 
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• Lack of Voice and Social Exclusion: One other aspect of the experience of poverty as 
revealed in the SA-PPA, is that of lack of 'voice', which is a growing area of attention 
internationally. Broadly speaking, a person 'has voice' when s/he feels s/he has an 
opportunity to somehow participate in decisions that may affect his/her life, as well as 
having avenues to lodge grievances with relevant authorities and institutions if s/he so 
wishes. Lack of voice was of course an acute aspect of many people's experience under 
apartheid, and was reversed in a significant way with the first all-inclusive democratic 
elections in 1994. The importance attached in the new dispensation to local government 
is a further reflection of the new government's earnestness to allow people these means of 
expression. However, much of the experience of voicelessness in South Africa, 
particularly among the poor, is not at the formal political level, but at the level of 
communities and households. In their study of trends in public participation, Roefs and 
Liebenberg (2000) note that the majority of South Africans have little understanding of 
the role of local councils and parliament (80 percent and 73 percent respectively), and 
only a minority of poor people specifically participate in any way in local councils or 
public hearings (23 percent and 22 percent respectively). However, 46 percent of poor 
respondents surveyed reported that they participate in some sort of community activity or 
organisation, and 30 percent of respondents indicate that community organisations are the 
most appropriate venue for addressing problems in the community. While these figures 
are encouragingly high, they underline the fact that the more marginal members of these 
same poor communities are apt to have an acute sense of social exclusion and 
voicelessness in their communities. This comes through vividly in the studies conducted 
as part of the SA-PPA. Chopra and Ross (1995), cited in May et al., (1997), led their 
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community participants in an exercise to identify the distinguishing characteristics of the 
poorest homes in their village in northern KwaZulu-Natal. Amongst the five 
characteristics identified, low income was not included, but not being part of community 
gardens or crèches was. 
 
Different sub-groups experience social exclusion in distinct ways. For the elderly, for 
example, the experience of social exclusion can be the result of fraught or absent family 
relationships. In a study in the Northern Province, Maphorogo and Eager (1995), cited in 
May et al., (1997), identified that "a 'bad' or 'rude' daughter-in-law is a main cause of 
unhappiness of older people", as was living without one's spouse. Poor support generally 
from one's children or partner is thus considered emblematic of poverty. Apart from the 
fact that loneliness diminishes one's sense of well-being, the absence of supportive family 
members can attenuate one's links to the community, and render more difficult tasks such 
as collecting one's pension on pension day, etc. A recent report by the Ministerial 
Committee on Abuse, Neglect and Ill-Treatment of Older Persons (Department of Social 
Development, 2001), draws a frightening picture of the insensitive and/or exploitative 
treatment to which some elderly people are subjected. In addition to the abuse directed at 
some elderly people by their own family members, the report highlights poor conditions 
in residential homes, at pension payout points, and at clinics. People with disabilities face 
forms of social exclusion, which contribute directly to their likelihood of missing 
economic opportunities. This social exclusion operates independently of the actual 
physical or mental challenges that the physically challenged may face. As such, 
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'disabilities' are in large measure a social construct, which has the effect of excluding 
certain individuals (Yeo, 2000). 
 
2.4 Categories of Poor People in South Africa  
One can fairly ask what personal attributes or environmental factors tend to keep people in 
poverty. The circumstances in which one finds poverty are in fact quite diverse. In addition to 
unemployability and poor business prospects, poverty can be a function of discrimination, or due 
to the severance of social networks, or in still other cases, it can be the outcome of complex 
processes such as the migrant labour system. This section describes some of the main categories 
of poor people in South Africa, and attempts to relate this poverty to underlying causes and 
influences. 
 
• The Rural Poor: Poverty is especially prevalent in rural areas, and particularly among 
Africans and Coloureds. The national data on poverty and unemployment, together with 
some of the statistics derived from the KwaZulu-Natal Income Dynamics Study (KIDS) 
data, indicate that, as a group, rural blacks have a high chance of being poor. Lack of 
access to employment is arguably the single greatest cause of rural poverty. In 1999, over 
51 percent of the rural African workforce was unemployed, versus 43 percent for 
Africans in urban areas. However, rural poverty is aggravated by lack of access to 
productive resources. According to the Rural Survey (Stats SA, 1999), in 1997 there were 
some 900 000 African households living in former homelands that had no access to 
arable land, 1,4 million that had no livestock other than chickens, and 770 000 
households that had neither. This is largely a function of the overcrowded conditions in 
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these areas. For those people dwelling in former homeland areas that do have access to 
arable and grazing land, that access can make a significant difference, though it does not 
often offer a route out of poverty. Based on the 1993 SALDRU data, it was estimated that 
among the poorest 20 percent of households in former homeland areas having access to 
arable land, agricultural production contributed 35 percent of total income (LAPC, 1996). 
Moreover, as Ardington (1988) has shown, poor households in particular rely on selling 
livestock to offset financial crises. Shackleton, et al. (2000) have shown that beyond 
conventional land-based products such as grains, vegetables, meat and milk are numerous 
other valuable products that can be harvested or derived from the land, whether their own 
land or from the commons. 
 
• Female-headed Households: According to Aliber (2003), statistics from the 1999 
October Household Survey (OHS), shows that 42 percent of all African households, (i.e. 
2,7 million) are female-headed. Largely, these are considered as single parent 
households, though they may occasionally receive remittances from absent males. In one 
third of these households, the household head is the only adult (18 years and older) in the 
household. The so-called 'granny households', i.e. the female household head is the 
grandmother rather than the mother of the children in her care, made up 17 percent of the 
household head. The reasons why female-headed households have a high probability of 
being stuck in poverty are numerous. The most obvious reason is that many female-
headed households rely only on the income of the mother, or worse, she may not have an 
income at all. She may rely mainly on child support grants from government, or on 
remittances from relatives or gifts from benefactors. As likely, the household head does 
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have some form of employment, but there is a good chance that it will be self-
employment or employment in the secondary labour market with a low level of 
remuneration and under poor conditions (Aliber, 2003). 
 
• People with Disabilities: According to the 1996 census, 2,7 million people in South 
Africa have disabilities (StatsSA, 1999). Of these 2,7 million people, 1,6 million are 
adults between the ages of 20 and 65 years old. Disabilities can reduce one's chances of 
obtaining a job, can impede one's pursuit of self-employment in the informal sector, and 
can impose medical and other costs that one would not otherwise have to bear. Of course, 
being physically challenged does not imply that no other household members are earning 
decent incomes. Surprisingly, data from the 1996 census show that there is no strong link 
between disabilities and unemployment. The unemployment rate for Africans with 
disabilities, for example, is 45,3 percent, which is only marginally above the 
unemployment rate (broad definition) for Africans for that year of 42,5 percent. 
Likewise, for Coloured people with disabilities, the unemployment rate is 26,7 percent, 
versus 20,9 percent for all Coloured people. Moreover, the occupational profiles of the 
physically challenged are not very different from those for the general population. 
Presumably, in a tighter labour market the discrepancies would be starker. 
 
• The Elderly: Elderly people are of specific concern in terms of poverty, especially if, like 
the physically challenged, they must fend entirely for themselves and for dependants. 
Many elderly people who do not have others on whom to rely on for support do receive 
old-age grants, but it is clear from Roberts (2001) that these grants are in no way 
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sufficient to keep a household out of poverty. In other words, the widespread allocation 
of old-age grants is not an indication that there are no poor households effectively headed 
by elderly people. 
 
• Retrenched Farm Workers: Agricultural employment peaked around 1968-1970 at over 
1.6 million workers, of whom 99 percent were African, Coloured, or Indian (Department 
of Agriculture, 2000). It is not possible to say how many of these were regular, and how 
many were seasonal or casual workers. Very likely around 8-15 percent were casual or 
seasonal, and the rest regular. In 2000, the total number of regular farm workers was 
around 580 000, implying a decline over the past three decades of some 860 000 jobs, of 
which the majority were almost certainly through retrenchments. Bekker et al. (1992) 
argued that former farm workers are particularly susceptible to social exclusion. The 
reason is that, having been retrenched, farm workers are usually evicted from the farms 
where they have resided. Many retrenched farm workers were in fact born and raised on 
the farm from which they are eventually ejected, thus they have no 'roots' elsewhere to 
which to return. According to Aliber (2003), these types of evictions should have ended 
in principle with the Extension of Security of Tenure Act Bill of 1997, but in practice, 
this has often not been the case. Retrenched farm workers are thus, severed from their 
existing social network – e.g. other farm workers in the immediate area – and forced to 
settle, typically with little or no savings or other capital, in townships, squatter 
settlements, or communal areas. Some attempt to switch to seasonal agricultural 
employment, as other employment prospects may be even poorer, given the non-
transferability of farm workers' skills. 
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• Cross-border Migrants: Refugees, asylum-seekers, and undocumented migrants face 
particular kinds of exclusion and deprivation in South Africa. The vast majority of these 
people come to South Africa from neighbouring African states in search of economic 
opportunity. Some migrants indeed manage to improve their circumstances significantly 
compared to their country of origin, particularly those with entrepreneurial skills (CASE, 
1998). The number of undocumented migrants is by definition difficult to gauge, 
estimates range from 250,000 to eight million (CASE, 1998). If the trend observed 
among visa overstayers is any indication, of whom there were an estimated 800 000 in 
2000, then 70 percent to 80 percent have probably arrived in South Africa since 1994. 
 
• The 'Street Homeless': “The homeless” is an amorphous category. This is particularly so 
in South Africa, because there exist hundreds of thousands of people living in informal 
squatter settlements who do have homes, but whose homes are obviously very 
unsatisfactory. Many are former farm workers, as discussed above. Many are wage 
earners in urban areas who cannot afford decent housing there, and for whom the costs of 
commuting into and out of the city are a significant burden. Their solution may be to pay 
rent in overcrowded flats in urban slums (Aliber, 2003). Those homeless living 'on the 
street' would appear to be a somewhat different category, though there may not be a clear 
line separating the two. These people, who are often referred to as the 'street homeless', 
are typically lone individuals or children rather than family units, and have severed or 
lost ties with social networks they may once have had. 
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• AIDS Orphans and Households with AIDS Sufferers: AIDS orphans are those defined 
by UNAIDS as children under the age of 15 who have lost their mother or both parents to 
AIDS. The number of AIDS orphans is set to rise as South Africa's high HIV prevalence 
rate among adults translates into a higher prevalence of AIDS and then AIDS deaths. 
UNAIDS estimates that at the end of 1999 there were around 371,000 living AIDS 
orphans in South Africa (UNAIDS, 1999), while 50,000 AIDS orphans have already died 
(presumably from AIDS but also other causes, as HIV-negative AIDS orphans have a 
higher mortality rate than non-orphans). The Metropolitan Life model estimates that by 
2005, there will be 920,000 AIDS orphans in South Africa, and by 2010, there will be 
roughly two million (Whiteside and Sunter, 2000). By contrast, according to the 1996 
census, the total number of motherless orphans 14 years and younger in the country was 
about 400,000. This figure is presumably inclusive of AIDS orphans of that time, but at 
any rate, the number of AIDS orphans will soon account for a very large increase in the 
total number of orphans in the country. Left untreated, adults who are infected with HIV 
develop symptoms of AIDS within 6 to 8 years, and most die within 10 years. Treating 
HIV to delay the onset of AIDS and opportunistic infections means a longer life, but in 
the absence of government support, this will generally be affordable only to those who 
are relatively wealthy. For everyone else, the economic effects of the infection will 
mainly occur when one develops AIDS, from which point the economic effects on the 
AIDS sufferer and his or her family can be devastating.  
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2.5 Measuring Poverty 
If measurement is the operationalisation of definitions, it follows that different definitions are 
measured by different measures. The measurement and analysis of poverty is important for 
several reasons among which are cognitive, that is to know what the situation is, and for 
analytical purposes, to understand the determining factors of this situation. Poverty measurement 
and analysis is crucial also for policymaking purposes in order to design interventions best 
adapted to the issues, for monitoring and evaluation purposes to assess the effectiveness of 
current policies and to determine whether there is appreciable change in the situation. 
 
One approach to measuring poverty is to define a minimally adequate standard of living in terms 
of a set of “basic needs” such as reasonably good health, adequate calorie intake, access to safe 
drinking water, enough schooling to attain functional literacy. One may even include non-
material components such as human rights and democratic political process.  
 
This multidimensional approach, while intuitively appealing, raises as many questions as it 
answers because many people have some of their minimal needs met, but not others, and it is not 
clear whether such people should be classified as poor. While one might argue that any person 
who does not attain the minimal level in all dimensions is poor, real-life situations quickly 
complicate this approach. For example, some people with high incomes may suffer from poor 
health, but one would not usually classify them as poor. Similarly, in some low-income families 
many children are clearly malnourished while other low-income families have well nourished 
children. In spite of this, in poverty analysis, certain basic steps have become quite standard 
(Hentschel and Lanjouw, 1996). First, households or individuals are ranked based on a welfare 
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indicator – usually income or expenditures. Second, a poverty line is selected which 
distinguishes the poor from the non-poor. The poor, identified in this way, are then finally 
examined closely through the construction of a poverty profile.  
 
Most empirical work on the distribution of welfare is done using either expenditure or income 
data recorded in household surveys (Glewwe, 1988). This is intuitively appealing and it is not 
necessary to review here the theoretical framework that allows one to draw the link between the 
income/expenditure distribution and the welfare distribution. 
 
The ‘standard of living’ concept can be either welfarist or non-welfarist. The welfarist approach 
typically emphasises expenditure on all goods and services consumed, including consumption of 
home production valued at appropriate prices. By contrast, a common non-welfarist approach 
emphasises specific commodity forms of deprivation (Ravallion, 1992), usually inadequate food 
consumption. 
 
Either way, the standard of living of a household is normally taken to depend only on the 
consumption of market goods. Although the limitations of this approach are well-documented 
(Deaton and Muelbauer, 1980), the tasks in valuing access to public goods are enormous. It is 
therefore expedient for pragmatic reasons that current consumption or current income is used as 
the indicator of well-being.  In this study, poverty was measured along only one dimension, the 
per capita consumption expenditure. 
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Another methodological issue with respect to poverty measurement is how to account for the fact 
that some poor households have consumption levels only slightly below the poverty line, while 
others have much lower levels of consumption. The most common poverty indicator is the 
headcount measure, which measures the proportion of individuals living in households whose 
consumption levels falls below poverty line. This measure has the disadvantage of ignoring how 
far below the poverty line households fall. For example, if poor households became poorer over 
time while non-poor households remain non-poor, the headcount measure would not change, 
although intuitively one would think that poverty had worsened. 
  
One measure of poverty that overcomes the deficiency of the headcount ratio is the poverty gap3 
measure. This measure of poverty will show an increase in poverty if poor households become 
poorer while non-poor households remained non-poor. Yet even this poverty indicator has been 
criticised because it does not account for inequality in the gaps. The most common way to 
overcome this deficiency is to use the “squared poverty gap”, which simply squares the poverty 
gaps (and divides them by the square of the poverty line). In practice, these three indicators of 
poverty give similar results. In this study, all the three measures were used.  
 
Of all the poverty measure indices developed (Sen, 1976; Foster, 1984; Foster and Shorrocks, 
1988; Foster et al. 1984), only the Foster-Greer-Thorbecke (FGT) class of poverty measures is 
found to meet the basic axiomatic requirements, mainly, consistency and additive 
decomposability (see Foster et al. 1984). In addition, the poverty orderings correspond 
accurately to the α  degree stochastic dominance of partial orderings. For the three members of 
                                                 
3
 Defined as the average difference i.e. gap between the poverty line and the (per adult equivalent) consumption 
level of poor households divided by the poverty line. 
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the class αP measures (Foster and Shorrocks, 1988), interesting welfare interpretations of the 
poverty orderings can be generated.  
 
The poverty measure itself, according to Coudouel et al. (2002), is a statistical function that 
translates into one aggregate number for the population as a whole or a population subgroup the 
comparison of the indicator of household well-being and the chosen poverty line. Hence, the 
three measures of the Foster-Greer-Thorbecke (FGT) class of poverty described below are most 
commonly used among many alternative measures that exist.  
 
• Incidence of poverty (headcount index): This is the percentage of the population whose 
income or consumption is below the poverty line, that is, the share of the population that 
cannot afford to buy a basic basket of goods. Similarly, for non-monetary indicators the 
incidence of poverty measures the share of the population that does not reach the defined 
threshold (for instance, the percentage of the population with less than three years of 
education). 
 
• Depth of poverty (poverty gap): This provides information regarding how far households 
are from the poverty line. This measure captures the mean aggregate income or 
consumption deficit compared to the poverty line across the whole population. It is 
obtained by adding up all the deficits of the poor and dividing the total by the population. 
In other words, it estimates the total resources needed to bring all the poor to the level of 
the poverty line (divided by the number of individuals in the population). For non-
monetary indicators this measure can also be used, if the measure of the distance is 
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meaningful. The poverty gap in education could be the number of years of education 
needed or required to reach a defined threshold. The limitation of this measure is that it is 
not quantifiable in some cases, for example, when binary indicators such as literacy are 
used, in which case only the concept of the headcount can be used. The poverty gap can 
be used as a measure of the minimum amount of resources necessary to eradicate 
poverty.  This is the amount under perfect targeting (that is, each poor person getting 
exactly the amount he/she needs to be lifted out of poverty) that  would be needed to be 
transfer to the poor in order to bring them all out of poverty. 
 
• Poverty severity (squared poverty gap). This takes into account both the distance 
separating the poor from the poverty line (the poverty gap), and the inequality among the 
poor. That is, a higher weight is placed on those households further away from the 
poverty line. 
 
For the poverty gap measure, limitations apply for some of the non-monetary indicators. In the 
case of the headcount index, all of these measures can be calculated on a household basis, that is, 
by assessing the share of households that are below the poverty line. However, it might be better 
in order to take into account the number of individuals within each household, to estimate the 
measures on a population basis, i.e. in terms of individuals. 
 
Important complements of the incidence of poverty are the measures of depth and severity of 
poverty. It might happen that some groups have a high poverty incidence but low poverty gap, 
especially when large members of the population are just below the poverty line. While other 
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groups have a low poverty incidence but a high poverty gap for those who are poor, when 
relatively few members are below the poverty line but with extremely low levels of consumption 
or income. 
 
Mostly important for the evaluation of programmes and policies is the measure of depth and 
severity of poverty. A program might be very effective at reducing the incidence of poverty, that 
is, the number of poor but might do so only by lifting those who were closest to the poverty line 
out of poverty (low impact on the poverty gap). Other interventions might better deal with the 
situation of the very poor but have a low impact on the overall incidence if it only brings the very 
poor closer but not above to the poverty line.  
 
2.6 Consumption as a Measure of Poverty 
This approach, as an indicator of poverty and welfare, has gained wide popularity in the last two 
decades (see Timmer et al., 1983; Nicholson, 1987; Annad and Harris, 1990). Empirical findings 
on nutritional deprivation and hunger have created the belief that households would typically 
give priority to food in its consumption allocation. Hence, the expenditure on food may be a 
better guide to a households’ overall economic solvency and opulence than more variable 
indicators. 
   
According to Deaton and Case (1988), in order to measure material welfare it is necessary to 
measure what and how much individuals consume. Accordingly, a person’s standard of living is 
taken to depend on current consumption of privately supplied goods (e.g. crops) from own 
production and the imputed rents from owner-occupied housing. The conventional approach of 
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ignoring the consumption of public goods and the value of leisure time (Ravallion, 1992), was 
followed in this dissertation.  
 
Empirical work on the distribution of welfare is sometimes undertaken using income data 
(Glewwe, 1988). There are several conceptual and pragmatic reasons for preferring private 
consumption expenditure to income as a measure of well-being. The most important of these 
reasons is that expenditure is usually more reliably reported and more stable than income, 
especially among the poor (Ravallion, 1992).  
 
The choice of consumption based rather than an income-based measure of household welfare is 
motivated by the fact that income can be viewed as a measure of welfare opportunity or a 
measure of potential welfare. On the other hand, consumption can be interpreted as a realised 
welfare or a measure of welfare achievement (Hentschel and Lanjouw, 1996; Atkinson, 1989). 
Since realised rather than potential welfare is concerned, consumption is arguably a more 
appropriate indicator.   
 
Coudouel et al. (2002) posited that consumption would be a better (or analysts preferred) 
monetary indicator of poverty (given that the information obtained from a household survey is 
detailed enough on consumption) for the following reasons: 
 
• Consumption is a better outcome indicator than income. It is more closely related to a 
person’s well-being in the sense defined above, that is, of having enough to meet current 
basic needs is his actual consumption. On the other hand, one of the elements that will 
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allow consumption of goods is income; others include questions of access and 
availability. 
 
• Consumption may be better measured than income. In poor agrarian economies, 
according to the harvest cycle, incomes for rural households may fluctuate during the 
year. Income flows also may be erratic in urban economies with large informal sectors. 
This makes it potentially difficult for households to recall their income correctly, as such; 
the information on income derived from the household survey could be of low quality. 
An additional difficulty in estimating income in agrarian economies consists in excluding 
the inputs purchased for agricultural production from the farmer’s revenues. Finally, if 
households consume their own production or exchange it for other goods, large shares of 
these incomes are not monetized, and it might be difficult to price these. Difficulties also 
exist in estimating consumption, but it could be more reliable if the consumption 
component in the household survey is well structured. 
 
• Consumption may be a better reflection of a household’s actual standard of living and its 
ability to meet basic needs. Consumption expenditure is not only a reflection of the goods 
and services that a household can purchase based on its current income, but also on its 
ability to access credit markets or household savings at times when current income is low 
or even negative, perhaps due to seasonal variation, harvest failure, or other conditions 
that cause income to fluctuate widely. 
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Some advantages of the use of income however are cited by Coudouel et al. (2002). According 
to them, a distinction can be made between sources of income, if poverty is measured by income. 
When such distinctions are made, income becomes easily compared with data from other 
sources, such as wages, this provides a check on the quality of data in the household survey. 
Finally, consumption or expenditure data might not be collected for some surveys. It is usually 
important to combine information provided at the household or individual level for many sources 
of income or consumption in the survey whether one chooses income or consumption. 
 
In this dissertation, the international norm of using material well-being or “standard of living” as 
the welfare indicator (Hentschel and Lanjouw, 1996) was conformed to and the lead of World 
Bank in defining poverty as “the inability to attain a minimal standard of living” measured in 
terms of basic consumption needs (World Bank, 1990) was also followed. 
 
2.7 Poverty Line 
An acceptable poverty line is the second condition next to the derivation of real household per 
capita expenditures required to estimate poverty and welfare indicators. A poverty line is ideally 
a level of income or expenditures required to satisfy a minimum level of consumption basket of 
goods and services that is thought an individual should be able to purchase to be considered non-
poor. A poverty line is country specific and this level of income or expenditure varies from one 
country to another. Irrespective of countries, households or individuals with per capita income 
falling below this line are considered poor, however; and households with per capita income 
above this line are considered non-poor. 
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The most commonly used approach to setting poverty lines is the budget standards or minimum 
needs approach. This involves the determination of minimum quantity of various needs or its 
money equivalents. This is often referred to as the “cost of basic needs” approach (Ravallion and 
Lokshin, 2006). 
 
Since poverty lines are cut-off points separating the poor and non-poor, there are two main ways 
of setting poverty lines, such as the relative and absolute poverty lines. Relative poverty line is 
defined as a proportion of sufficient statistics; generally either the mean or median of total 
adjusted aggregate income. Hence, this line is variable over time and across space. In absolute 
poverty line, the poverty threshold is established as the income level at which households are 
able to purchase essential food and non-food items, including social services. This poverty line is 
fixed in terms of living standards indicator, and over the entire domain of poverty comparison 
(Ravallion, 1998). 
 
2.8 Overview of Analyses of Poverty in South Africa 
There have been peculiar difficulties pertaining to comparative data in South Africa, due to the 
fact that, prior to 1994 a number of regions in South Africa – largely the poorest areas – were 
classified as ‘independent homelands’ and therefore excluded from the country’s main dataset. 
Consequently, this has, as expected, led to the unsettled debate on whether poverty has increased 
or not in South Africa since 1994 in particular. Researchers and analysts are thus faced with a 
dearth of data and methodological inadequacies, although attempts were made to get an accurate 
picture of the transformation of the South African society, as it is possible. The overview in this 
section will focus on the event of the 1990’s onwards. 
50 
 
 
2.8.1  Early 1990s 
One of earlier contributions to the understanding of poverty in post-apartheid South African 
society was the Poverty and Inequality in South Africa Report (May 1998). It has been argued 
that, compared to other post-1994 studies of poverty, May (1998) examined the poverty issue in 
a comprehensive manner. Prior to that, there was a report titled Key Indicators of Poverty in 
South Africa (Ministry in the Office of the President, 1994). The Key Indicators of Poverty in 
South Africa study estimated the extent of poverty in South Africa in the early1990s (see for 
example Table 2.1). 
 
Table 2.1 Comparison of Selected Poverty lines for South Africa in 1993 
Types of Poverty Lines Rand 
Amount/month 
Cut-off 
Percentage of 
Population below 
the poverty line 
1. Population cut-offs at the: 
    40th percentile of household (in adult 
equivalent) 
    20th percentile of household (in adult 
equivalent) 
 
301,1 
 
177,6 
 
52,8 
 
28,8 
2. Minimum per capita adult caloric intake (at 2  
000 Kcal per day) 
 
143,2 
 
39,3 
3. Minimum per capita adult-equivalent caloric 
     intake (at 2 500  Kcal per day) 
 
185,5 
 
42,3 
4. Minimum and supplemental living levels per 
    capita set by the Bureau of Market Research, 
    (UNISA): 
    Supplemental Living Level (SLL)    
    Minimum Living Level (MLL)   
 
 
 
220,1 
164,2 
 
 
 
56,7 
44,7 
5. Per adult equivalent Household subsistence 
Level (HSL) set by the Institute of Planning 
Research (Nelson Mandela Metropolitan 
University, PE) 
 
251,1 
 
 
36,2 
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There are other reports and documents on poverty in South Africa, which have been central in 
directing policies in government. Everatt (2003) contends that the most common feature of these 
reports and documents is the inconsistency in the choice of poverty definition and measurement 
reflecting the ‘many meanings of poverty within government’. Among the earlier reports, that 
presents a relatively more comprehensive approach to understanding poverty in South Africa is 
that of  Measuring Poverty in South Africa (StatsSA, 2000). 
  
Before the Statistics South Africa report, there was the Committee of Inquiry Report  into a 
Comprehensive System of Social Security for South Africa (Taylor Commission, 2002), which 
approached poverty dynamics in South Africa from a legal and constitutional perspective, using 
the constitutional framework as the basis for understanding poverty and state intervention 
through social protection measures. Emphasis on socio-economic rights was clearly articulated 
and its importance when making policies is persuasive.  
 
2.8.2 The late 1990s and the recent Past 
There has been a growing body of research on poverty in South Africa showing levels of poverty 
and trends over time and more recently examining poverty dynamics in specific localities. 
Among these studies are those of Whiteford and Posel (1995), Woolard and Leibbrandt (2001), 
Budlender (1999), May et al., (1999), Roberts (2001), Bhorat et al., (2001), Meth and Dias 
(2004), Robeyns (2005), Hoogeveen and Özler (2006), Van der Berg et al., (2005; 2007), Bhorat 
et al., (2006; 2008) among others. Table 2.2 shows some of the recent measures of poverty used 
by these researchers.  
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As reported in South Africa’s Millennium Development Goals Country Report (2006), in terms 
of money-metric measures, according to Statistics South Africa, using national estimates of 
poverty in South Africa in 2000, 11 percent of people were living on less than US$1 a day and 
34 percent were living on less than US$ 2 a day. 
 
Table 2.2 Recent Measures of Poverty in South Africa  
 
 
Types of Poverty Lines 
 
 
Threshold in 2000 Rands 
Percentage of 
individuals below 
the poverty line 
(2000 IES) 
Poverty line set at per capita expenditure of the 
40th percentile of household. 
 
R346 per capita 
 
54,9 
StatsSA (as reported by Hoogeveen and Özler) 
lower bound 
 
R322 per capita 
 
52,6 
StatsSA (as reported by Hoogeveen and Özler) 
upper bound 
 
R593 per capita 
 
70,4 
Dollar a day – International poverty line of 
US$370 (1985 prices)  per capita per annum 
 
R81 per capita 
 
8,1 
Two dollar a day – International poverty line of 
US$370 (1985 prices)  per capita per annum 
 
R162 per capita  
 
27,0 
Poverty Line implied by the Old Age Pension 
means test for married person, assuming a 
household of 5 persons and no non-elderly 
income earners 
 
 
R454 per capita 
 
 
63,4 
Indigence line of R800 per household per month 
(in 2006 prices) 
R573 per household 11,7 
Indigence line of R2400 per household per 
month (in 2006 prices) 
R1720 per household 55,1 
 
Recently, there have been studies that show that poverty is declining in South Africa, although 
this is contestable. For instance, Bhorat et al., (2006) in analysing welfare shifts in the post-
apartheid period, showed that access to formal housing grew by 42 percent and 34 percent for 
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deciles 1 and 2 between 1993 and 2004, and 21 percent and 16 percent for deciles 3 and 4. 
Access to piped-water increased by 187 percent in decile 1 over this period, while the growth 
was 31 percent in the 4th decile. Access to electricity for lighting for the poorest households – 
those in decile 1 – grew by an extraordinary 578 percent. It seems obvious from their study that 
the delivery of basic services has been strongly pro-poor. Bhorat et al., (2006) also showed in 
their study that, while in 1993, 40 percent of all South African households were asset- (and 
service-) poor, by 2004 this figure had been almost halved to 22 percent.  
 
A study by Van der Berg et al., (2005) showed a decline in poverty in South Africa. The study 
showed that poverty had stabilised since the political transition and decreased since 2000. They 
used a poverty line set at R250 household income per month or R3 000 per year in 2000 Rands. 
They concluded that, while the proportion of people living in poverty increased during 1993-
2000, in more recent years, the proportion of poor people appears to have declined substantially 
– 18.5 million in 2000 to 15.4 million in 2004. Over the same period, the number of non-poor 
rose from 26.2 million in 2000 to 31 million in 2004.  
 
Van der Berg et al., (2005) also showed that per capita real incomes of individuals comprising 
the poorest two population quintiles rose by more than 30 percent during 2000-2004. In relation 
to this, they concluded that for all poverty lines ranging from R2 000 to R4 000 per capita 
income per annum, poverty decreased since about 2002 after a modest rise at the end of the 
previous decade. They argue that the impact of the recent expansion of social grants on the poor 
was likely to have been major, considering that real social assistance transfers from government 
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increased by some R22 billion during 2003-5 (in 2000 Rands), an amount well in excess of 
R1 000 per poor person.  
 
Lately, Bhorat et al., (2008), using poverty lines of R174 per person per month and of R322 per 
person per month, in 2000 prices concluded that during 1995-2005 both absolute and relative 
poverty have reduced. They also showed that both poverty lines and the poverty gap index 
declined. In particular, at R322 per person per month, money-metric poverty declined from 53 
percent in 1995 to 48 percent in 2005. At R174 per person per month, poverty declined from 
approximately 31 percent to 23 percent. Linked to this are improvements in job creation and 
social transfers to the most vulnerable. For instance, Van der Berg et al., (2007: 11) using the 
Labour Force Survey show that ‘approximately 1,7 million jobs were created between 1995 and 
2002 and 1,2 million between 2002 and 2006’. In relation to social transfers, the government 
records, according to Gumude (2008), suggested that almost 12,5 million South Africans 
received cash transfers, this excludes the social wage in terms of free basic water and electricity, 
subsidised housing and so on. 
 
2.9 Conclusion 
Poverty is one of the most important developmental challenges facing South Africa. Since the 
advent of democratic governance in 1994, considerable efforts have been undertaken to address 
poverty and to overcome inequality, but rather than abating, the incidence of poverty has 
continued to be on the increase, thus many households have sunk deeper into poverty. 
 
55 
 
The poverty being experienced in South Africa is pervasive and persistent as the situation is 
reaching an alarming rate. Despite the recognition of the importance of the rural dwellers to the 
national economy, they have continually been left in a counterproductive state. Rural people are 
not only isolated from economic opportunities like improved marketing facilities (storage, 
transportation and processing) for their product, they also tend to have less access to social 
services such as health, sanitation, education and infrastructural facilities like electricity and safe 
water supplies. The report of the South African Participatory Poverty Assessment (SA-PPA) 
showed deteriorating living and environmental conditions for the poor rural households. The 
food intake of the surveyed rural households indicated an extreme poverty situation, as high 
calorie food items such as “pap” (maize-meal) dominate the household’s nutritional types. There 
is generally low and inadequate provision of basic infrastructure such as energy, potable water, 
housing and transport in rural areas. In addition, the rural areas have restricted access to basic 
education and health facilities because of long distance to traverse to their locations in adjoining 
towns and inability to afford fees charged for them.  
 
The very first step at helping these poor households out of poverty is to understand the nature 
and extent of their poverty. Since the ultimate goal of development is to improve the quality of 
life of people, developing countries such as South Africa need to identify and implement poverty 
alleviating strategies and to assess the extent and depth of poverty. This is because, if effective 
policies to reduce households’ poverty are to be formulated and successively, implemented, more 
knowledge about the characteristics and determinants of poverty is crucial (Glewwe and Van der 
Gang, 1988; World Bank, 1990) 
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Microfinance has been enthusiastically championed as a promising tool for poverty alleviation 
and development all over the world. The next chapter explores the issue of microfinance in the 
South African context and the role micro-credit as an intervention for poverty alleviation. 
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  CHAPTER 3 
  MICROFINANCE AND POVERTY ALLEVIATION   
 
 
3.1 Introduction 
Microfinance programmes have been embraced all over the world, especially in developing 
countries as an important strategy for poverty alleviation. It has been demonstrated that the 
poverty alleviation impacts of microfinance services is evident in reaching the poor, lifting their 
economic well-being as well as empowering them, especially women (Ashe, 2000; Fisher and 
Sriram, 2002; Robinson, 2002; Simanowitz and Walter, 2002; Snodgrass and Sebstad, 2002; 
Khandker, 2005). Over the last decade, there has been substantial expansion both in terms of the 
number of institutions and in terms of the size of institutions in the field of microfinance. 
 
Microfinance, according to Kosiura (2001), is the provision of financial services to the poor who 
do not have access to capital and financial services. Latifee (2003) defined microcredit as 
programmes that are poverty focused, aimed at providing financial and business services to the 
very poor persons for generation of self-employment and income. A more precise definition 
describes microfinance as the provision of appropriate financial services to significant numbers 
of low-income, economically active people with an end objective to alleviate poverty 
(Ledgerwood, 1999). The financial services generally include one or any combination of the 
following: lending, savings, and payment services. Collectively, microfinance includes loans for 
businesses and personal use, savings and other deposit products or services a bank can offer to 
this market segment.  
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During the microcredit summit of 1997, the definition of microcredit that was adopted saw 
microcredit as programmes that extend small loans to very poor people for self-employment 
projects that generate income, allowing them to care for themselves and their families (UN, 
1995). Definitions differ, of course, from country to country. Some of the defining criteria used 
include: 
 
i) The loan size - loans are micro, or very small. 
ii) Target User - are micro entrepreneurs and low-income households. 
iii) Utilization - the use of funds is for income generation, and enterprise 
development, and for community use (health/education) etc.  
iv) Terms and conditions - most terms and conditions for microcredit loans are 
flexible and easy to understand, and suited to the local conditions of the 
community.   
 
The broader term microfinance grew out of microcredit, or loans directed to low-income and 
disadvantaged people who cannot get these services from commercial banks.  The microcredit 
programmes were initiated in the 1970s in Bangladesh and in Latin America, with the objective 
of providing the poor people with credit without collateral, alleviating poverty and unleashing 
human creativity and endeavour of poor people.  
 
It is group-based lending, which focused on small business lending for income-generating 
activities. Grameen Bank and SEWA Bank are two of the best-known microfinance 
organizations. Because of the success of these organizations, microcredit was incorporated into 
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many development programmes as a strategy for poverty alleviation.  Development institutions 
incorporated some level of microcredit or banking services into their programmes (Rutherford 
1998). 
 
This chapter explores a range of issues around microfinance and poverty alleviation. In section 2, 
the different paradigms of microfinance are presented, while section 3, the state of the financial 
sector in South Africa is presented. In Section 4, households’ financial services accessibility in 
South Africa is explored while section 5 reviews the major providers of financial services. 
Empirical evidence of the role of microcredit programmes in alleviating poverty of borrowing 
households are presented in the last section.  
 
3.2 Paradigms of Microfinance 
Microfinance Institutions (MFIs) include all types of entities that provide microfinance services.  
MFIs range from non-governmental organizations (NGOs) to regulated financial institutions 
such as non-bank financial institutions, commercial banks, credit unions and state banks 
(Christen and Drake, 2001). MFIs are generally guided and defined by two competing 
paradigms; these are financial self-sustainability and poverty alleviation.4 
 
The poverty alleviation approach (also referred to the welfarist approach) claims that the overall 
goals of microfinance should be poverty reduction and empowerment. Such MFIs are to a certain 
extent unequivocal in their focus on immediately improving the well-being of their clients. 
According to Woller et al. (2000), they have the objective of making their clients/participants 
                                                 
4
 Some researchers propose the third one: the feminist empowerment paradigm (e.g., Mayoux, 1998). For the 
purpose of this study, this paradigm is integrated into the poverty alleviation paradigm). 
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self-employed by targeting the poorer among the economically active poor, especially women, 
who are believed to be able to use the modest increases in their income and savings to empower 
themselves thereby improving their conditions of life and that of their children. 
 
Feminist empowerment authors also exist within this paradigm; they emphasise women’s 
economic, social and political empowerment. Although the role of  microfinance as an important 
way to respond to poor informal sector women workers’ immediate practical needs is 
acknowledged, it is seen as only part of a strategy for wider social and political empowerment of 
women which, in turn, is seen as crucial to sustained increases in income (Mayoux, 1998). 
Overall, those who follow the poverty alleviation approach are only interested in discussing the 
sustainability of organisations that target poverty. This view dominates among NGOs. Since their 
overall goal is poverty reduction, complementary services are often needed and integrated 
approaches are commonly applied. Some donor funding and subsidies may be needed because 
the availability of funds is the most binding constraint in expanding outreach and the supply of 
financial services to the poor. 
 
The financial self-sustainability approach (also referred to as the “profit” or financial systems or 
the institutionalist approach) largely sees the goal of microfinance as the provision of financial 
services to low-income people, but not to the poorest of the poor (Gulli, 1998). The services 
should not target exclusively the poorest, but the underserved, in general. According to Otero 
and Rhyne (1994), financial self-sufficiency is achieved when clients’ savings are used fully to 
finance the program and capital is raised from formal financial institutions at commercial rates. 
The real cost of funds, loan loss reserves, operations, inflation and profits are covered by fees 
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and interest income. The ultimate aim therefore, according to Mayoux, (1998), is programmes, 
which are profitable and fully self-supporting in competition with other private sector banking 
institutions, and rather than relying on funds from development agencies able to raise capital 
from international financial markets. Generally, those who deliver microfinance services as 
regulated financial institutions, such as commercial banks, fall under this approach. For 
microfinance institutions to achieve exponential growth, financial self-sustainability (profit) is 
seen as a necessary precondition. Without achieving financial sustainability, no amount of 
subsidy is adequate to maintain the enduring access of a large number of very poor clients to 
basic financial services (Christen and Drake 2001).  
 
As described above, the microfinance community is divided along two paradigms, i.e. between 
those who argue poverty alleviation is primary the goal for MFIs and those who argue that the 
priority is to achieve financial self-sustainability. However, a third paradigm has recently 
emerged. This paradigm promotes a “middle ground” or balancing the goals of poverty 
alleviation and financial self-sustainability (Christen, et al. 1995; Woller et al. 2000). They noted 
that if service delivery methods that meet client needs at an affordable rate are developed by 
institutions, then financial viability as well as poverty outreach could be achieved. This is 
eventually dependent on how interest rates are set; it has been revealed that charging full interest 
rates does not reduce client demand. Using a mathematical framework of maximization and 
constraints to determine the occurrence of tradeoffs, Rhyne (1998) showed that outreach or scale 
is only an objective and it is only through financial sustainability it can be achieved; and that the 
debate is not “either-or” but about degrees of emphasis and about what happens in the event of 
trade-offs. 
62 
 
3.3 The State of the Financial Sector in South Africa   
The South African financial sector presents an ideal case study in financial sector development. 
The country’s extreme income inequality is one of the most important variables confronting 
South African microfinance institutions. With Gross Domestic Product per capita around 
$13 300, South Africa is in the middle-income band globally, but this conceals vast variation in 
income distribution. South Africa’s Gini coefficient is about 0,65 which makes it one of the most 
unequal societies in the world (World Bank, 2000). 
 
According to Baumann (2004), the dualism of the South African economy is the chief cause and 
manifestation of its radical income inequality. There is coexistence of an economically 
‘advanced’ and globally integrated minority, black and white, often referred to as the ‘formal’ 
sector, with a dependent and a marginalised majority, almost entirely black, known as the 
‘informal’ sector. While the former enjoys a human development index comparable to Southern 
Europe, the informal sector lives in a level comparable to that in South Asia. 
 
There are both historical and structural perspectives to this dualism. Unlike peasantries 
elsewhere in Africa, South Africa’s rural poor lack access to basic means of production, such as 
land, because of unsettled issues of widespread settler dispossession. The rural poor live in 
crowded rural ‘villages’ squeezed between commercial farmland and tourist-oriented game 
reserves. South Africa’s manufacturing and retail sectors, the most advanced in Africa, have also 
contributed by relegating small-scale trading and manufacturing to the margins in the urban 
areas, thereby severely constraining the opportunities for self-employment in the urban areas 
(Baumann, 2004).  
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For South Africa’s poor, their survival is largely dependent on the output of the formal economy 
because of their lack of access to productive resources. The things that sustain and enhance life 
therefore are only available as commodities. The poor, however, are structurally excluded from 
access to the cash required to obtain these. One upshot of this state of affairs is poor household’s 
reliance on state transfer payments, such as pension, disability and childcare grants, and inter- 
and intra- household transfers. This is especially patent in rural areas. Another outcome is the 
high incidence of predatory economic crime (Baumann, 2004).   
 
Before 1994, the apartheid government supported financial sector policies that resulted in gross 
financial sector inefficiencies, developed within the context of inward looking policies designed 
to protect and benefit only the few. The financial sector was also highly concentrated on the 
wealthier individuals with limited competition allowed (Kirsten, 2006). Since the advent of 
democratic governance, however, the South African government has strived hard to promote the 
deepening of the financial market and the provision of a wide range of financial services to 
previously disadvantaged South Africans. This has resulted in the improvement of the Gini 
coefficient after the democratic elections of 1994. However, despite this decline, there has been a 
steep rise in unemployment and poorly paid employment, which has been motivated by industrial 
and trade policies intended to improve global competitiveness, and a macroeconomic policy 
enhancing low inflation and a small government deficit in order to attract foreign capital 
(Baumann, 2004). 
 
The provision of financial services to the rural households in South Africa therefore, has to be 
seen against the background of the past government’s intervention in the economy. This was 
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characterised by distorted financial policies and institutional impediments that have resulted in 
the dualism in the rural and broader financial sector, with only a few South Africans enjoying a 
highly modern and sophisticated financial system that serves to provide a full range of financial 
services at the expense of the majority (Mohane et al. 2000). 
 
One of the major issues in South Africa has been the lack of formal financial services including 
savings, loans, and insurance products to the poor. Due to the large number of people employed 
in the informal sector, there has been a heavy focus on microfinance. In South Africa, the 
responsibility for job creation has moved to individuals, by offering loans to individuals who 
have few options for higher paying, more sustainable formal sector employment. The 
government has shifted the responsibility to individuals instead of creating more jobs in South 
Africa. This came into full force during a neo-liberal policy change of the growth, employment 
and redistribution (GEAR) policy. The push for micro lending in many developing countries has 
just moved the focus to individuals. With a microloan, it is expected that these informal workers 
can make themselves economically productive and earn an income. Nevertheless, many of the 
structural problems are still in place in South Africa, like poor education systems and weak 
markets.   
 
South Africa has a sophisticated banking sector, but many people are denied access to formal 
banking services. Over 53 percent of the adult populations are excluded from formal banking 
services, which is an extremely high proportion compared to countries with similar banking 
systems. The country has a much larger banking system than other developing countries, but 
services have only been concentrated in the urban areas of the country, with limited participation 
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and enormous demand for financial services in the rural areas. One of the major causes is the 
high level of poverty and unemployment in South Africa, especially in the rural areas, which is 
one reason that many adults do not have bank accounts. One-third of the population that do not 
have bank accounts are the economically active individuals, meaning they earn an income and do 
not use formal banking products (savings accounts) to store and access their money. These 
“unbankable” are low-income individuals, 99 percent of who are black, and still disadvantaged 
in the post-apartheid era (FinScope, 2006; Kirsten, 2006). 
 
Historically, the “Big Four”5 banks in South Africa have taken a risk-averse model of lending 
and have not reached out to this group. Like most commercial banks, South African commercial 
financial institutions have seen the poor as unprofitable and too risky (Dallimore, 2003).  
Therefore, state development banks and non-commercial financial institutions have tried to 
supply financial services to this group, but have not fully met the low-income individuals 
banking needs. Recently under political pressure, new policies have been enacted providing 
incentives for the commercial banks to market products and services to the unbanked population 
in South Africa. For example, the Dedicated and Cooperatives Bank Bill is aimed at making 
banking services available in areas where (and to consumers to whom) such services have thus 
far not been readily available. In addition, to create an enabling environment for companies 
interested in entering the banking system by lowering entry requirements and prudential 
regulations as currently prescribed by the Banks Act (Mashiya, 2004). Regulation under the 
National Credit Bill Act of 2006, which specifies maximum interest rates and transaction fees 
that can be charged on credit arrangement and loans, and the Financial Sector Charter, allows for 
the creation of the Mzansi account. Unfortunately, the goals of the new legislation have not been 
                                                 
5
 ABSA, First National Bank, Nedbank and Standard Bank. 
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fully realized and growth in technological advances like ATMS and cell-phone banking may not 
be the best way to meet the very poor and unbankable population.  
 
Before 1994, the financial sector was concentrated highly on the richer individuals and there was 
limited competition in the market (Kirsten, 2006). This resulted in very limited opportunities for 
low-income South Africans to use banking services. Banks have limited access to the poor in 
terms of cost of products, location of services and types of products offered.  For the poor, bank 
accounts are very expensive (Baumann, 2004). In addition, banks have historically been too 
distant for the large proportion of South Africa’s population who live in semi-urban or rural 
areas. Banks and branches tend to be in urban areas, and transportation costs are high, so it was 
difficult for low-income individuals to use banking services. In addition, products have not been 
appropriate for the very poor. Deposit services are very costly and have high minimum balances 
so the poor seek banking products elsewhere.  
 
One of the major reasons of exclusion of the poor from banking products is because of 
information asymmetries. Accurate information helps lenders and borrowers make good 
decisions about finances. Poor people who do not have collateral or credit history may be seen as 
high risks to lenders. Most often, these borrowers lack assets that serve as collateral, have no 
relationship with the banks and are not employed in sectors that are attractive to the formal 
lenders. Due to the shut out factor from commercial banking services, the alternative MFIs and 
the informal market have been the option for low-income people to obtain credit. This imperfect 
information also leads to market failure, as the demand for banking products is much higher than 
supply of banking products to this sector. However, with the growth of new Mzansi accounts, 
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free savings accounts marketed to the poor, Akpan (2005) showed that there is no basis for the 
exclusion as there is high demand for banking products, and therefore, concludes that the growth 
of MFIs in South Africa is not a sign of financial sector growth but rather that of a market 
failure.   
 
3.4 Household Access to Financial Services in South Africa 
Over the last four years, the annual Fin Scope survey has examined the use and perceptions of 
the financial sector in South Africa, which provides information on financial service delivery. In 
2006, it was estimated that about 16 million people did not have a bank account, because many 
lack regular income or employment, and due to the prohibitive cost of bank accounts. In 
addition, many people work informally, and it is difficult to open a bank account without proof 
of employment. In the Fin Scope 2006 Survey, three categories of people were identified in 
terms of use banking products. These are the “formally included people” - who use products at a 
formal institution; “the informally served” - these use a burial society or smaller savings club 
exclusively, and the “financially excluded people” – who use neither of the products at a formal 
institution nor those of a burial society or smaller savings club and are therefore classified as the 
unbanked. The unbanked in South Africa share many of the same characteristics. Typically they 
are less educated, reside in townships, rural or peri-urban areas, they are black, lack a steady cash 
flow, and many have never had a bank account (FinScope 2006; Coetzee 2005). Most of these 
excluded people were disadvantaged because of apartheid, and their economic situation has not 
greatly improved in the post-Apartheid era (Kirsten, 2006).  
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The poor are in the low-income markets like microenterprise, small-scale farmers, domestic 
workers, day labourers, pensioners and others who receive government grants and who have 
been underserved by banks. They demand bank services but the supply of products from the 
formal banking sector has not met this demand. Banking services for low-income people may 
include loans for business and personal use, savings and deposit mechanisms, remittances and 
transfers, payment services, and insurance. Millions of South Africans share bank accounts with 
family members, as it is much cheaper to bank together (Akpan, 2005). Between 2005 and 2006, 
there has been an estimated 4,6 percent increase in the number of the banked population because 
of the growth in Mzansi6 accounts, savings accounts targeted to low-income individuals at 
commercial banks and ATM card usage. Consequently, the proportion of total banked adults in 
South Africa rose to 51 percent with 15,9 million people with bank accounts in 2005 (FinScope, 
2006).  
 
New legislation has opened banking up to competition and commercial banks now provide a 
wide range of financial services to previously disadvantaged South Africans. Many institutions 
offer banking services to low-income people, with each group having a different mission in why 
they should provide services to the poor, ranging from profit to philanthropic and what services 
they can offer.  
 
3.5 South African Financial Services Providers  
The key players in the financial service delivery in South Africa include the informal financial 
services - Stokvels, ROSCAs, and burial societies. South African government-regulated, state 
banks and wholesale financiers like Khula and the Eastern Cape Rural Finance Corporation 
                                                 
6
 Mzansi means South, see details on Mzansi accounts in section 3.6.2  
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(ECRFC), Private sector banks - “Big 4” large commercial banks and smaller banks. 
Microfinance Institutions - semi-commercial MFIs, NGOs, Co-operatives and the International 
banks. 
 
3.5.1 Informal services 
Because the demand of banking products has not been met in the formal sector, many people use 
informal banking services. In terms of savings, people use informal savings clubs, Stokvels or 
Rotating Savings and Credit Associations (ROSCAs). For credit purposes, many turn to the 
traditional moneylenders who can be expensive and exploitative, but they are the only option for 
many people (Baumann, 2002). Expensive loans from moneylenders may only exacerbate the 
situation of certain individuals by continuing a cycle of poverty.  These are debt traps for people 
with no savings option. 
 
Informal banking products are very popular.  According to Baumann (2002), Stokvels were used 
by 12 percent of South African population and about 3,6 million people are members of 
ROSCAs. Most of these people meet their savings goals with Stokvels. Typically, people save in 
these accounts for an emergency, for funeral costs or for food, while many other South Africans 
may invest in cattle or livestock (FinScope, 2006). For credit, family and friends are first point of 
call for loans. It is a positive experience for people to save money formally, as they are able to 
plan, especially if the products are inexpensive and geared towards low-income people. There 
are benefits in terms of liquidity and security, as a poor person cannot sell part of a cow, but 
could use a portion of savings. However, these informal services do not mobilize the best use of 
people’s savings as they are subject to market fluctuations. The cost of a cow could fluctuate or a 
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cow could even die, greatly increasing the risk of investing in cattle alone. In addition, actual 
cash saved at home is much more prone to theft, fire, flood or some other natural disaster. It is 
important to allow low-income people a choice of savings products whether it is with an 
informal group or at a commercial bank. A commercial bank does offer some advantage in terms 
of access and security. 
 
3.5.2 Microfinance Institutions 
There is a significant cash lending industry in South Africa comprising of microloan firms 
targeting short-term borrowers with unsecured loans, while non-governmental organization 
(NGO) based Microfinance Finance Institutions (MFIs) target the small, medium, and micro 
enterprises (SMMEs). According to Baumann (2004), the latter group targets SMMEs to 
facilitate entrepreneurial employment creation and economic growth instead of providing 
consumer loans.  If people want non-income generating loan they may need to go to one of the 
‘loan sharks’ for a microloan. Most of the NGO-based MFIs have a development mission and 
attempt to reach poorer clients, while the microloan firms generally do not have a philanthropic 
mission but only want to make a profit. 
 
One type of MFI is the village bank or linkage banking. Village banks address the needs of a 
group who utilize services from a formal bank as a group, with an NGO as an intermediary. 
These institutions were designed to mobilize savings in rural communities. The banks link rural 
communities with the formal financial sector.  They bring banking to rural areas and reduce cost 
of banking through group banking. They were exempted from the deposit-taking ban, by 
maintaining a relationship with a link bank (Schoombee, 2004). One specific village bank group 
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was the Financial Services Association, which had member village banks and gave start-up loans 
to new village banks. It went bankrupt in 2006 when they lost a funding agreement (Baumann, 
2004; Dallimore, 2003). There exist some inherent problems with linkage banking. It assumes 
clients want to keep accounts as group and this may cause a problem for clients who want to 
receive individual government grants, but there is no way to keep it separate in a group village 
bank account. Inexpensive individual accounts may be more helpful for people who receive 
grants from the government. 
 
Another type of MFI is the Savings and Credit Cooperatives League of South Africa (SACCOL), 
which was established by Savings and Cooperatives (SACCOs) and Credit Unions in South 
Africa as their national association. A SACCO is a democratic, unique member driven and a self-
help co-operative. Each SACCO is independent, owned, governed and managed by its members, 
who have a common bond, either working for the same employee, belonging to the same church, 
labour union, social fraternity or living/working in the same community. They are essentially 
formalised Stokvels, through registration and adoption of a formal governance structure. 
SACCOs are savings led and provide loans by proven ability to repay. They receive an 
exemption from restrictions on deposit taking. There are 28 SACCOs in South Africa with over 
12 000 members (Baumann, 2004).  
 
According to Baumann (2004), SACCO has R12 million in outstanding loans, 32 percent of 
which goes to housing, 8 percent into small business, and 37 percent for personal loans and 23 
percent for vehicle loans. However, as SACCOL is self-sustaining, it has been struggling to 
sustain growth, because of lack of capital to continue to be sustainable through growth. 
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Therefore SACCOLs cannot reach scales to meet the needs of all low-income South Africans 
(Baumann, 2004). 
 
3.5.3 Foreign and Commercial Banks 
There has been an increase in the number of foreign owned banks in South Africa.  Between 
1994 and 1999, foreign banks increased by about 50 percent (Kirsten, 2006), for example, 
Barclays Bank bought ABSA in 2005. The share of foreign banks will increase over time 
(Coetzee, 2005), which may be a problem for low-income clients if foreign banks do not have 
the best interests of the local community at heart, but are more profit oriented. With banks 
headquarters overseas, the bank may not be interested in the needs of South Africans, but more 
interested in their home client base. As the trend continues for large international banks to 
acquire smaller banks, products directed to the low-income South Africans, has been on the 
decline as ownership becomes moves from the local community.  
 
Commercial banks have the largest share of the microfinance market, but different types of 
financial services providers need to be permitted entry into the banking system. These will cater 
for local communities, by offering appropriate products that fit their needs as profit seeking 
entities, as commercial banks will never fully meet the need for financial services in South 
Africa.  
 
Government regulations lack some connection with the banking issues that poor populations 
face. For instance, access and usage are not synonymous as many more people have access to a 
product than those who choose to use it (FinScope, 2007). One of the major issues with the aims 
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of the Financial Sector Charter (FSC) and the Mzansi account is that it works to expand access 
and the usage of banking products, but many factors hinder access, like criteria that prohibit 
certain clients, distant service points, and expensive products. These are issues being addressed 
by the banking sector, but clients may not use a product because they may not be aware of its 
existence, how to use it, nor understand how it can help them (FinScope, 2007). These are more 
difficult issues to handle than simply expanding banking products.  
 
Even though banks have the largest share of the microfinance market, banks ability to reach out 
to the very poor individuals has been questioned. Banks typically focus on employed people 
only, while MFIs help self-employed or under employed people. At the commercial banks, loans 
are granted mostly to salary earners who pay for consumption needs, but may not be used to 
increase livelihoods for the lower-income earners. According to Baumann (2002), not all South 
Africans would want a bank account at the current cost and level of service. Bank fees are 
extremely high, and banks report that fee income is more important than interest income 
(Coetzee, 2005). To create products, the government and private sector need to understand poor 
savers, understanding how they manage their savings, how they pay for life cycle events, and if 
poor people can secure themselves against emergencies, get business finances, and pay for life 
cycle expenses (Baumann, 2002). According the FinScope (2006), one in five unbanked South 
African would not like a bank account, as they do not see how it would benefit them. 
 
Commercial banks hold the largest microloan portfolio and have the largest number of clients, 
far exceeding MFIs, NGOs or informal groups. The “Big Four” banks have a market share of 84 
percent in terms of assets (Schoombee, 2004). According to Akpan (2005), banks have the 
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largest share of the microfinance market and number of loans while Microfinance NGOs and 
MFIs, which give microloans, have the smallest share in terms of actual amount disbursed and 
number of loan recipients. According to DFID (2005), some MFIs cannot mobilize funds on a 
large scale or pool risks like large organizations. These MFIs only have limited coverage and 
cannot offer low cost banking products to as many people as commercial banks. In 2005 alone, 
according to Akpan (2005), banks provided over 1 million microloans, while MFIs and NGOs 
combined only provided 21 000 microloans.  
 
The informal sector does not reach the same scale as commercial banks in South Africa, but the 
emergence of South African micro lending sector and its considerable growth within a short 
period has had major implication for credit access by employed low-income individuals. The 
combined balances outstanding of all registered lenders totalled R15.2 billion at the end of 2002 
with a total clientele of 4.898 million. 2.7 million loans had been disbursed during 2002 totalling 
R3.03 billion. The total number of registered micro-lending institution was 6 798 (Micro 
Lending Industry Statistics, 2002) 
 
MFIs will never be able to reach the scale of commercial lenders and so will have a difficult time 
reaching the poorest and unbankable populations. MFIs have greater depth by targeting poorer 
households, but are likely to drift in their mission to serve poorer households as they may target 
better clients among the poor households. Even if they focus on the poorest segments of the 
population, MFIs may be unable to do so while remaining financially sustainable. In addition, 
MFIs only offer entrepreneurial loans to expand businesses and may not offer needed 
consumption loans or savings products (Baumann, 2004).  
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According to Moyo et al. (2002), 45 percent of microloans are used for emergency and 
consumption finance, 15 percent are education loans and 17 percent are housing loans. So they 
questioned the focus of the loans which are for employment creation and economic growth, and 
do not necessarily focus on poverty reduction, even when no jobs or growth is created from these 
entrepreneurial loans. Only a few lenders are strategically involved in social development and 
upliftment, with most providing only entrepreneurial loans (Moyo et al., 2002). Many MFIs 
receive subsidies to offer banking services as a type of development because they are not earning 
a profit, but becoming sustainable is very important, as it prevents hiding bad practices with 
ongoing subsidies.  In addition, the goal should be to extend banking services to the poor and 
excluded, so MFIs should be run well enough to get wholesale credit through groups like the 
South African Microfinance Apex Fund (SAMAF) and to be sustainable. It is clear that both 
commercial banks and MFIs have some specific issues in meeting the banking needs of the poor. 
 
Low-income South Africans use both informal and formal strategies to save money and improve 
their livelihood. As the unbanked is a heterogeneous group in South Africa, it is important to link 
people with the best products in terms of location, need, and income. Although the South African 
government is highly dependent on the financial market to provide financial services to the poor, 
many will still be underserved or un-served by the commercial sector. It may become too costly 
to provide commercial services in so many locations, so banks will depend on already 
established financial intermediaries like MFIs. Moreover, the technological advances at 
commercial banks aimed to serve the unbanked may not be appropriate for this population and so 
informal banking organizations will continue to thrive in South Africa. It is important that 
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policies should be geared towards including these players, even though their share of the market 
is much lower than the commercial banks. Appropriate banking products can help protect low-
income South Africans against economic shocks and carve a pathway out of poverty. 
 
The major providers of microfinance services in South Africa based on the type of entity, the 
product offered, their major clients and how the accounts are used, are presented in Table 3.1 
 
Table 3.1  Providers of Microfinance in South Africa 
Name of MFI Type of 
entity 
Products offered Charge 
fees? 
Main clients How accounts is 
used 
Stokvels, 
ROSCAs and 
burial societies 
Informal Small savings, 
loans and funeral 
cover 
No or 
nominal 
Low-income 
individuals 
School fees, 
household, 
emergencies 
Commercial 
Bank 
 Private/ 
Formal 
Savings and loan 
products 
Yes Variety  Household/business 
expenses 
Village Bank Informal/ 
Formal 
Small savings, 
loans and funeral 
cover 
Yes Rural, low-
income 
individuals 
Household/business 
expenses 
SACCOL Formal Small savings, 
loans and funeral 
cover 
Yes Low-income 
individuals 
Household/business 
expenses 
Foreign banks Private/ 
Formal 
Savings and loan 
products 
Yes Variety Household/business 
expenses 
ECRFC State Banks Savings Yes Rural, low-
income 
individuals 
Household/business 
expenses 
 
 
3.6 The Role of the South African Government to Transform the Financial Sector 
According to Kirsten (2006), prior to the first exemption notice issued in 1992, much of South 
African population people have been excluded from formal banking systems, and do not have 
legal access to formal credit. The Usury Act limited pricing and effectively restricted the product 
offering in the market. 
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As the government has taken a market-based approach for policy, the government has done more 
to facilitate and regulate rather than provide direct financial services (Kirsten, 2006). These 
policies which are in line with the capitalist neoliberal policies, which move the responsibility to 
the individual rather than to the government, while aiming at increasing lending for small 
businesses has not actually provided formal sector jobs (Akpan, 2005). 
 
One of the first pieces of legislation to provide more banking options to the poor was the 
Exemption to the 1968 Usury Act7, which allowed financial institutions to give small loans 
without interest rate restrictions. Micro lending increased dramatically as a result and 
disbursements reached nearly R15 million in 1999 and micro lenders created a separate, largely 
unregulated tier of credit provision to people on the fringes of the banking system, people who 
were unable to utilize many, if any, banking products (Kirsten, 2006). In 1999, the Micro 
Finance Regulatory Council (MFRC) was established after the government realized that the 1992 
exemption created an environment for abusive practices and high interest rates under the 1999 
Usury Act Exemption Notice, as part of the process of financial sector liberalisation. The 1999 
Exemption Notice makes it compulsory for all micro lender operations (those who extend credit 
up to a new maximum R10 000 at rates above the statutory cap) to register with the MFRC. The 
MFRC will supervise the operations of those institutions lending under its unrestricted interest 
rate window, in order to enable more effective consumer protection and regularisation of micro-
lender operations in a growing market. It became mandatory in 2002 for all providers of 
microfinance services to register with the National Loans Register (NLR), which is a database 
that records all loans disbursed by lenders registered with the MFRC.  
 
                                                 
7
 This Act limited finance charges on money lending transactions, credit transactions and leasing transactions. 
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The government also has wholesale financiers like Khula, which fund and start up the 
microfinance organizations.  Khula offer guarantee products to registered commercial banks and 
other private sector financial institutions with a risk sharing arrangement so Khula assumes some 
risk associated with lending to the small, medium and micro enterprises (SMME) community.  
MFIs then must use their own minimum standards for loans, with over R165 million having been 
channelled to SMMEs (Rogerson, 2004). These MFIs target historically disadvantaged 
communities, particularly women and semi-urban areas, with over 70 percent of loans given to 
women to help them start small businesses or expand existing ones (Akpan, 2005). Khula has 
received a lot of criticism because they have not built capacity or expanded outreach (Akpan, 
2005; Rogerson, 2004). In 2005, the government created the South African Microfinance Apex 
Fund (SAMAF) to replace Khula, with the mandate to address poverty and unemployment 
through the provision of affordable access to financial services, institutional and client capacity 
building and savings mobilization through co-operatives and other indigenous formations such as 
burial societies and Stokvels. The failure of Khula is an example of how lending may not be 
effective without structural change. 
 
South Africa had several state government funding agencies like the Land Bank, Eastern Cape 
Rural Finance Corporation (ECRFC) and the Ithala in KwaZulu-Natal, which functions as a 
thoroughfare for government funding for economic development and small, medium, and 
microenterprises (SMMEs). These agencies are often self-sustaining, but as parastatals, they are 
required to carry out government programmes without the input of the corporation, which may 
cause a disconnection between clients and the bank organization. 
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3.6.1 Financial Sector Charter 
The Financial Sector Charter was launched in 2003. The Charter embodies an agreement among 
major players in the financial sector, such as the banks, insurance companies, brokers and 
exchanges, on a set of service provision and empowerment targets in such areas as banking 
services to low income populations, black empowerment and ownership in the financial sector, 
and support for black entrepreneurship.  The South African Banking Council was threatened with 
a government mandated charter, so it negotiated a voluntary affirmative action charter on a set of 
principles for the financial services sector, which was included as part of the Broad Based Black 
Economic Empowerment (BEE) Act. The Banking Council represents all foreign, retail, 
merchant, investment, and commercial banks in South Africa. Under the Charter, all financial 
service providers are expected to pursue these targets, to report periodically on their progress to a 
monitoring body set up under the Charter, and to be graded on their performance in form of a 
public score card. The “Big Four” commercial banks and other financial institutions committed 
to redress inequalities from apartheid, strive to provide access to affordable banking by 2008 to 
80 percent of the poorest 60 percent of the population (Kirsten, 2006). Some of the commitments 
include improving access to financial services for low-income communities, increasing 
investment in low income housing, small and medium black owned-enterprise, agriculture and 
transformational infrastructure; increasing funding for BEE transaction financing, accelerating 
employment equity and skills development within the sector, increasing procurement from BEE-
accredited enterprises, and achieving BEE ownership and control targets (Banking Council 
Update, 2005). All financial institutions are expected to pursue the target, and if targets are met, 
over 8 million people will move from unbanked to banked, or from using no banking products to 
using some banking products, formal or informal (Kirsten, 2006).   
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3.6.2 Mzansi Bank Account 
Mzansi accounts were created after the Financial Sector Charter as first order bank accounts that 
provide entry-level banking services. The aim was to provide affordable and accessible banking 
to the previously unbanked population because of the prohibitive cost of accounts or because 
banks were too far away. This account allows people to save their money in a safe account, 
which can be easily turned into cash. Banks have acknowledged the exclusion to banking 
products many low-income people experienced, by targeting this group and creating Mzansi 
accounts (Akpan, 2005).  According to the Banking Council Update (2005), banks do not plan to 
make a profit, but instead plan to sell more banking products to those people, and eventually 
break even. So they may not plan to make a profit from the Mzansi accounts, they do hope these 
clients will buy credit eventually, and that they can earn a profit from them. If banks plan to 
make a profit, it is hoped that there will not be predatory lenders and that decisions for lending 
will be made with profit and the good of the client in mind. The banks involved are the South 
Africa’s major retail banks - ABSA, FNB, Nedbank, Standard Bank and Post Bank.   
 
The Mzansi accounts have made a significant impact for many unbanked people in South Africa. 
Over 9 000 accounts are opened everyday (Preuss, 2005), with over 2 million accounts as of year 
2005 (Banking Council Update, 2005). Over 90 percent of those who open the accounts did not 
have accounts before and with over 56 percent of the accounts opened by women with average 
account balance of R300, about $50 (Kirsten, 2006). Majority of bank holders are between 25 
and 54 years old and with largest take up from black communities (Banking Council Update, 
2005). The group of people that are using the Mzansi accounts shows it suits the unbanked 
population in South Africa and redressing their exclusion from banking products.  The growth of 
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Mzansi account puts South Africa on target with other developing countries such as Bangladesh, 
Malaysia, Indonesia, India, Ghana and Nigeria, to offer banking products to low-income 
individuals (Preuss, 2005).   
 
This change to make banking cheaper and more accessible has made a significant impact on the 
number of people using banking products in South Africa. According to FinScope (2006), there 
has been an increase in the banked population by 11 percent and the use of ATMs and Mzansi 
accounts has increased. Although perceptions are positive, as it is seen as an affordable option, 
there is the feeling that it is a poor man’s account. The FinScope 2006 annual report also states 
that usage of bank products is still very low, and in fact, most poor people choose informal 
financial services over formal services to save. Generally, there have been some successes with 
banking products but the products and technology have not reached as many people as expected.   
 
3.6.3 Legal and Regulatory Interventions 
Three different pieces of legislation will most directly affect the structure and market response in 
the South African financial services arena, are namely Dedicated Banks Bill, the Cooperative 
Banks Bill and the National Credit Act. These initiatives are expected to deepen the financial 
sector. They are discussed below. 
   
a) Dedicated Banks Bill and Cooperatives Banks Bill 
This is a banking regulatory framework, proposed by the South African National Treasury, 
which seeks to create a tiered structure, making way for a new class of low-cost banking 
institutions focused on providing retail financial services to clients currently not serviced 
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through products provided by the commercial banks. The second tier banks would be 
commercial banks with banking licenses that allow for restricted banking services (dedicated 
banks) and the third tier would be member-based deposit-taking financial services 
cooperatives and credit unions (cooperative banks).  
 
The Dedicated Banks Bill seeks to create a second tier of commercial banks. These banks 
will be sub-divided into Saving Banks and Saving and Loan Banks. A Saving Bank will be 
required to maintain minimum qualifying capital and unimpaired reserved funds of R10 
million, while the Savings and Loans Bank will be required to maintain R50 million of the 
same capital and reserved fund. 
 
These banks will be allowed to take deposits from the public. Presently, regulations only 
allow banks to accept deposits, but a financial institution in a rural area might have products 
that fit better with the community. This will allow micro-lenders and smaller niche banks to 
provide a wider variety of products to low-income people, with depositors to have the same 
safety and stability as at formal banks (Coetzee, 2005).  This is important because the focus 
has only been to give low-income people loans, while little attention is on how the poor can 
save for investments purposes to improve their well-being. 
 
They will also be allowed to provide secured loans and limited unsecured loans. Their 
investment will be restricted to liquid assets (Government Bonds, Treasury Bills). In the 
event, they need to take on a riskier investment (and on unsecured loans) they will be 
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required to maintain the prescribed first-tier, unencumbered capital against such risk-
weighted exposure. 
 
This bill would also allow many new entrants including retailers like Pick and Pay, telephone 
companies, micro-lenders, non-bank financial institutions, small niche banks, and Post Bank.  
These groups have strong brands, large and loyal client bases, many branches, and flexible 
trading hours (Coetzee, 2005).  With many choices for making deposits, it would be very 
easy for many previously unbankable individuals to become bankable.  
 
The Cooperative Banks Bill seeks to formalise the cooperative banking industry by affording 
a legal standing in its operation. Secondly, it seeks to bring the industry into the regulatory 
framework to afford its depositors the same safety and stability as enjoyed by the formal 
commercial bank’s depositors. Thirdly, the Bill provides for the creation of support 
organisations for the cooperative banks in order to ensure a continuous and sustainable 
capacity programme for the industry. This is necessary to ensure the growth and stability of 
the industry. Cooperative (village) banks are member-based financial institutions that 
currently operate under exemption from the Banks Act. The Cooperatives Banks Bill would 
place fewer burdens on the capital and entry requirements for the industry. 
 
b) National Credit Act  
The National Credit Act seeks to promote a fair and non-discriminatory marketplace for 
access to consumer credit and regulate how credit is given. This bill was passed into law on 
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June 1, 2006 replacing the Usury Act (which governs money lending transactions), and the 
exemptions to the Usury Act.  
 
According to Kirsten (2006), a review of credit laws had found that interest rate caps 
contained in the previous Usury Act (1969), the exemption notices thereof and Credit 
Agreements Act (1980) have not been effective in protecting consumers. Credit allocation 
has been distorted to the detriment of low-income clients. Misleading disclosure, anti-
competitive practices and very high cost of credit had subsequently undermined the potential 
benefit for access to credit. The problems in micro lending industry are also largely an 
indication of the failure of the banking sector to meet the needs of low-income earners. 
Consequently, the Department of Trade and Industry (dti) has thus introduced the National 
Credit Act, as a strategy that would allow the credit market to function in a robust and 
effective manner. 
 
Historically, consumers have been subjected to high cost of credit and exploitative practices 
by non-reputable credit providers. The legislation focuses on consumer interest as the 
government seeks to redress imbalances in the South African consumer credit market and 
aims to create a more efficient market in which all South Africans will be able to have access 
to credit at affordable rates. 
 
The National Credit Act aims to regulate the granting of consumer credit by all providers, 
including micro lenders, banks and retailers. This new legislative framework would create 
formal bodies referred to as the National Credit Regulator and the National Consumer 
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Tribunal, which will play a vital role in ensuring enforcement, promotion of access to redress 
and adjudicate contraventions of the Act. Other aspects include general regulation of 
consumer credit, promotion of BEE within the consumer credit industry, promotion of 
responsible credit granting, and stopping prohibitive reckless credit granting, as well as 
establishing norms and standards for credit (Banking Council Update, 2005). This is 
important for protecting the consumer’s rights from predatory lending and expensive fees. 
 
3.6.4 Private Sector Initiatives 
Banks were attracted to the concept of providing banking products to low-income people after 
witnessing the large numbers of people using informal services and at institutions with a 
development mission like the ECRFC. Banks realized that this was an untapped group and 
reformed microfinance practices, which had been pioneered by NGO’s (DFID, 2005).  Although 
they may have some altruistic reasons for getting into micro lending, banks realise that it is 
profitable to provide banking services to low-income people. Banks may be more interested in 
the profit margin than in helping the community. 
 
After the restrictions on interest rates were lifted, over 3 500 micro lenders disbursed loans to 
low-income people (Schoombee, 2004). From this growth, it was evident that banks could 
achieve full cost recovery and a market return, hence a business incentive to serve this sector 
(DFID, 2005; Schoombee, 2004). In South Africa, on a sustainable basis, the low-income people 
are seen as untapped market, due to the high numbers in low-income employment (FinScope, 
2006). The contribution to the GDP of small businesses and microenterprises is small in South 
Africa, but this sector employs a significant number of people. Furthermore, as traditional 
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markets shrink and become more competitive, banks need to diversify their customer base, as 
there seem to be profit-driven reasons for investing in the poor rather than for the benefit of the 
poor.   
 
According to Coetzee (2005), the “big 4” had more than 31,2 million retail accounts in 2005, 
which are expected to grow to 35,4 million in 2008. The physical location of these banks is 
important to meeting geographic aspects of the FSC. The number of branches and ATMs will 
grow by 15,5 percent in 2008, in line with FSC to provide first order retail products and services. 
Existing rural branches will be regional service hubs, and mini branches with longer trading 
hours will be created to compete with retailers (Coetzee, 2005).  
 
Technology will play a major part in making banking more accessible. New technology has been 
introduced including mobile phone banking, e-banking, and self-service terminals, which are the 
cheapest for banks, rather than building a new branch. As cell phones have become more 
popular, banks have pushed for cell-phone banking, where one can pay bills, check account 
information and transfer money on their cell phone. However, cell-phone banking, internet and 
self-service banking may exclude some clients because the technology may be confusing or 
difficult to use, and some clients are not even aware that it exists or trust the technology 
(FinScope, 2006).  
 
3.7 The New South African Development Finance System 
In order to correct the perceived market and government failures as well as the political and 
socio-economic imbalances of the past, the new democratic government, which came into place 
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after the fall of the apartheid regime, has restructured the South Africa development finance 
system (DFS) to reflect the new policy orientations of the ANC-led government (Murray, 1999). 
According to Murray (1999), this has led to the closure of some development finance 
institutions, for example, the South Africa Housing Trust and the Local Authorities Loan Funds. 
The restructuring and transformation of others like the Land Bank, Industrial Development 
Corporation and the Development Bank of Southern Africa (DBSA) and the setting up of others, 
such as the National Housing Finance Corporation (NHFC) and the Khula Finance Enterprise 
Corporation (KFEC). In addition, the government also established the National Development 
Agency with the Transitional National Development Trust as its forerunner to channel funds to 
non-governmental and community based organisations.  
 
In order to avoid duplication of duties and spending, the new development finance system was 
reorganised in such a way that each institution finances its own niche market. The DBSA with 
infrastructure development; IDC with industrial development; NHFC with housing; Land Bank 
with agriculture, land reform and rural development and the KEFC with small, medium and 
microenterprise development. There also exist a number of provincial development corporations, 
mostly former homeland corporation, such as the Eastern Cape Rural Finance Corporation 
(ECRFC) and the Ithala Development Finance Corporation in KwaZulu-Natal. To date there has 
been little progress in transforming these corporations, with no national regulatory framework in 
place. According to Murray (1999), the future of these corporations and their role in the 
development finance system remains uncertain.  
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The extent of the intervention has varied from direct steps to increase or supplant credit provided 
by the private sector to indirect measures aimed at improving the policy environment (for, 
example, by addressing incentive problems and regulating financial intermediaries). In South 
Africa, the supply led approach to rural finance is still the lead for most of the government 
interventions. According to Spio (2006), one prominent feature of the South African DFS is the 
lack of a healthy partnership between the government and the private sector organizations. 
Generally, the interventionist credit programmes have had a limited outreach - in terms of both 
location and services offered, and resulted in high costs, with little or no identifiable impact at 
the small-scale farm level.  
 
In 1995 and 1996, the access of rural inhabitants to rural financial services was investigated by 
the Strauss Commission of Inquiry. The new government and financial institutions were 
instrumental in the formulation of policies aimed at addressing the imbalances and deficiencies 
of previous policies, which culminated in the establishment of the Strauss Commission to 
investigate and make recommendations to the government on the South African rural financial 
markets. The Strauss Commission (1996) put forward a number of proposals, some of which 
attended to the access problem and the expansion of retail financial services in the provinces. 
The responsibility at the national level for providing capital and support to provincial level 
institutions, are also addressed in some of the proposals. Other sets of proposals aimed at 
structuring support for rural finance retail institutions at the national level in the form of the Land 
Bank. 
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The supply-led system of rural credit was rejected by the Strauss Commission.  The Commission 
placed more emphasis on a broad range of services that should be made accessible within a 
demand driven system. The importance of a retail network in rural areas in achieving access to 
these services was further emphasized. The Commission also stressed the importance of 
subsidies, but suggested that, they should be the implemented within strict rules and be finite in 
nature. Coetzee (1997) has documented detailed discussion on the report 
 
According to Spio (2006), the report of the Strauss Commission provided a broad framework and 
a paradigm shift away from a supply-led approach. The implementation of this framework 
requires a realistic approach based on objectives to increase sustainability of institutions, while at 
the same time ensuring a development impact and as wide as possible outreach. Spio (2006) 
specifically points to the functions of the DFS, which include: 
 
i) obtain and channel finance at relatively favourable terms from international and local 
markets; 
ii) serve as a conduit  for international donor finance and grants from the state budget; 
iii) create a credit-risk analysis capacity and project appraisal; 
iv) generate private sector investment; 
v) build up core expertise; and 
vi) resource allocation in a manner that promotes overall socio-economic objectives. 
 
However, Coetzee (1997) had suggested that institutions at both the retail and wholesale levels 
must fulfil certain requirements for the new DFS to achieve the desired impact. These broad 
requirements include: 
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i) Development/outreach capacity – This refers to resources of adequate scope and 
quality to execute the development objectives of the institutions. For financial 
institutions, they should have the ability to reach a large proportion of the total 
market in the rural areas of operation, while still being sustainable (Gurgand et al., 
1996). 
ii) Full financial self-sufficiency - This is an essential prerequisite for making financial 
services widely available to demanding clients. It is necessary that institutions be 
structured and financed in such a way that sustainability is achieved in the longer 
term. According to Spio and Groenwald (1998), a three-stage process could be 
adopted to move these institutions towards the commercialisation of institutions. The 
first step is to develop a cost-covering operation focusing primarily on lending; the 
second step begins with the expansion of savings mobilization; and the third step is 
to move to full independence when concessional sources of finance are longer used 
and the institution becomes a genuine financial institution. 
 
In order to achieve the stated objectives above, Coetzee (1997) listed some issues, which need to 
be well thought-out. Firstly, is the need for government to concentrate on establishing a 
favourable policy environment that facilitates the smooth running of rural financial markets 
while playing a limited but efficient role in the direct provision of rural financial services. 
Secondly, in order to serve the needs of the reconstruction and development process, efforts 
should be geared towards capacity building of existing institutions, as well as transforming the 
existing institutional structures. In addition, because of the dynamic nature of developments in 
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South Africa, he suggested that the spirit of flexibility should be an integral part to both the 
application of sectorally and geographically based proposals on development funding and to the 
eventual functioning of the Development Finance System.  
 
Thirdly, the need to minimize both systemic and institutional risk was also highlighted. 
According to Coetzee (1997), development finance institutions should preferably be structured to 
accommodate the spreading of risk over different types of clients, over different sectors and over 
different geographical areas, in order to promote the stability of the Development Finance 
System. The importance of sound management information systems for minimizing institutional 
risk was also stressed. Fourthly, the need for the Development Finance System to be able to 
mobilize funds at the lowest cost is essential. The nature of the national development financial 
institutions should therefore allow for the most appropriate and low-cost deposit and financing 
options. Lastly, he suggested that the coordination of investment to achieve development should 
be applicable at all levels, including the policy, strategic planning and budgeting, and operational 
levels. 
 
3.8 The Role of Credit in Development and Poverty Alleviation 
There is a major challenge of reducing poverty facing the world today. It has been estimated that 
2,8 billion of the world’s 6 billion people, live on less than $2 a day and 1,2 billion on less than a 
dollar a day. Of these 1,2 billion, 22,8 million are estimated to live in South Africa (HSRC, 
2004). Credit in a developing country context, is an important instrument for improving the 
welfare of the poor directly, most especially for consumption smoothing that reduces their 
vulnerability to short-term income shocks (Binswanger and Khandker, 1995; Heidhues, 1995; 
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Nwanna, 1995). It could also enhance productive capacity through financing investment by the 
poor in their human and physical capital. An investigation of household credit thus has 
implications that link together micro-level analysis with factors that determine long-term macro-
economic performance. 
 
According to Okurut et al. (2005), the demand for credit for productive investments usually 
comes from those poor who are less risk-averse and enables them to overcome liquidity 
constraints, making it possible to undertake investment that can boost production, employment 
and income. Credit for consumption purposes can have a long-term positive impact on household 
productivity, allowing acquisition of skills or improvement in health status if such loans are used 
for education or health care. These may enhance or at least preserve the productivity of the 
labour force.  
 
Financial services are useful in processes of market enlargement and integration as intermediate 
inputs, and as tools in inter-temporal resource allocations and the management of risk. They also 
aid in the accumulation of human and physical capital and in other ways of upgrading productive 
opportunities (Gonzalez-Vega, 1993). Financial services are particularly important for the 
integration into markets of those households and firms that have been excluded from 
participation, including those individuals engaged in farming and other activities in the rural 
informal sector of developing countries. 
  
Zeller et al. (1997) have identified three pathways through which household welfare outcomes 
can be affected by access to credit. The first pathway according to them is through the alleviation 
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of the capital constraints on agricultural households. Generally, expenditures are incurred during 
the planting and vegetative growth periods of crops on agricultural inputs and on food and 
essential non-food items, whereas returns are received only after the crops are harvested several 
months later. Often during the planting season, most households show a negative cash flow. 
Consequently, the farm household must either dip into its savings or obtain credit to finance the 
purchase of essential consumption and production inputs. According to Zeller et al. (1997), 
access to credit can thus appreciably boost the capacity of poor households with little or no 
savings to acquire agricultural inputs. In addition, easing possible capital constraints by making 
credit available reduces the opportunity costs of capital-intensive assets relative to family labour, 
thereby encouraging the adoption of labour-saving, high-yielding technologies, which further 
increases land and labour productivity, a crucial factor in encouraging development, in 
particular, in many African developing countries. 
 
The second pathway through which household welfare is impacted by access to credit is by 
increasing its risk-bearing ability and altering its risk-coping strategy. The third pathway, which 
is enabling access to credit for consumption smoothing, is closely related to the second, because 
they both affect the resilience of households in bearing production and consumption risks. 
According to Eswaran and Kotwal (1990), the mere awareness/knowledge that credit will be 
accessible to cushion consumption against an income shortfall if a potentially profitable, but 
risky, investment should turn out badly may provoke a household to put up with the additional 
risk. The household may as a result be willing to adopt new, riskier technologies. A household 
may also profit from mere access to credit even if it is not borrowing.  It can avoid adopting such 
risk-reducing but expensive strategies such as the production of low risk but less profitable food 
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crops, such as cassava and local maize, and the build up of assets that primarily serve 
precautionary savings purposes although may offer very poor yields or even negative returns (for 
example, keeping cattle or cash). 
 
By providing the poor with a credit facility to start a small business, microcredit helps in 
reducing poverty. It supports the economic condition of the poor people, as well as having a 
positive impact on their social life, through better standard of living, greater access to education 
and health facilities and increased empowerment to participate in decisions of the society. The 
transmission mechanism of microcredit to poverty is illustrated in figure 3.1. 
 
 
 
    
  
 
 
                 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.1: Transmission Mechanism of Microcredit to Poverty Alleviation 
Source: Adapted from State of the Pakistan’s Economy (2005) 
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The role of microcredit for development efforts around the world, particularly for poverty 
alleviation has been significant. Making financial services accessible to poor people are seen to 
reduce capital market distortions to exclude the poor, reduce vulnerability by providing the poor 
with financial resources when needed, and opportunities for income-generating activities. 
Microcredit enables clients to protect, diversify and increase their income, as well as to 
accumulate assets, reducing their vulnerability to income and consumption shocks (Robinson, 
2002). The solidarity group lending methodologies common in microfinance has helped increase 
the confidence of the poor (especially women), and empowering them to more effectively 
confront inequities (Ashe, 2000; Fisher and Sriram, 2002; Simanowitz and Walter, 2002; 
Snodgrass and Sebstad, 2002).  The availability of financial services has proven to be a critical 
factor in reducing poverty and its effects, revealing positive results on nutrition, education, 
health, gender equity, and the environment (Littlefield, et al. 2003). 
 
Microfinance programmes have been embraced around the world as an important strategy for 
poverty alleviation. Over the last decade, there has been substantial expansion in terms of both 
number of institutions and the size of institutions in the field of microfinance. It has been 
demonstrated in microfinance impact studies (Ashe, 2000; Fisher and Sriram, 2002; Robinson, 
2002; Simanowitz and Walter, 2002; Snodgrass and Sebstad, 2002; Khandker, 2005) that: 
 
• Poor households can meet basic needs and protect themselves against risks by using 
microcredit. 
• Improvements in household economic welfare and enterprise stability and growth can 
be achieved by the use of financial services by low-income households. 
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• Microcredit empowers women, thereby promoting gender-equity and improving 
household well-being by supporting women’s economic participation. 
• Length of time clients have had access to financial services is an indication of the 
level of impact.   
 
Most policy and research interest regarding rural credit market revolves around the perception 
that poor rural households lack adequate access to credit. This, according to Diagne and Zeller 
(2001), is in turn believed to have considerable negative consequences for various collective and 
household-level outcomes, including the adoption of technology, agricultural productivity, food 
security, nutrition, health, and overall household welfare. In the next chapter, consideration is 
given to the features of rural credit markets and their relationship to credit accessibility for poor 
rural households. 
 
3.9 Conclusion 
The South African government has tended to facilitate and regulate, rather than provide financial 
services directly. Direct provision of financial services by the government relates only to the 
provision of wholesale finance in housing, agriculture and enterprise finance through 
Development Finance Institutions, like NHFC and Khula. 
 
As far as financial legislation is concerned, there has been much activity over the past years, and 
the government has been content to accept and support the private sector’s commitment under 
the Financial Sector Charter to deliver broad-based access. The targets set in the Charter have yet 
not been achieved. As was revealed in a number of socio-economic profiles of Eastern Cape 
towns and districts, access to credit and financial assistance remains the principal constraint that 
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small-scale producers face (Eastern Cape Province, 1995; Provide, 2005). Meanwhile, the new 
development finance system is so far having little impact on the poor. In order to implement their 
cost-recovery strategies, development finance institutions are still primarily servicing historic 
and wealthy clientele. Where credit is available to the poor, it is at extremely high levels of 
interest. However, while the development finance institutions must be subject to critical scrutiny 
and made to account for their practices, to lay all the blame at their feet would be to miss the 
point. The problem lies in South Africa's macro-economic and financial policies, which 
ultimately set the conditions of cost-recovery that control DFIs, consequently affecting who they 
lend to and at what rates. There is also a need to critically examine the impact of globalization, 
and how the `internationalization of finance' has forced the state to battle inflation above all else.  
 
Long term solutions lie in restructuring the country's macro-economic policy to allow for 
increased social spending on the poor and to reduce the exorbitant interest rates which make it 
impossible for the poor to access credit (even if this may mean slightly higher levels of 
inflation). In the meantime, the onus lies on government to bring pressure to bear on the 
development finance institutions, to ensure more of their finances are directed towards the poor 
and incurred on, non-loan expenditures, such as training and capacity building. Since these 
activities will incur extra costs for the development finance institutions, government will have to 
consider providing targeted grants and subsidies to institutions for lending to the poor through 
intermediary agencies at below market rates. 
  
Government also has the onerous task of plugging the gaps in the development finance system. 
Where development finance institutions are not directing credit towards basic development needs 
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for the poor, then it is government, which should be undertaking this responsibility. The question 
is whether it has the capacity and will to fulfil this obligation. The next chapter focuses on rural 
households’ credit accessibility. 
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  CHAPTER 4 
RURAL HOUSEHOLD CREDIT ACCESSIBILTY  
 
 
“Money, says the proverb, makes money. When you have a little, it is often easy to get more. The 
great difficulty is to get that little”. -  Adam Smith. 
 
4.1 Introduction 
The provision of financial services at a reasonable cost, especially credit to poor rural households 
who have limited assets, has not been an easy task.  In many developing countries up until the 
1980s, state-run agricultural development banks were at the forefront in establishing formal 
credit markets in the rural areas. However, according to Zeller and Sharma (1998) and 
Ledgerwood (1999), their performance has been severely handicapped by the shortcomings of 
the banking principles that they were based on, which include, an organisational setup without 
any incentive to do business with the poor, collateralised lending, excessive dependence on 
government funding, and pervasive political patronage. 
 
The Asian Development Bank (2000) has identified the lack of access to a broader set of 
financial options as an indication of a potential constraint to entrepreneurship and the ability to 
undertake socially and privately profitable investment ventures. The reasons for any early failure 
on the part of financial institutions must be well understood if they are going to play any 
meaningful role in the delivery of micro financial services. The outcomes of which could be 
useful in determining the modalities for restructuring the rural financial systems in order to 
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convert them into viable rural financial markets. According to Von Pischke, (1983), a well 
functioning rural financial market requires institutions that are healthy and expanding and that 
financial innovation should cause a fall in the costs of financial services. 
 
In this chapter, factors that affect poor household credit accessibility are explored. As had earlier 
been pointed out, the link between financial services and household economic welfare is 
determined by the nature and operations of the financial institutions and their operational 
policies. In section 2, discussions on the main features of rural credit markets in developing 
countries are presented. This background is necessary as a building block to bring out some of 
the issues that need to be considered when one attempts to look at rural household accessibility 
to financial services, especially credit. Section 3 focuses mainly on the determinants of rural 
household accessibility to credit. Some of the factors highlighted here include risk, credit 
rationing, transaction costs, delinquency and default rates, interest rates and collateral. Section 4 
presents empirical evidence of the determinants of credit accessibility. 
 
4.2 The Main Features of Rural Credit Markets 
The most important functions of financial markets are capital transfer from savers to borrowers, 
capital agglomeration, projects selection, investments monitoring, contract enforcement, risks 
transfer, pooling and sharing, and transactions recording, while capital markets deal with 
intertemporal trade, as well as risk and information (Levine, 1997). It has been argued that there 
exists no likelihood for rural credit markets to be efficient, as they do not operate like the 
classical competitive markets. According to Llanto (1990), transactions in credit markets are not 
the same as other market transactions, where a transaction is terminated once payment is 
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received. The commodity seller does not care who the buyer is or what happens to the 
commodity after sale, as long as he/she is paid. In contrast however, in the credit markets, 
information is required both on personal characteristics of the borrowers and on the project for 
which an application for financing is lodged. It is important for the bank or lender to know the 
viability of the project, the purpose of the loan, the borrower’s credit-worthiness and his/her 
strategic behaviour. Credit markets are different from an ideal market because they are largely 
dependent on information. According to Hoff and Stiglitz (1990), rural credit markets have to 
contend with the problems of screening, incentives, contract enforcement, information 
asymmetry and monitoring. 
 
Several features have been identified that make credit markets in developing countries different 
from other credit markets, which include the following: 
 
i) Segmented/Fragmented Market - Rural credit markets in developing countries are often 
segmented or fragmented. According to McKinnon (1973), different borrowers or clients 
face different capital prices for land, labour, commodities and capital, in other words, 
different lenders in the rural financial markets have different interest rate policies. 
 
In credit markets, interest rates may not bring supply and demand to equilibrium; this is 
largely because interest rates have the dual function of setting prices on one hand, and 
serving as an instrument for regulating the risk composition of the lender’s portfolio on 
the other hand. However, by allowing the interest rate to reflect the market prices these 
imperfections may be eliminated. The cost of segmentation is that it hinders the flow of 
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funds across regions or groups of individuals even though there are potential gains from 
doing so, as when needs for credit differ across locations (Besley, 1994; Herath, 1996; 
Black et al., 1997). 
 
ii) Collateral Security – It has been demonstrated in studies by Plaut (1985) and Herath 
(1996) that collateral increases the amount of credit offered to a given borrower and/or 
reduces the rate of interest charged ceteris paribus. It increases the expected returns of 
the lender and creates an incentive for borrowers to avoid intentional default. According 
to Udry (1990), collateral pledge in exchange for a loan directly reduces the cost to the 
lender of default on the loan; it can reduce the moral hazard associated with lending by 
providing an added incentive for the borrower to repay; it can alleviate the problem of 
adverse selection by screening out those borrowers most likely to default. However, 
according to Binswanger and Rosenzweig (1986), land can be expected to be the most 
common and appropriate collateral in developing countries, especially in rural areas, 
since collateral can be damaged or moved before the creditor confiscates it. However, 
most rural households in developing countries do not posses title deeds to their land 
because they are often too poor to buy the land. Furthermore, according to Besley (1994), 
poorly developed property rights in the rural areas of many developing countries could 
render appropriation of collateral in the event of default difficult, while Feder et al. 
(1988) identified legal constraints existing on mortgaging of agricultural land as a 
constraint. Often political cost of foreclosing on debtors with collateral is significant. 
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iii) Weak/Underdeveloped Complementary Institutions – If rural financial markets are to 
function properly then the functioning of certain other complementary institutions and 
markets are essential. In most rural areas of developing countries, these institutions are 
not in place and are weak wherever they do exist. For example, there are limited and 
weak equity markets that provide a mechanism for sharing risks in most rural areas of 
developing countries. Also evident in most rural credit markets is the absence of 
insurance markets to mitigate the problems of income uncertainty. The absence of or 
weakness in infrastructure has been identified as a hindrance to the operations of 
financial institutions in the rural areas. According to Spio et al. (1995), more often than 
not, savings mobilisation is frustrated because social amenities such as water, electricity, 
communication facilities and roads are not within ready access.  
 
4.3 Factors Determining Household Access to Credit  
In spite of the increasing number of private and public agencies involved in raising the efficiency 
of financial intermediaries targeting the poorer clientele, their effectiveness in improving the 
poor’s access to financial services, especially credit, is below expectations (Schrieder and 
Theesfeld, 2000; Zeller, 2000). As a result, the majority of poor rural households are left out of 
the rural financial system. According to Lariviere and Martin (1999), rural financial 
intermediation is expensive because participants are geographically scattered, small financial 
transactions are involved and rural incomes tend to be unstable. Most often, there is no clearly 
defined collateral and rural people are usually not educated. Furthermore, the cost of gathering 
information about rural borrowers is high, which naturally impedes financial markets from 
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making contact with rural people, especially the poor (Lariviere and Martin, 1999; Schrieder and 
Theesfeld, 2000). 
 
Lipton (1976) was of the opinion that these problems result from urban bias. According to her, 
urban interests conspire against the rural poor to deny them access to significant amounts of 
credit, while Gonzalez-Vega (1989) based his argument on the supply allocation problems within 
financial institutions. He identified widely used concessional interest rate policies coupled with a 
relatively high transaction costs for servicing small loans and new borrowers as the factors that 
discourage financial institutions from lending to the rural poor. Another plausible explanation is 
that because most poor rural households lack profitable investment opportunities, they do not 
seek formal credit, nor are they aware of the availability of formal credit, or are too timid to 
request formal loans. Another significant factor playing a role in household credit accessibility is 
the differences in borrowing costs among various types of lenders. These discrepancies in costs 
strongly affect the willingness of the rural poor to seek loans from formal lenders.  Some of the 
factors, which influence the accessibility of credit to poor rural households, are discussed in this 
section. 
 
4.3.1 Risk 
Spio (2006) describes risk as a blessing as well as a curse of rural finance. It is risk that 
motivates lenders’ efforts to remain liquid so that payments are honoured on demand and to 
remain solvent by using profits to build capital. Risk is the essential element of finance (Von 
Pischke, 1994). This is illogical because it is risk that unseats systems, institutions and projects 
that issue excessive credit, risk translates otherwise rational behaviour into forces that depreciate 
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credit contracts and destroys credit institutions. Debtors are unable to pay, creditors are unable to 
collect or both (Spio, 2006). 
 
From Herath (1996) and Barry and Lee (1983), six sources of risk for an intermediary can be 
identified, which include: 
 
i) credit risk from potential delinquency or default by borrowers, 
ii) investment risk from capital gains or losses on securities sold before maturity,  
iii) liquidity risk from possible losses of funding resources,  
iv) cost of funds risk from unanticipated changes in the cost of funds,  
v) financial risk from intermediaries’ high financial leverage, and  
vi) regulatory risk from unanticipated changes in the regulatory environment.  
 
One source of credit risk that is more prominent in rural credit markets is information 
asymmetry. Imperfect information about the likelihood of default has several fundamental 
implications for the nature of credit markets (Blinder and Stiglitz, 1983; Herath, 1996). It gives 
rise to institutions that specialize in acquiring information about default risk, hence influencing 
the behaviour of the lender towards its clients. It is easy for a lender with superior information to 
distinguish between good and bad risks. With such superior information, a lender’s ability to 
identify the borrowers with the best investment opportunities improves greatly. Lenders can 
discriminate between borrowers only in very broad terms, and will indiscriminately adopt 
rational and/or irrational methods to reduce risk when information is poor. 
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Lenders may raise interest rates charged on loans to cover risk; this approach may lead to 
adverse selection. To illustrate how the adverse selection problem arises in financial markets and 
how interest rate can be used as a direct screening mechanism to differentiate the risky projects 
from the safe ones. It is assumed that both borrowers and lenders are risk-neutral, and there are 
two groups of borrowers, safe and risky ones, and the value of output if successful, while the 
bank is assumed ignorant of the probability of success of the individual borrower projects. Even 
though it is assumed that the bank is ignorant about the characteristics of each individual project, 
it does know the value of the common expected gross returns of the two projects. 
 
In the model developed by Stiglitz and Weiss (1981), it is indicated that lender does not use the 
interest rate as a screening device because changes in interest rate may affect the riskiness of the 
pool of borrowers. The implicit assumption is that riskier borrowers have access to risky projects 
with lower probability of success but higher return if they succeed, while safe borrowers have 
projects with higher probability of success but a lower return. For any class of projects with the 
same mean gross return but differing risk, the interest rate can be used to determine the riskiness 
of a project. At a certain low interest rate, even low return low risk projects will survive. As the 
interest rate increases, low return projects will start to yield negative expected returns. Thus, the 
higher the interest rate, the higher the expected return must be before a borrower finds it worth 
borrowing for his project. All remaining projects that give the borrower a higher expected net 
return entail a lower probability of success. Borrowers with low return, low risk project will drop 
out of the credit market, because they are unable or unwilling to pay higher interest rates. 
Therefore, the bank cannot use the interest rate as a signalling mechanism.  
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However, this analysis of credit market is contrary to the classical teachings of the market 
mechanism. At a given interest rate, if there were excess demand for loan, the classical economic 
analysis would suggest that the price (interest rate) would rise to offset excess demand. However, 
in the presence of asymmetric information, the lender will choose to keep the interest rate low 
enough to obtain a favourable risk composition of projects and to ration the available loanable 
funds through other means. Therefore, quantity demanded may exceed quantity supplied, while 
the interest rate does not rise as a result. 
 
Another form of information asymmetry problem is moral hazard. This occurs in credit markets 
if an increase in the interest rate induces borrowers, who have a choice of projects, to invest in a 
project that yields the bank lower return than another project in which the borrowers could have 
invested. It is assumed that both the lender and borrower are risk-neutral that a borrower has an 
investment choice between a risky and safe project. The riskier project has a lower probability of 
success but a higher pay off if it succeeds, while the safe project has a higher probability of 
success but with lower return. However, the bank does not know which project has been chosen. 
 
In this case, the interest rate acts not as selection mechanism, as in the previous case, but as an 
incentive mechanism, since it affects the actions taken by the borrower once he obtains the loan. 
At lower interest rate, it is worthwhile for the borrower to invest in safer project that brings 
positive returns. However, as the interest rate continues to rise, the borrower is induced to switch 
from the safer project to the risky one, because with the increase interest rate the safer project 
starts to yield negative net returns. In other words, the higher the interest rate, the higher the net 
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expected returns has to be, and only the risky project will fetch higher expected returns, which 
induces borrowers to opt for it. 
  
This switch affects the expected returns of the lender because of the limited liability 
characteristics of the loan contract. If the project is successful, the lender will receive at most the 
loan amount with the accrued interest, while if the project fails, the lender will receive nothing 
(or any residual value). The expected returns to the bank are lower for the riskier project than for 
the safe project. Expectedly, due to the moral hazard problem, banks tend to keep the interest 
rate low and instead ration credit in order to curb excess demand (See: Herath, 1996; Yazdani 
and Gunjai, 1998).  
 
Different financial markets try to come up with mechanisms to reduce information asymmetry. 
The formal financial institutions tends to tackle the adverse selection and moral incentive 
problems by imposing stringent collateral requirements or restrictive agreement, or by requiring 
borrowers to provide carefully documented evidence, showing their intention and ability to repay 
(Floro and Yotopoulos, 1991). The MFIs uses mechanisms that make credit arrangement 
possible without the use of traditional methods employed by the formal institutions. By using 
mechanisms such as social networks, social ties and social sanctions, MFIs are in a position to 
reduce the selection, incentive and enforcement problems inherent to credit transaction, which 
may not be effectively handled in the formal institutions. 
  
Lenders in some cases may also devise contracts that will provide a strong incentive for its 
clients not to default, such as contracts in which both the rate charged and the availability of 
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credit at a time in future will depend on the borrower’s previous performance, i.e. based on the 
strength of previous relationship. This will thus create a “customer market” – linking particular 
borrowers to particular lenders. 
 
Barry and Lee (1983) have identified other ways the lenders may choose to counter risks, which 
are:  
i) diversifying assets and liabilities in order to spread risks over various types of loans, 
investments, and funding resources; 
ii) diversifying geographically to spread credit risks over a wider area; 
iii) developing loan participation and loss-sharing agreements with other institutions; and 
iv) utilising loan insurance, government guarantees, security requirements, customer 
counselling, documentation, supervision and avoiding loan risk and other activities. 
 
Some of these approaches have reduced the accessibility of credit to poor rural households. 
Therefore, to be able to manage risk effectively and efficiently, information is not only a 
necessary condition but must be sufficient and adequate. Accordingly, the greater the amount of 
relevant, valid and timely information that can be gathered about the affairs of a loan applicant 
and the markets in which the client operates, the more refined the rational credit or investment 
decision. In fact, according to Von Pischke (1994), this is often used to create confidence in the 
financial markets. 
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4.3.2 Credit Rationing 
In economics and banking, the concept of credit rationing is commonly used to describe a 
situation when bank limits the supply of loans, even though it has enough funds to loan out, and 
the supply of loans has not yet equalled the demand of prospective borrowers. Jaffee and 
Modigliani (1969) defined credit rationing as a situation whereby demand for commercial loans 
exceeds the supply of these loans at rates quoted by the banks. Bester (1985) viewed credit 
rationing as when some borrowers receive a loan and others do not, although the latter would be 
willing to pay even higher interest or to offer an increase in collateral. However, according to 
Jaffee and Russell (1976), credit rationing occurs when lenders quote an interest rate on loans 
and then proceed to supply a smaller loan size than demanded by the borrowers.  
 
There is a great debate about the rationale, mechanism and effects of credit rationing on both 
borrowers and lenders, because of the interest of various governments and donor agencies to 
advancing credit to smallholder farmers, micro-enterprises and the rural poor and the asymmetric 
information characterising most rural credit markets.  
 
The theory of asymmetric information comes from the discipline that is known as “economics of 
information”. The basic teaching of this discipline is that many markets such as labour, finance 
and insurance, information is asymmetrically distributed and is costly to acquire (Akerlof, 1970). 
Information asymmetry models assume that at least one party to a transaction has more, better or 
relevant information than others (Brown, et al. 2004). This creates an imbalance of power in 
transactions, which can sometimes cause the transaction to go awry. According to Stiglitz 
(1989), financial contracts include elements that lead to the basic problems of adverse selection 
and moral hazard. In adverse selection, the ignorant party lacks information while negotiating an 
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agreed understanding of or contract to the transaction, whereas in moral hazard the ignorant 
party lacks information about the performance of the agreed-upon transaction or lacks the ability 
to retaliate for a breach of agreement (Aboody and Baruch, 2000; Brown, et al., 2004).   
 
In the next section, the rationale for financial institution credit rationing by non-price mechanism 
and the reasons for favouring larger clients over small clients in this process will be explored. 
 
4.3.2.1  Rationale for Credit rationing by non-price mechanism 
According to Spio (2006), if the basic tenets of economics are to be followed, then credit 
rationing will not exist because market equilibrium results when demand equates to supply. 
Stiglitz and Weiss (1981) posited that credit rationing is not necessary if prices perform their job 
well, but in reality, it does exist. They explained this phenomenon based on the idea of short or 
long-term disequilibrium. In the short term, credit rationing is viewed as a temporary 
disequilibrium phenomenon in which the economy is said to have incurred an exogenous shock, 
resulting in some stickiness in the cost of borrowing (interest rate), creating a transitional period 
during which rationing of credit occurs. Governmental constraints such as usury laws are used to 
explain long term credit rationing. 
 
Braverman and Guasch (1986) and Schrieder and Theesfeld (2000) have identified a variety of 
factors that seems to induce the allocation of credit under competition in the form of rationing, 
which include: 
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i) Finiteness of Client’s Wealth: Clients’ liabilities are postulated to be bound by an 
amount no greater than their wealth; hence, lenders find it optimal to set credit limits 
(Spio, 2006). According to Bradford et al. (1996), it is normal for the client’s equity 
to offer the lender some protection against loss from default. However, it is the 
client’s overall equity position on an unsecured loan that is relevant, usually 
measured by the ratio of down payment to value. In general, the supply of credit is a 
positive function of these ratios, given that the larger the client’s own investment or 
equity relative to his/her borrowed funds, the less the risk to the lender that adverse 
circumstances will reduce the value of the collateral below the outstanding principal 
of the loan and thus lead to default. According to Bradford et al. (1996), the demand 
for credit will tend to be a negative function of these ratios because of the existence of 
“marginal” borrowers for whom equity or down payment requirements represent an 
effective constraint on borrowing and spending. 
 
ii) Adverse Selection and Incentives Effects: Credit markets are characterised by 
imperfect information that disables interest rates from playing its classical market-
clearing role (Baydas et al., 1994). If there were perfect information and no cost 
incurred in information gathering about borrowers, lenders would be able to stipulate 
precisely all the actions that the borrower would undertake which might affect the 
returns on the loan given to him. However, due to information asymmetries, and the 
situation obtained in most rural financial markets in developing countries, where the 
credit histories of borrowers are not documented and pooled, and the lender is not 
able to control directly all the actions of the borrower. Should lenders increase the 
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lending rate to compensate for higher cost of information gathering and its reliability; 
this may result in adverse selection and moral hazard (See Stiglitz and Weiss, 1981; 
Blinder and Stiglitz, 1983; Bester, 1985; Herath, 1996; Bradford et al., 1996; Chaves 
and Gonzalez-Vega, 1996). Both forms of behaviour of borrowers could negatively 
affect the lenders’ returns on loans. 
 
Adverse selection occurs where borrowers with safe and low default risk projects 
choose not to borrow because of high and rising interest rate, while more risky 
projects with potential higher returns but higher probability of default are attracted 
into the market. An increase in the interest rate increases the probability of attracting 
projects with high probability of default, which reduces lenders’ returns on loans. 
 
A rise in the lending rate may also create an incentive or moral hazard problem that 
induces borrowers to undertake riskier projects that promise higher returns but with 
high probability of default. The lenders often use a variety of screening devices in the 
formulation of the loan contracts in order to protect its interest, enhanced the 
likelihood of repayment and attract low risk borrowers. They may therefore find it 
optimal to charge lower than equilibrium interest rates and use non-price mechanism 
to ration credit (Hoff and Stiglitz, 1990). 
 
iii) Small Clients versus Large Clients: small farmers and poor households alike are often 
discriminated against in favour of the large farmers/households in the credit market 
especially for agricultural loans, mainly because of the high risks and costs associated 
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with lending to them; and secondly when the lenders rely on farm size as an 
(imperfect) indicator of individual farm characteristics. According to Spio (2006), 
because farms are imputed to possess the average characteristics of the group, 
relatively productive and low risk small farms are offered discriminatory contracts, 
which discourage credit use and further distorts equilibrium credit allocation away 
from small farms. This distortion is based on information asymmetry, which would be 
reduced if lenders faced lower information cost, by efficiently collecting better 
information about their prospective clients (Carter, 1989).  
 
Lenders would only lend to the small farmers/poor households (at the margin) only if 
they can charge or transfer the proportionally large transaction costs of the small 
loans to the small clients, either as a fixed fee or an increased interest rate. However, 
when they cannot shift costs, the existence of markets from the supplier’s side for 
small clients will cease (Binswanger and Sillers 1983). 
 
Two contractual restrictions, such as, the imposition of a collateral ceiling and high 
interest rates, are used by lenders to ration the small farmers in the credit market 
(Carter, 1989).  Most small farms have vague legal title, and this gives them only 
limited net collateral value, which restricts their feasible loan terms. If interest rate 
restrictions are imposed exogenously, the conventional result applies a fortiori. With 
restricted interest rates and high collateral requirements, offering loans to small farms 
to yield the requisite expected profit level may not be attractive. With binding interest 
rate ceilings, lenders would shift their lending to better collateralised and, on the 
115 
 
average, safer and more productive large farms at the expense of the small farms. 
Lenders would still prefer lending to large farms than to small farms and would ration 
credit accordingly, even under the same collateral ceiling. Carter (1989) has identify 
the key factor of credit rationing as the variability in production, which makes small 
farm loans risky and unprofitable, while the systematic outcome of profit maximizing 
behaviour of competitive lenders is the reason why credit are made available to large 
farms.   
 
4.3.3 Transaction Costs 
It has been argued that high transaction costs are the major factor discouraging many of the rural 
poor in developing countries from using formal loans. According to Gonzalez-Vega (1993) and 
Olomola (1999), transaction costs have clearly influenced on the structure of rural financial 
markets and the behaviour of participants. Gonzalez-Vega (1993:32) identified that improved 
access to financial services is determined by “changes in the environment in which financial 
institutions operate, changes in the policies that regulate their behaviour, changes in their 
organisational design and operational procedures, and changes in financial technologies”. 
Transaction costs constitute one of the major determinants in such policies. 
 
According to Spio (2006), transaction costs are an appropriate measure of the higher degree of 
“friction” in the functioning of these markets. Transaction cost is inversely proportional to 
market efficiency. The higher the transaction costs of financial intermediation, the less efficient 
is the performance of the financial markets, and the more constrained is their contribution to 
development. Higher transaction costs limit the services that the financial institutions are willing 
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to provide to the rural poor and their new clients. High transaction costs encountered by clients 
of financial institutions have been a major obstacle discouraging them from seeking loans and 
making deposits. According to Adams and Canavesi (1992), if rural financial intermediation is to 
be sustained and expanded, it will largely be dependent on a decrease in transaction costs for 
both the institutions and their clients. 
 
Insights into how efficiently and equitably rural financial markets are functioning is provided by 
information on transaction costs. If the clients of rural credit markets are incurring high 
transaction costs, there is a likelihood that relatively few people are being served by these 
markets and that the qualities of services provided to clients are poor. It also an indication that 
intermediaries are inflicting extensive transaction costs on non-preferred clients, which shows 
that interest rates are not doing an efficient job of rationing credit. According to Adams and 
Higurashi (1987), a decline in total transaction costs is a sign that intermediaries are successfully 
innovating, that more people have access to financial services and that the quality of services is 
increasing. 
 
The costs of financial intermediation are not shared in fixed proportions between borrowers and 
lenders. According to Adams (1978), the intermediaries can transfer, absorb, or in some cases, 
increase transaction costs incurred by various classes of individuals through a rationing device, 
depending on whether they are preferred or non-preferred clients. 
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4.3.4 Delinquency and Default  
Delinquency is the inability of borrowers to repay their debts on time, while default is the 
inability or failure to repay them at all. This is a serious problem and has been a widespread 
experience for the past few decades. In most developing countries credit repayment, especially 
smallholder agricultural credit has been a major problem (Chirwa, 1997). Loan delinquency and 
default has continued to threaten the existence of most formal lenders. According to Sharma and 
Zeller (2000), delinquency and default not only decapitalise the institutions and increase their 
reliance on donors and governments, but they also discourage lending to specific target groups. 
Credit institutions and programmes in many developing countries have become liquidity 
constrained largely because of poor loan repayment. These massive defaults and delinquencies 
have destroyed the long-run efforts to create viable rural lending institutions. 
 
However, informal lenders have often innovatively succeeded in reducing the incidence of 
default and delinquencies. For instance, by lending to groups of borrowers, the joint liability and 
social collateral that is created ensures the strict screening of members, the incentive to honour 
commitments and members of the group monitoring each other’s actions. According to Mosley 
and Hulme (1998), intensive loan collection either monthly or more frequently and loan 
supervision measures have been found not only to be effective in limiting default, but also to 
pass-cost analyses. 
 
Another set of effective measures used employed by informal lenders to limit loan default is the 
provision of repayment incentives, such as pardoning part of the final interest payment if all 
payments are received on time; speeding up subsequent loan approvals; and increasing 
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borrower’s credit limit if repayment are made on time (Mosley and Hulme, 1998; Schmidt and 
Zeitinger, 1994). 
   
Credit availability, and timeous access to it, is of importance to the poor rural households. Thus, 
if repayment is not necessary, then there will be no place for credit and therefore, any funds 
advanced cannot be defined as credit. According to Spio (2006), if credit does not return to the 
lender, revolving funds will not revolve, and to make things worse, new money will not come 
out from the original sources, which are the savers. Fry (1988) and Hunte (1993) have identified 
excessive arrears and default rates as an indication of inefficiency either because the financial 
institution has financed unproductive investments or it has failed to press for loan repayment.  
  
4.3.5 Interest Rate   
Interest rate is the cost associated with borrowing. In other words, it is the rent or level of 
compensation a borrower of funds must pay a supplier, or the compensation a lender gives a 
saver. The interest rate is used as a regulatory device to control the flow of funds between 
suppliers and demanders, and/or keepers and savers. Thus, the interest rate represents the cost of 
the money. It is a key variable influencing the actions of financial institutions, borrowers and 
savers (Mohane et al., 2000). 
 
The common feature of most credit programmes is the subsidization of interest rates. There are 
numerous arguments for subsidized credit in rural financial markets and deeply held convictions 
about its desirability. According to Von Pischke, (1991); Ellis (1994); and Lariviere and Martin 
(1999), the artificial low interest rate policies have been justified on the following grounds: 
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i) They serve as an income transfer device to the poor, who cannot afford expensive 
credit. 
ii) High rates contribute to inflation. 
iii) Low interest rates induce borrowers to adopt new technologies and increase 
production. 
iv) Such policies have been adopted in advanced economies, so why not in 
developing countries 
v) The concessions provided by development agencies should be passed on to 
farmers. 
vi) Religious and ethical values; and 
vii) They are the second best alternative if the government cannot improve the 
economy.  
 
Low interest rate policies have failed to achieve their primary objectives of promoting 
agricultural production and assisting the poor. Von Pischke (1983) has argued that subsidized 
credit is not a cost effective approach for promoting most of the activities mentioned in the 
preceding section. An unprofitable investment cannot be profitable, just because credit is 
subsidized. Credit does not create (non-existent) technologies, just as it does not make the 
required (unavailable) inputs accessible, nor build the (missing) infrastructure (roads, storage 
facilities). In addition, credit does not create the (absent) markets, does not engender comparative 
advantages, and does not reduce yield uncertainty. In particular, credit does not modify relative 
(social and private) profitability, or create investment opportunities that do not exist. Credit 
simply transfers generalized purchasing power to borrowers who still face the same investment 
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options. According to Meyer and Nagarajan (1988), subsidized credit is obviously a weak 
instrument to achieve most of the intended objectives and evidence emanating from most 
developing countries points to the fact that subsidized credit cannot compensate for high input 
prices, low product prices, unstable input supplies, poor information and transportation systems, 
and complicated rules and regulations that favour large enterprises.  
 
According to Vogel (1984) and Gonzalez-Vega (1993), there is an implicit subsidy, when 
interest rates do not reflect the social opportunity cost of the claims on resources transferred. 
Subsidized interest rates, contrary to their good intentions had regressive implications for the 
distribution of wealth in rural areas. According to Gonzalez-Vega (1993), only small farmer loan 
portfolios showed much concentration, as a few of the borrowers captured the principal fraction 
of the funds disbursed and the linked subsidies. The effects of low interest are widely 
documented in literature by Mohane et al., (2000), the Strauss Commission (1996) and Spio et 
al. (1995). 
 
Subsidized interest rates have been shown to restrict rural households’ access to formal credit, it 
follows therefore that low interest rates cannot remove the monopoly of moneylenders in rural 
areas as it has been recognized that low interest rates cannot create the missing physical inputs, 
markets, or the technologies that keep the productivity of farmers low in many developing 
countries. Once the factors are in place (i.e. inputs, markets and technologies) subsidized credit 
will not stimulate the adoption of new technologies unless large loans are granted to many poor 
households. Subsidized interest rates will also lead to credit rationing and exclusion in the credit 
markets. 
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The general subsidization of lending interest rates in the rural economy has no strong economic 
justification, even for the rural poor. Nonetheless, scarce resources will be required to finance the 
start-up activities and institutional strengthening of emerging rural finance institutions. Grants 
are preferable to interest rate subsidies especially when income redistribution is pursued. 
According to Spio (2006), subsidies create a bias towards accepting investment projects with low 
returns. It allows borrowers’ own funds or the funds of other lenders to be substituted for credit; 
it encourages excessive indebtedness, distorts incentives in favour of capital-intensive techniques 
of production, promotes corruption and the rationing of credit, and weakens borrowers’ 
incentives for debt recovery. According to the Strauss Commission (1996), subsidised interest 
rates, unless the subsidy is fully paid through the fiscus instead of the banks, will result in lower 
returns to savers and higher costs for non-subsidized borrowers and will increase significantly 
many countries’ inflation and fiscal deficits. 
 
4.3.6 Collateral 
Many lenders have come up with various mechanisms to reduce delinquency and to minimize the 
losses in the case of default by the client. One of the non-price mechanisms universally designed 
to increase the lender’s expected profitability from a loan transaction, apart from screening 
potential borrowers according to creditworthiness criteria and credit rationing is the use of 
collateral and guarantees (Feder et al. 1988). Collateral, at a given interest rate, has three effects, 
namely: 
 
i) Its ability to increases the expected return of the lender and reduce the expected 
return for the borrower. 
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ii) It can partly or fully shifts the risk of losing the principal from the lender to the 
borrower (Bradford et al. 1996) and; 
iii) It provides those borrowers who have low disutility of default with additional 
incentives to repay a loan (Binswanger and Sillers, 1983). According to Von 
Pischke (1983), an additional risk-bearing element, implicit in collateral, is the 
fact that it reduces the borrower’s ability to incur additional debt. 
 
Larr (1994) had defined collateral as an asset that upon liquidation is adequate to cover most or 
all of the lender’s risk exposure, including principal, accrued interest and collection costs. Most 
of the definitions of collateral in formal finance fail to include collateral substitutes, which are 
used more often in the informal financial markets. To extend these definitions of collateral to 
include these substitutes, FAO (1996) defined collateral as an asset that a borrower agrees to 
forfeit in the event of loan default, or an asset that has the qualities to enforce loan repayment. To 
fulfil the above requirement, collateral should have certain features, which include: 
 
• Appropriability - the ease of liquidation in the event that a lender defaults. 
• Absence of collateral-specific - it should have low risk or be properly insured. 
• Accrual of the returns to the borrower during the loan period (Binswanger et al., 
1993). 
• Value - it should be valuable to both borrower and lender. 
 
More often than not, physical assets such as land and real estate are used as collateral. Land is 
more commonly used as collateral, and is less risky than other forms of security, except in places 
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where legal inhibitions exist on mortgaging agricultural land. The use of land as collateral in 
rural areas depends on the extent to which the legal system as well as the socio-political 
environment enables actual foreclosure on agricultural land (Feder et al. 1988). Foreclosure is an 
easy accomplishment in countries where property rights are clearly defined. 
 
It is also possible for movable assets and crops to be used as collateral especial in areas where 
some institutional lenders will not accept land as a collateral. However, using assets and crops as 
collateral has not been easy to maintain. Crops especially need to be stored in warehouses, grain 
silos, and a legal framework is needed for transfer of ownership to lenders in the case of default 
by clients. Where these institutional frameworks are lacking, crops are not reliable as collateral 
in formal financial markets. Savings funds, guarantee funds, warehouse receipts and insurance 
policies are other tradable assets that can be used as collateral.  
 
In some cases however, credit market participants have employed a variety of collateral 
substitutes such as third party guarantees, threat of loss of future borrowing opportunities, tied 
contracts, loss of reputation and social ostracism especially where the market environment 
renders most assets less acceptable as collateral or where borrowers possess few collateralized 
assets. 
 
However, land remains the most suitable collateral to use because of information asymmetry 
between lenders. Institutional lenders are heavily regulated, backed by usury laws, which 
stipulate a low interest rate; therefore, they cannot charge higher interest rates to compensate for 
risk posed by other forms of collateral or collateral substitutes.  
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The roles of collateral in rural credit accessibility have been defined by various theoretical 
models (Stiglitz and Weiss, 1981; Plaut, 1985; Bester, 1987) as signalling and enforcement 
functions. 
 
a) The Signalling Function: These models are based on the assumption that borrowers 
with a low probability of default are likely to accept an increase in collateral 
requirements for a certain reduction in loan interest rates than those with a high 
probability of default. Therefore, borrowers’ risk type is determined when they reveal 
their preferences between collateral and interest rates. Increases in collateral 
requirements always favour low risk borrowers over high-risk borrowers. However, 
according Devinney (1986), collateral will not perform the signalling function when 
the following conditions prevail: 
 
i) If interest rates are sticky; 
ii) If the marginal collateralization costs for high risk borrowers are less than for low 
risk borrowers so that they prefer to offer more collateral for a reduction in loan 
terms; 
iii) If low risk borrowers have less wealth that can be offered as collateral than high 
risk borrowers; 
iv) When lenders are not diligent in loan collection, high risk borrowers will be 
prepared to offer more collateral for lower interest with the hope that they can 
escape repayment and foreclosure of collateral; and 
iv) In the presence of re-negotiations on loan extension and collateral foreclosing at 
the end of a contract.  
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b) The Enforcement Functions:  In these models, the basis lies on the assumption of a 
legal environment that facilitates loan enforcement and marketability of assets offered 
as collateral. Collateral performs the enforcement function by either reducing the 
lender’s default loss or making it costly for the borrower to default. Therefore, it is 
recommended that high-risk clients be made to offer more collateral for a given loan 
size than low risk clients. 
 
Restricted access to formal credit for poor rural households is often linked to inadequate 
conventional collateral like land. It is imperative therefore for formal lenders to consider the use 
of other assets rather than land in order to improve rural households’ access to formal credit, as 
has been the case in the informal financial markets. Coetzee et al. (1994) have argued that 
alternative collateral (collateral substitute) which is more appropriate at the local level, should be 
used, which revolve around character-based collateral, referrals, linked contracts and building a 
relationship between the clients and lenders. Another channel to reduce the use of collateral in 
loan transactions is finding a solution to the persistent problem of information asymmetry in the 
rural financial markets. 
 
4.4 Empirical Evidence of Determinants of Credit Accessibility 
Although an increasing number of governmental and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) 
are involved in raising the efficiency of financial intermediaries targeting poor rural households, 
their effectiveness in improving the poor’s access to financial services, especially credit, is below 
expectations (CGAP, 1995; Schrieder and Theesfeld, 2000; Zeller, 2000). As a result, the 
majority of the poor rural households are left out in the rural financial market. According to 
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Lariviere and Martin (1999), rural financial intermediation is expensive because participants are 
geographically scattered, financial transactions are small and rural incomes are often unstable. 
Clearly defined collateral is often not available and most rural households are less educated than 
their urban counterparts are. In addition, the cost of information gathering about poor rural 
households is high. The high costs naturally impede financial markets from making contact with 
rural people, especially the poor (Lariviere and Martin, 1999; Schrieder and Theesfeld, 2000).  
 
Empirical evidence from literature suggests that household access to financial services both in 
the formal and informal sectors is influenced by institutional factors, product features and 
household socio-economic characteristics. From the institutional perspective, the location of the 
lender and its conditions for credit allocation greatly influence the probability of access. In a 
study by Porteous (2003), he observed that access to formal financial services in South Africa 
tends to be limited to salaried workers, therefore, excluding the poor, unemployed, self-
employed and informally employed. This is attributed to the fact that most banks demand a pay 
slip as a pre-condition for account opening. Dallimore and Mgimeti (2003) also showed that long 
distances and high transportation cost constrained the poor rural household’s access to formal 
financial services mainly located in urban areas. 
 
Other factors include financial product features such as interest rates and collateral requirements. 
In a study by Kochar (1997), he examined the effect of formal sector interest rates on access to 
informal credit. The result from the study showed a positive and significant relationship between 
the formal sector interest rate and the probability of access to informal credit.  
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Bradford et al. (1996) have identified loan size and quantity rationing, and the interest rate 
charged to be the effects of collateral on credit availability and there is ample support for this 
assertion. In a study conducted in India by Binswanger et al. (1993), the result showed that the 
probability of obtaining loans from lenders was determined by the amount and the form of the 
client’s assets that have high collateral value, and by his personal characteristics. The likelihood 
of getting better loan terms and a larger loan size was influenced by increases in the client’s 
wealth. Also, in a study of 34 banks in the Philippines conducted by Llanto and Dingcong 
(1994), the results indicates that the probability of quantity rationing by these banks is lower 
when the ratios of the value of the collateral offered to the loan size is large.  
 
Pledging of land collateral has been found to increase the amount of institutional credit offered. 
In a study in Thailand by Feder et al. (1988), the result of the disequilibrium model shows that 
institutional credit increased by 43 percent while it increases by 55 percent in the equilibrium 
model as compared to a loan without security. The result further revealed that a ban on land 
collateral is likely to result in efficiency loss as it will force lenders to spend more resources (at a 
margin) in assessing clients’ creditworthiness, thereby shifting funds to clients who are less risky 
at the margin, thus reducing lending to farmers. 
 
There exists an inverse relationship between collateral and interest rate. The higher the value of 
collateral, the lower the interest rate charged. In a survey conducted in some Indian villages, as 
reported in Spio (2006), the highest rates of interest were charged for loans without collateral, 
followed by loans secured with movable assets, while lowest interest rates were charged for 
immovable assets. Binswanger et al. (1993) also reported that small loans with high interest rates 
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were offered to borrowers without collateral while the reverse holds true for those clients with 
large amount of collateral. Naragajan and Meyer (1995) have identified that, the relationship 
between the collateral, loan size and interests rates depends on the following factors: 
 
i) limits on the assets available as collateral, 
ii) limits on loan-able funds by lenders,  
iii) costs of collateralization,  
iv) the institutional environment, and  
v) the availability of markets to liquidate collateral in case of loan default. 
 
At the household level, borrower characteristics such as the strength of previous business 
relationships, borrowers’ reputation in the market, borrowers’ acceptance of interlinked credit 
contracts, borrowers’ debt-service capacity and borrowers’ wealth status all influences the 
household access to credit. In a study of informal lenders and their clients in Chambar, Pakistan, 
Aleem (1990) was of the opinion that informal lenders mainly used their established relationship 
with clients as a screening mechanism. Lenders will generally not entertain loan applications 
from households with whom they had not had previous dealings either in form of sale of 
harvested output or purchase of farm inputs. The longer the period of business relationship, the 
higher will be the likelihood that the household will have credit access. This is because business 
relationships provide the lender with important information about the potential borrower, 
including his marketable surplus and the way he conducts business. Empirical evidence from the 
study by Kochar (1997) also showed that the likelihood of access to formal credit is influenced 
positively and significantly by whether personal guarantee are given for informal loans, 
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especially if personal guarantees can serve as alternative collateral that is valued by informal 
lenders.      
 
Bell et al. (1997) found that interlinked credit contracts and visible household assets have a 
positive and significant influence on the amount of credit supplied by informal credit agents, 
while Baydas et al. (1994) observed that interest rates, loan period, business profits, and 
education level had a positive and significant influence on the amount of informal credit 
supplied. 
 
In a study of rural credit accessibility in Northern Nicaragua, Vaessen (2001) showed that both 
institutional and household level characteristics influence access to credit. At the institutional 
level, the target group (either women, men or both), the selection criteria of clients, the 
geographical area of operation, and the features of financial products to be provided to address 
sustainability concerns, all which influence credit availability are important factors which lenders 
based their decision on.  At the household level, being part of the target group or living within 
the targeted geographical area also influences credit access. The results from the logit regression 
showed that education level, off-farm activities, and access to a network of information and 
recommendation are all positively and significantly influencing the probability of access to 
credit. The off-farm activities, captured by a trader dummy was used as a proxy for repayment 
capacity while the network of information and recommendation acts as a screening mechanism 
where potential clients are required to be recommended or guaranteed by existing clients, thereby 
acting as social collateral. 
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Access to credit from the Gambian Co-operative according to Zeller et al. (1994) was influenced 
positively and significantly by age and household income, while being female had a negative and 
significant effect. This result implies that an older person who had control of household 
resources is likely to be rated to be more creditworthy, while women were discriminated against 
in the credit market. In the view of Daniels (2001), collateral requirements are a major 
determinant of household access to credit especially in the formal sector. He observed that the 
low levels of collateral among the poor, largely, explained their limited access to financial 
instruments in the formal financial market.   
 
4.5 Conclusion 
Credit access can be defined as the supply side phenomenon of credit markets, because the 
lenders decide whether borrowers can access credit or not. The credit process involves two 
distinct stages. In the first stage, borrowers who have demand for credit decide how much funds 
to apply for and from which particular lender (formal or informal sector) at the prevailing market 
interest rates. This process constitutes the demand side. In the second stage, the lenders decide 
who accesses credit and what amount, which constitutes the supply side. Market imperfections 
and information asymmetry problems raise the probability of default risk, thus lenders do not sell 
loan contracts to every willing buyer (borrower) at the prevailing market price (interest rate). The 
interest rate as the price for credit therefore fails to play its market-clearing role of equating 
credit demand and supply, thus giving rise to equilibrium with credit rationing. 
 
As in many countries in Sub-Saharan Africa, the majority of poor households in South Africa are 
left out financial (credit) market systems. It has been argued the most rural households in South 
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Africa are too poor and cash-strapped to benefit from any kind of access to credit, they are 
essentially shut out of credit and savings services because they did not meet the traditional 
criteria for borrowing. Financial institutions perceived them as bad credit risks. They incur high 
information costs to assess the creditworthiness of small borrowers, and have low returns due to 
the small loan amounts involved. This motivates them to adopt strict collateral requirements as a 
screening mechanism to minimize default risk, hence rationing out the poor from the formal 
credit market. At the household level, the low levels of income and asset accumulation and 
highly skewed income and asset distribution render the poor households to have a high-risk 
profile, which makes them less attractive to formal lenders. The poor with no access to formal 
sector credit have to revert to the informal financial sector to meet their credit demand for both 
productive investment and consumption smoothing. Therefore, poor households’ limited access 
to formal financial risk management instruments (savings, credit and insurance) constrains their 
ability to cope with shocks and further increases vulnerability to poverty. 
 
Given the nature of poverty and the way it is conceptualised in South Africa, it is argued here 
that, it is the intersection between access to credit, income, services and assets that the issue of 
overall poverty trends among the poor rural household should be examined. Even when 
households have access to some credit, they may still have a binding constraint i.e. they may not 
be able to borrow as much as would be optimal under given terms and prices. They may face 
terms that are inconsistent in timing with the investment, and may be stuck in poverty. In the 
next chapter, the concept of credit constraint and its measurement is explored.  
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  CHAPTER 5 
 CREDIT CONSTRAINT: A THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK   
 
 
5. 1 Introduction 
The focus of this chapter is to present a brief literature review on credit constraint. A concise 
definition of credit rationing/credit constraint and a review of the existing approaches for 
measuring access to credit and credit constraints are presented. The weaknesses in the simple 
versions of the life-cycle/permanent income hypothesis (LC/PIH) as an approach for detecting 
credit constraint are exposed. This chapter suggests a credit constraints framework for the 
classification of borrowers that is used in this study.  
 
5.2 Credit Rationing and Credit Constraint   
Despite the frequent use of the term “credit constraint” in economics literature, it is not clear that 
the term is always employed to refer to the same phenomena. In addition, access to credit and 
participation in a credit program are two distinct concepts, which are often confused to mean the 
same thing and are often used interchangeably in many studies. However, in order to 
satisfactorily analyse the socioeconomic determinants of both access to credit and participation 
in credit programmes and to assess their respective impacts on household economic outcomes, a 
clear distinction between access to credit, participation in credit programmes, and being credit 
constrained must be made. 
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Credit market literature distinguishes between access to credit and participation in credit 
markets, according to Diagne and Zeller (2001), a household has access to credit from a 
particular source if it is able to borrow from that source, although it may choose not to borrow 
for a variety of reasons. The maximum amount a household can borrow is a measure of the 
extent of access to credit it has and this is its credit limit. A household is said to have access if 
this amount is positive, whereas it participates in the credit market if it actually borrows from 
that source of credit. This implies that access to credit can be a constraint externally imposed on 
the households, while participation in a credit market is a choice made by a farm household. 
Thus, a household can have access but may choose not to participate in the credit market for such 
reasons as expected rate of return of the loan and/or risk consideration. In this connection, 
Eswaran and Kotwal (1990) argue that a non-participating household that has access to credit 
will still benefit if the knowledge of access increases its ability to bear risk, as it can be 
encouraged to experiment with riskier, but potentially high-yielding technology. The ability to 
borrow will also alleviate the need for accumulation of assets that mainly serve as precautionary 
savings, yielding poor or negative returns (Deaton, 1991). 
 
When a household lacks access to credit or cannot borrow as much as it wants, it said to be credit 
constrained. Hayashi (1987) defined consumers as credit constrained if they face either some 
quantity constraint on the amount of borrowing (i.e. quantity rationing) or the loan rate available 
to them is higher than the rate at which they could borrow.  Duca and Rosenthal (1993) argue 
that a farm household is credit constrained only when it would like to borrow more than lenders 
allow or if its preferred demand for credit exceeds the amount lenders are willing to supply. 
Stiglitz and Weiss (1992), on the other hand, describe credit constraints in two terms viz 
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redlining and credit rationing. Redlining refers to excluding certain observationally distinct 
groups from credit markets, rather than offering them a contract that require higher interest 
payments and collateral guarantee. Credit rationing refers to a situation in which, among 
observationally identical borrowers, some get loans and others are denied. 
 
Zeller et al., (1997) distinguish four groups of farm households in relation to credit constraints. 
The first, referred to as voluntary non-borrowers, are those who decline to borrow at will either 
because they have strong risk aversion and fear of getting into debt or because they are prudent 
and only would like to consume up to what they earn. Others who want to borrow less than their 
combined available credit lines from all lenders referred to as non-rationed borrowers. Rationed 
borrowers are those who want to borrow more than their available credit limit at a particular 
point in time. The last type of farm households, referred to as involuntary non-borrowers, are 
non-borrowers with no access to credit, or those who perceive that they are highly unlikely to get 
credit, so that the perceived borrowing costs outweigh the expected benefits of the loan. 
 
On the supply side, quantity, transaction costs and risks are identified as relevant factors in the 
existing credit market literature (e.g., Feder, 1985; Foltz, 2004). First, farm households are 
credit-constrained if they face a binding supply constraint as limited by lenders’ considerations. 
Second, as lenders may pass on transaction costs associated with screening, monitoring, and 
enforcing loan contracts to borrowers, as in the case of group lending scheme (Besley and Coate, 
1995), farmers with investments profitable when evaluated at the contractual interest rate may 
not be profitable when transaction costs are factored in. Thus, they may decide not to borrow but 
remain credit-constrained. Finally, for households with access to credit, risk may reduce loan 
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demand and hence productivity. For example, Boucher et al. (2005) analytically show that in the 
presence of moral hazard lenders require borrowers to bear some contractual risk, and if this risk 
is sufficiently large, farmers will prefer not to borrow even though the loan would raise their 
productivity and expected income. Lenders assess creditworthiness of their clients based on 
observable characteristics (Bigsten et al., 2003), and extend loans at certain interest rate. This 
means that borrowers are credit-constrained if, at specific interest rate, they would have liked to 
borrow larger amount than the lender supplied. In this case, the borrower exhausts this supply 
and then looks for another lender. However, the fact that this borrower exhausts its supply from 
one source, at specific interest rate, makes it a risky borrower for another lender. 
 
Credit markets in developing countries are inefficient due to market imperfections such as 
interest rate ceilings imposed by governments, monopoly power often exercised by informal 
lenders (Bell et al., 1997), large transaction costs incurred by borrowers in loan acquisition, and 
moral hazard problems (Carter, 1988; Carter and Weibe, 1990). Stiglitz & Weiss (1981) argue 
that the problem where the lender bears risk of the transaction and the borrower obtains project 
benefits can be seen as an information problem. The asymmetries of information in credit market 
imply that first-best credit allocation is not possible, and this leads to the need for partial or full 
collateral. Then, inadequate collateral or lack of it implies that some individuals are denied 
credit, being otherwise identical to those who have the collateral and obtain the credits. In this 
connection, Banerjee (2001) argues that high-income individuals can borrow large amounts at 
low costs whereas low-income ones are able to borrow a small amount at high cost. This 
suggests that income or wealth level of borrowers has a direct relationship with the amount of 
available credit and an inverse relationship with cost of credit. 
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Moreover, lenders may not be allowed legally to charge above certain limits on loans, although 
informal lenders in practice may do so, as noted in Ethiopia by Emana et al., (2005). If the lender 
is not allowed to charge an interest rate at which the expected return is positive, then there will 
be credit rationing. Even if allowed to do so, lenders may be affected by adverse selection and/or 
incentive problems so that the expected return on a loan may not monotonically increase with 
interest rate. That is, lenders may try to avoid selection and incentive problems by rationing 
credit. 
 
For rural finance, access to credit, credit rationing, and credit constraints are related but distinct 
issues. According to Stiglitz and Weiss (1981), lenders are generally unwilling to distribute 
credit based on price alone because of transactions costs and asymmetric information. Credit 
markets are subject to credit rationing when lenders provide less than they could at the prevailing 
interest rates and allot credit based on non-price considerations. A potential borrower may be 
unable to borrow a desired amount, under credit rationing, even if he/she is willing to pay the 
prevailing interest rate. When a firm or household lacks the finance from any source to undertake 
an investment that is profitable at the prevailing input, factor, and output prices, it is said to be 
credit constrained. It is possible for a credit-constrained agent to have access to some credit, but 
not be able to borrow as much as would be optimal under the given terms and prices or may face 
terms that are inconsistent in timing and investment. Consequently, households with access to 
credit may or may not be credit constrained. For households with no access to credit at all, the 
same holds true. A household with no access to credit and who also has no investment needing 
finance is not credit constrained, but one with an investment opportunity and lack access to 
finance may be constrained. 
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Two distinct stages are involved in the credit process. In the first stage, which constitutes the 
demand side of the bargain, the household who wants credit decides on the sum to apply for from 
a particular source at the prevailing market price. In the second stage, the lender makes a 
financing decision on the loan application; this constitutes the supply side of the bargain. The 
lender undertakes the screening of the potential client based on observable characteristics in 
order to minimize default risk; the results of this screening influences the lender’s response to the 
client’s credit demand. Three outcomes are possible, firstly, the loan amount demanded by the 
client may be fully granted by the lender. Secondly, the loan amount demanded by the client may 
be partially granted by the lender and thirdly, the loan application may be completely rejected by 
the lender. The two last scenarios represent credit constraint; the state in which the borrower is 
constrained in his/her access to credit markets or is credit rationed by the lender (Zeller, 1994).       
    
Access to credit does not imply that the demand for credit will be satisfied. Lenders determine 
how much credit is allocated based on the probability of loan default, often resulting in credit 
rationing. The probability of default may be influenced by a number of factors that include the 
expected returns of the project, the terms of the loan, market imperfections and borrower 
characteristics. 
 
The expected return on the borrower's proposed investment project plays a key role in 
influencing the lender's credit rationing behaviour (Kochar, 1997). Here the interest rate plays 
the role of a screening device. If the expected return, is less than the principal loan amount plus 
interest (the terms of the loan), then the probability of default will be high. In such a scenario, the 
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optimal lender's decision will be either to ration the borrower by granting a smaller amount than 
originally applied for or to reject completely the loan application. 
 
Credit markets are characterized by imperfect information that disables interest rates from 
playing their classical market-clearing role (Baydas et al., 1994). Information asymmetry in 
credit markets arises because borrowers have better information about their potential risk of 
default than the lenders (Aleem, 1990). This asymmetry is compounded in informal credit 
markets by the fact that the credit histories of borrowers are not documented and pooled. The 
costs of acquiring this information are very high, in terms of both time and financial resources. 
The other complication is its reliability. If lenders collect such information from the potential 
borrowers themselves, borrowers are likely to give an exaggerated view of their 
creditworthiness. This raises the need to validate such information from other sources. 
Furthermore, if lenders try to collect such information from other community members, there is a 
tendency to withhold information if the one soliciting such information is a stranger. Should 
lenders increase the lending rate to compensate for the higher cost of information gathering or 
the level of reliability of the information, this may result in adverse selection and moral hazard, 
both forms of behaviour of borrowers which may negatively affect the lenders’ returns on loans. 
 
An increase in the interest rate increases the probability of attracting projects with a higher 
probability of default, which in turn reduces the profitability of lending operations. For this 
reason, lenders faced with information asymmetry and lack of control over actions of borrowers 
tend to design credit contracts that will induce borrowers to take actions that enhance the 
likelihood of repayment and also attract low risk borrowers. The lenders may therefore find it 
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optimal to charge lower than equilibrium interest rates and use non-price mechanisms to ration 
credit (Hoff and Stiglitz, 1990). 
 
The specific borrower characteristics that influence the informal lenders’ credit rationing 
behaviour include strength of previous business relationships, reputation in the market, and 
acceptance of interlinked credit contracts, debt-service capacity and wealth status.  Aleem (1990) 
argues that informal lenders mainly use the established relationship with borrowers as a 
screening and credit rationing mechanism. The longer the previous business relationship, the 
lower will be the probability of the borrower being credit rationed. Bell (1990) further points out 
that because it takes so long to build a relationship with formal lenders (a minimum of one year), 
borrowers tend to stick to particular informal lenders so as to avoid the long screening process 
and high probability of loan applications being rejected by new lenders. 
 
The reputation of the potential borrower is another important yardstick that influences the 
informal lenders’ credit rationing behaviour (Siamwalla et al., 1990). Since loans in the informal 
financial sector are mainly character loans (i.e. not backed by any collateral security), the 
borrower’s reputation is of significant importance to the informal lender. For this reason, 
informal lenders invest both financial resources and time to gather information about potential 
borrowers from people known to them both in the market place and the villages where borrowers 
reside. The reputation of the borrower determines the probability of wilful default, which may be 
assessed through how he has performed in the repayment of loans borrowed from other people. 
Borrowers with poor reputations will more likely be credit rationed. 
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The informal lenders’ assessment of the borrowers’ debt service capacity (outstanding debt as 
proportion of total household income) will also influence the probability of their being credit 
rationed (Zeller, 1994). If the debt-income ratio is higher, the potential borrower is more likely to 
be credit rationed. However, the composition of the borrowers’ outstanding debt is of 
significance to the informal lenders’ credit rationing behaviour. If the outstanding debt is mainly 
from the formal financial sector, the informal lender may not be threatened, as he may expect to 
have a better chance of recovering his money as compared to the formal lender. In such a 
scenario, the potential borrower may be less credit rationed. 
 
The borrowers’ acceptance of interlinked credit contracts also determines their likelihood of 
being credit rationed (Udry, 1990). An interlinked credit contract acts as a disguised form of 
collateral that reduces the adverse selection and moral hazard problems and consequently 
reduces the probability of default. It also provides an added incentive for the borrower to repay 
the loan. Bell (1990) argues that there is an effective enforcement mechanism for interlinked 
credit contracts through co-operation among informal lenders. For example, if a farmer who has 
a contract with a trader/lender that links his borrowing to marketing his output then tries to sell 
his agricultural output through another trader, this trader/lender may deduct the loan plus interest 
and pass it on to the original trader/lender that the borrower is trying to dodge. The ease of 
enforcing the interlinked credit contracts explains why borrowers who accept them are less likely 
to be credit rationed. Non-interest credit rationing may be used by lenders to deal with 
information asymmetries. Interlinked contract is also prevalent in the formal markets. 
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In general, rationing can occur through price or quantity mechanisms. Price rationing arises 
when credit markets are cleared through interest rates or through the non-interest terms and 
conditions of the loan contract (Baltensperger, 1978). In contrast, quantity rationing, occurs 
when the borrowers are willing to pay higher interest rates to get larger loan amounts or even just 
to get a loan and the lender is not willing to accommodate this demand. The heterogeneity of 
loan contracts, non-simultaneity of transactions and imperfect information in credit markets may 
lead to equilibrium situations where an excess demand for credit may persist at the equilibrium 
interest rates. 
 
Jaffee and Russell (1976) show how imperfect information and uncertainty can lead to rationing 
in credit markets. They introduced a model with honest borrowers (who want to repay) and 
dishonest borrowers (who are ready to default when the costs of defaulting are low). The lenders 
only know the distribution of these two types of borrowers but not the exact type of each 
individual applicant. In equilibrium, lenders offer contracts with loan sizes smaller than those 
needed to clear the market.  
 
Using a model of credit rationing based on the inability of the lender to discriminate across 
borrowers despite the different costs and risks of lending to them, Gonzalez-Vega (1976) shows 
how credit rationing reduces access to credit in a non-uniform fashion across applicants. In 
particular, when the inability to distinguish comes from interest rate policies; credit rationing 
leads to the exclusion of the poorer applicants from access to credit markets.  
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Stiglitz and Weiss (1981) argue that credit rationing is an equilibrium phenomenon that occurs 
because, at some point, expected lender profits become an inverse function of the interest rate. 
Given limited liability, only high-risk borrowers would be willing to accept loans at high interest 
rates, as they perceive a low probability of repayment and insufficient penalties from default. 
This adversely affects the lender’s profits, as it either creates a composition of riskier borrowers 
(because of adverse selection) or encourages borrowers to invest in riskier projects (because of 
moral hazard). In these circumstances, the bank reduces the number of loans it would make, 
leading eventually to a rationing equilibrium. Williamson (1987) relies on monitoring costs to 
produce credit rationing in equilibrium. 
  
Borrowers can use collateral as a signalling device to show their creditworthiness. Low-risk 
borrowers may be willing to pledge collateral with higher values in order to get lower rates of 
interest. Bester (1985) argues that, because lenders do not know the type of borrower, in a credit-
rationing equilibrium, there is a pool of high-risk and low-risk borrowers. This happens because, 
when high-risk borrowers do not get loans at high interest rates, they still apply for loans at lower 
rates of interest. 
  
Most of the credit rationing models found in the literature, do not consider, however, the 
existence of the informal financial sector. Jain (1999) observes that enterprises in developing 
countries are active both in formal and informal financial markets. He emphasizes the 
informational differences between these two sectors. The informal sector has informational 
advantages over the formal sector; however, the opportunity cost of funds is lower for the formal 
sector. In the formal sector, because of the information asymmetry borrowers are rationed, while 
143 
 
the informal sector still lends to them. He argues that banks are more likely to opt for partial 
financing when the proportion of high-risk borrowers is high. In this case, the volume of 
transactions increases in informal markets. This also happens when interest rate ceilings are 
enforced.  
 
Kochar (1997) investigated the extent of credit rationing in India’s rural credit markets. She 
suggests that in order to understand the degree of rationing in the formal sector, information on 
how many applied and did not receive loans becomes relevant. She argues that the extent of 
rationing in the formal sector is less than what is generally assumed, as the reservation cost of 
informal credit for some households may be less than that of formal credit. In Kochar’s 
framework, non-borrowers comprise those households that do not demand credit from the formal 
or informal sectors as well as those that ask for a loan from the formal sector but are denied and 
then choose not to apply from the informal sector.  
 
Barham, et al., (1996) analyzed the extent of rationing by categorizing producers into the 
following three categories, such as the fully constrained i.e. those who applied but did not 
receive a loan or those who did not apply due to high transaction costs, insufficient collateral or 
fear of risk, such as the loss of collateral. The partially constrained i.e. those who applied but 
received less than the amount they requested, given the terms and conditions of the loan contract 
and the Un-constrained, those who received the full loan amount they desired or those who were 
not interested in a loan.  
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Maldonado (2004) argues that households not using credit may not necessarily be quantity 
rationed and that those using it may be quantity rationed. Therefore, he groups borrowers into the 
four categories. The first category is the “price rationed without a loan” i.e. these are producers 
that did not need a loan or that did not apply for a loan because they perceived unattractive costs 
and benefits from doing so. The terms and conditions of loan contracts seemed too costly from 
their perspective. The second category is the “fully quantity rationed” i.e. these producers either 
applied for a loan but were rejected, or they were so risk averse that they did not feel comfortable 
being in debt, or they did not apply due to their high subjective probability of rejection. The third 
category is the “partially quantity rationed” i.e. these producers got loan amounts smaller than 
what they applied for, and the last category is “price rationed with a loan” i.e. these producers 
received the amount of loan they applied for.  
 
In general, the theoretical literature above shows that credit market failures give rise to 
heterogeneous resource allocation and different outcomes among farm households with varying 
characteristics. That is, a farm household that faces a binding credit constraint, ceteris paribus, 
will misallocate its resources and under-invest compared to its unconstrained peer. Availability 
of finance and its accessibility crucially affect production start-up and subsequent performances 
of the households. Barriers to access adequate loans will have adverse effect on household 
welfare. Increased welfare output following improved access to credit is therefore evidence of 
binding credit constraint. 
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5.3 Empirical Studies on Credit Constraint 
According to Grant (2000), it is believed by economists that at least some agents are credit 
constrained. Credit constraints are offered as one of the most important explanations for a wide 
variety of phenomena that are observed in economics, and also implicitly informs the policy 
debate, not only at the macro-economic level in motivating fiscal and monetary policy, but it also 
motivates micro-economic policies such as supporting small business investment.  
 
The Euler equation framework has been used to analyse the effect of credit constraints (Hall and 
Mishkin, 1982; Mariger, 1987; Zeldes, 1989; Jappelli et al., 1998). These studies focussed on 
explaining the increasing consumption growth rate, and suggested that the rejection of the 
standard Euler equation, in which predictable changes in income were found to affect 
consumption growth, may be due to credit constraints. For example using this method, Hall and 
Mishkin (1982), in a study to investigate the stochastic relation between income and 
consumption using panel data of about 2 000 households in the United States argued as many as 
20 percent of households were constrained. Following the same approach, Zeldes (1989) grouped 
households based on their level of assets and found that while the Euler equation held for high 
asset households, this was not true for households with fewer assets. He thus concluded that 
credit constraints were prevalent among households with low assets. Jappelli et al., (1998) 
grouped their sample by whether they were denied credit and reported similar conclusions.   
 
Ever since the seminal paper by Hall (1978), consumption economists have questioned simple 
versions of the life-cycle/permanent income hypothesis (LC/PIH). This paper and many other 
succeeding papers have rejected the Euler equation formulation for consumption. Another strand 
146 
 
of the literature, for instance, Carroll and Summers (1991) showed how consumption tracked 
income over the life cycle, which again rejects the simple versions of the PIH. One of the most 
popular explanations for this is that at least some consumers face binding credit constraints. 
These consumers would like to borrow more in order to increase their level of consumption, 
which is compatible with their life-cycle budget constraint, but for some reason they could not 
borrow as much as they would like at the ‘market clearing’ interest rate (Hall and Mishkin, 
1982). 
 
For instance, Hayashi (1987) defined consumers as credit constrained if either firstly, they face 
some quantity constraint on the amount of borrowing or secondly, the loan rate available to them 
is higher than the rate at which they could lend. The first is often called credit rationing, and 
there are number of reasons behind such credit rationing by lenders, because some consumers 
default on their loans, and there is imperfect information as to which agents will default (Jaffee 
and Russell 1976; Stiglitz and Weiss, 1981). The decision to default is however not modelled; 
nevertheless, such models show that it can be optimal to restrict lending to consumers. Such 
models imply (see figure 5.1) that lending takes place in discrete jumps: there are a number of 
order points ( ),.....,,0 21 bb between which lending takes place at a constant marginal rate of 
interest. At each of these points kb , there is a jump in the marginal rate of interest charged 
(perhaps to infinity, in which case no lending occurs beyond kb ). 
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Figure 5.1:  The marginal rate of interest as debt increases 
 
In addition, studies by Kehoe and Levine (1993) and Kocherlakota (1996) have attempted 
explicitly to model the decision to default by consumers. This literature aimed to explain the 
limited ability of consumers to pool risk. In these papers, the standard model of an infinitely 
lived, utility maximising consumer subject to a life-cycle budget constraint is augmented by an 
additional constraint on the consumer’s behaviour. This additional constraint explicitly accounts 
for the fact that ex post the consumer may wish to default on his debt, and suffer any penalty that 
ensues. The punishment for default could take many forms but these papers concentrate on 
default resulting from autarky, in which the consumer is permanently excluded from both 
borrowing and lending. By solving these models for a decentralised market economy these 
models can endogenously create credit rationing in which the ability to borrow is restricted to 
some maximum level which depends on the parameters of the model. Above this maximum 
level, default is assured, and hence it is never rational for lenders to allow borrowing beyond this 
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limit. Such models differ from earlier literature in that information is perfect, and in that there is 
one interest rate at which lending occurs (if it occurs at all). 
 
Hajivassiliou and Ioannides (2002) formalised how the Euler equation is affected by credit 
constraints, motivating their switching regression approach. Mariger (1987) tried to estimate the 
effective time horizon in the Euler equation and concluded that 19 percent of households were 
constrained. The rejection of the simple version of the PIH in the Euler equation is one problem 
with this approach, which could instead be due to misspecification of the Euler equation, a point 
that is well known in the literature. Hence, some papers have instead tried more directly to 
estimate or test for credit constraints. The problem is that, denoting iC as a binary variable taking 
the value zero (0) if household i is unconstrained and one (1) if constrained, this variable iC  is 
not directly observed. In much of the literature, some proxy variables have been substituted for 
unobserved latent variables. For instance, Zeldes (1989) splits households by their level of 
assets: low assets households (with a gross asset to monthly income ratio of less than 2) are 
assumed credit constrained. He then documents how low and high assets households’ behaviour 
differs. Japelli (1990) instead uses self-reported responses to a question about credit constraints 
contained in the survey of consumers’ finances. The question asked if the householder had been 
rejected for a loan, or if he had failed to apply for a loan because he feared rejection.  
 
In either case, having chosen the proxy variable, the observations can be partitioned, and those 
who are thought to be credit constrained can be compared to those who are not. When a suitable 
proxy variable exists, there is no need to estimate the incidence of credit constraints, but different 
groups can still be usefully compared. Jappelli (1990) found that about 12 percent of households 
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are credit constrained; if discouraged borrowers are included, it rises to 19 percent. He also 
found that credit constraints were more often binding for low income, low assets, young, and 
black households.   
 
In many cases, it is not clear what variable would be an appropriate proxy for credit constraints 
(Garcia, Lusardi, and Ng, 1997). They used a switching regression technique in the Euler 
equation, and noted that agents would react differently to increases and decreases in income if 
they are at the margin of being constrained. Their technique allowed constraints to be a function 
of several variables, and they found that around 16 percent of agents were constrained. Gross and 
Souleles (2002) looked at credit card balances and limits, and noted that consumers increased 
their borrowing in response to any increase in their limit: they interpreted this as due to credit 
constraints and argue that the effect of credit constraints on consumer behaviour was substantial.   
 
Early estimates of the extra amount that households wanted to borrow, such as Hayashi (1985) 
and Mariger (1987) found by using an Euler equation approach, that credit constraints had little 
effect on debt holdings and consumption. Cox and Jappelli (1993) studied a cross section of 
households and compared a group who were assumed to be credit constrained (based on 
responses to a question about having been turned down for credit), with a group who were not. 
They found that constrained households would like to hold over $8 000 more credit than they 
actually do.   
 
Perraudin and Sorensen (2000) considered a two-stage estimation of asset holding, whereby a 
probit model predicted which asset types were held, while the second stage predicted how much 
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of each asset was held. They found that age, marital status, education, and sex all have 
substantial effects on both the type and quantity of assets. In contrast, Duca and Rosenthal 
(1994) looked at how liquidity constraints affected the ability of households to enter the 
mortgage market again using Jappelli’s “turn-down” measure. Their model allowed for 
selectivity by using a bivariate probit model for the housing choice and whether a household was 
credit constrained or not, finding borrowing constraints particularly affect younger households. 
They asked whether household borrowed, but not how much. 
 
Most often it is not possible to observe directly who is, and who is not, constrained. Moreover, 
although the focus is frequently on whether or not the individual is constrained it seems that the 
underlying question of interest is the determination of the supply and demand for credit. 
Accordingly, it seems valuable to examine whether one can learn anything about demand and 
supply for credit by examining the observed level of credit without observing whether or not the 
household is constrained or not. 
 
One problem is that even if it were known which households were credit constrained, estimates 
of the demand, or other behavioural equations can still be biased. Estimates of the demand 
equation based only on those observations who are credit constrained (for which 0=iC ) are 
likely to underestimate the true demand for credit among constrained households. Those 
households with unusually low level of demand, in the same sense that they have low errors 
draws in the demand equation, are less likely to be observed to be credit constrained. This 
selection problem must be accounted for when recovering a true estimate of how much more 
credit-constrained households want to borrow than they are currently allowed. This problem 
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occurred when Cox and Jappelli (1993) estimated how much more households wish to borrow, 
but was controlled for by Duca and Rosenthal (1994). 
 
One approach, as in Grant (2000), is to make distributional assumptions about the unobservable 
factors generating the observed data and then recover the demand and supply equations by 
imposing the appropriate exclusion restrictions and then estimating the appropriate likelihood 
function. While this approach is attractive, in that it estimates the demand and supply equations, 
the estimation procedure is likelihood based and the resulting estimates, and their statistical 
properties, are thus sensitive to the distributional assumptions, in addition to any other 
parametric assumptions, of the model. 
 
However, irrespective of the methodology employed most empirical literature reviewed below 
support that credit constraints could affect resource allocations, risk behaviour and technology 
choice and adoption in production, which may lead to lower welfare of credit constrained 
household compared to the unconstrained households. For example, better access to credit 
resulted in higher income and consumption in Bangladesh (Diagne and Zeller, 2001) and in 
higher farm profitability in Côte d’Ivoire (Adesina and Djato, 1996), Malawi (Hazarika and 
Alwang, 2003) and in Tunisia (Foltz, 2004). Examining sources of efficiency differentials among 
basmati rice producers in the Punjab province of Pakistan, Ali and Flinn (1989) found significant 
effect of farmers’ access to credit and later Parikh et al., (1995) also found that farmers with 
greater loan uptake were less cost inefficient than those with smaller loan size. Another study in 
Pakistan by Khandker and Faruqee (2003) reported formal credit’s positive impact on household 
welfare outcomes. It was also found that formal credit increased rural income and productivity 
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and that overall benefits exceeded costs of the formal credit system by about 13 percent in India 
(Binswanger and Khandker, 1995). Significant difference in productivities of credit-constrained 
and unconstrained households was observed in China (Feder et al., 1990; Feder et al., 1989). In 
Bangladesh, Pitt and Khandker (1996) examined the impact of credit from the Grameen Bank 
and other two targeted credit programs and found significant effects on household welfare, 
including education, labour supply and asset holding. Freeman et al., (1998) found that the 
marginal contribution of credit to milk productivity was different among credit-constrained and 
non-constrained farmers in east Africa. 
 
More recently, studying the effect of credit constraints in Peruvian agriculture, Guirkinger and 
Boucher (2005) found that productivity of credit-constrained households depended on their 
endowments of productive assets and the credit they obtained from informal lenders. In Ethiopia, 
for example, Alene and Hassan (2006), studying the efficiency of traditional and hybrid maize 
production in eastern Ethiopia, found significant difference in farmers’ technical efficiency due 
to differences in technology choice. The hybrid maize technology required adoption of a package 
of improved seed, chemical fertilizers, and cultural practices that farmers did not equally adopt, 
resulting in low technical efficiency differential. Part of the reason for the farmers’ differential 
adoption of modern technology could be the credit constraints they face. Similarly, Holden and 
Bekele (2004) observed that households with access to credit compensated for increasing risk of 
drought by reallocating their production in such a way that crop sales were lower in good years 
to reduce the need to buy the crops in bad years. They argued that the households would be less 
able to do so without access to credit. Other efficiency studies in Ethiopia referred to earlier also 
identify access to credit as an important factor affecting efficiency of farmers. 
153 
 
It can also be seen that credit constraint is not only a problem of developing countries, where 
credit market imperfection is the norm rather than exception. The problem is present also in the 
developed world, where credit market imperfection is considered significantly lower (Blancard et 
al., 2006; Jappelli, 1990; Färe et al., 1990; Tauer and Kaiser, 1988; Lee and Chambers, 1986). 
For example, Blancard et al., (2006), studying short- and long-run credit constraints in French 
agriculture (where 67 percent of 178 sample farms were financially constrained in the short-run 
and nearly all farms face investment constraints in the long run) found that financially 
unconstrained farms are larger in size and better in economic performance than financially 
constrained small farmers, resulting in a difference of about 8,34 percent in profit. However, the 
nature and extent of credit constraints in developed countries are significantly different from 
those in developing countries, where the imperfection is also prevalent in other factor markets. 
 
In general, although credit is mostly identified as one of the socioeconomic factors affecting 
different outcomes such as farm productivity and profitability, and so on, only few studies have 
directly focused on the effects of credit constraints on household welfare. The generally limited 
studies explicitly addressing the effect of credit constraints on household welfare, suggest that 
more studies are still desirable. 
 
5.4. Measuring Access to Credit and Credit Constraints: A Review of Existing 
Approaches 
There are two methodologies for measuring household access to credit and credit constraints. 
The first and indirect method detects the presence of credit constraints from violations of the 
assumptions of the life cycle or permanent income hypothesis, while the second involves the 
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collection of information directly from household surveys on whether households perceive 
themselves to be credit constrained.  
 
5.4.1 Detection of Credit Constraints through Violation of Life-Cycle Hypothesis 
One of the testable implications of the simple version of the life-cycle/permanent income 
hypothesis (LC/PIH) in Hall (1978) and Deaton (1992) is that in the absence of liquidity and 
borrowing constraints, transitory income shocks should not affect consumption. Empirical 
models use household consumption and income data to look for a significant dependence (or 
“excess sensitivity”) of consumption on transitory income to test for the presence of credit 
constraints based on the life-cycle/permanent income or “consumption-smoothing” hypotheses. 
Empirical evidence of a significant dependence is taken as an indication of a borrowing or 
liquidity constraint. The LC/PIH literature is extensive and has been reviewed among others by 
Gersovitz (1988), Deaton (1989; 1992), Alderman and Paxson (1992), and Browning and 
Lursardi (1996).  
 
The empirical evidence based on the LC/PIH approach, in general, has been inconclusive. The 
first reason that often comes to mind is to think that this is because empirical testing of the 
implications of the LC/PIH requires repeated observations on the same household, whereas most 
of the studies are based on relatively short panels. Nevertheless, there are more fundamental 
reasons why the evidence from the LC/PIH approach for detecting credit constraint has been 
inconclusive. 
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First and possibly the most important violation of the implications of the LC/PIH can result from 
prudent or precautionary behaviour, under condition of uncertainty, even if the household is not 
credit constrained (Kimball 1990; Carroll 1991). Many authors have extended the standard life-
cycle model to clearly incorporate both liquidity constraints and precautionary behaviour, and 
assess through either simulation or empirical testing the importance of each effect (Zeldes 1989; 
Murdoch 1990; Deaton 1991; Paxson 1992). However, due to identification problems to separate 
the effects of credit constraints and precautionary behaviour from the type of income, 
consumption, and asset data typically available for these studies would be practically impossible 
(Browning and Lursardi 1996).  
 
Secondly, according to Carroll (1991), if conditions of uncertainty are correlated with wealth, 
then even in the absence of borrowing constraints, current income will be negatively correlated 
with consumption growth. In addition, as Deaton (1991) clearly points out, the initial asset 
position of households is a major determinant of the effects of negative income shocks on 
consumption. Browning and Lusardi (1996) has outlined several other reasons why even without 
a credit constraint the implications of the LC/PIH may be violated. Furthermore, from the 
simulation results of Deaton (1991), there is an important insight that a credit-constrained 
household may still be able to smooth consumption with precautionary saving and therefore not 
violate any implication of the LC/PIH. For this reason, it is possible to conclude that the 
violation of an implication of the LC/PIH is neither a sufficient nor a necessary condition for 
being credit constrained.   
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5.4.2 Detection of Credit Constraints by directly asking households 
The second method mostly used in empirical studies for detecting the presence of credit 
constraint uses information obtained directly from household members on their participation and 
experiences in the credit market to determine whether they are credit constrained or not. In 
practice, several qualitative questions regarding household loans applications (or lack of) and 
rejections during a given recall period are asked and households based on their responses are 
classified as credit constrained or not. This classification is then used to analyse the determinants 
of the likelihood of a household being credit constrained and the effects of this likelihood on 
various household outcomes in reduced form regression equations. Examples of this approach 
known as the direct elicitation methodology (DEM) include Petrick (2004) who evaluates the 
impact of credit constraints on farm output in Poland; Foltz (2004) who evaluates the impact of 
credit constraints on farm profit in Tunisia; and Carter and Olinto (2003) who examines the 
impact of credit constraints on investment level in Paraguay.  
 
This method was first used by Jappelli (1990) with data from the United States 1983 Survey of 
Consumer Finances. Feder et al. (1990) using data from a household survey in China also 
employed this method. It was subsequently adopted by Zeller (1994), Schrieder and Heidhues 
(1995), and Barham et al. (1996) with data from Guatemala and Zeller, et al. (1996) with 
household survey data from Madagascar, Cameroon and Pakistan. The theoretical justification 
for the direct elicitation method, (i.e. by directly asking the households if they are credit 
constrained or not), can be found in the extended version of the life-cycle/permanent income 
model that explicitly allows for the possibility of a credit constraint. For instance, Jappelli 
(1990), in analysing the determinants of the likelihood of a household being constrained used 
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credit constraint inequality in the extended model to derive reduced-form equations. According 
to Browning and Lusardi (1996), an important contribution toward empirically identifying the 
respective effects of liquidity constraint and precautionary behaviour in life-cycle models is the 
information on household credit market experiences collected in the direct method.   
 
5.5 Conclusion 
Stiglitz and Weiss (1981) have shown that asymmetric information and adverse selection 
typically prevail in credit markets, giving rise to credit rationing as an optimal behaviour. 
Furthermore, government interventions in form of interest rate ceilings or subsidized interest 
rates used to be common in many developing countries’ agricultural sector has also necessitated 
rationing. Whenever credit supply is rationed, some borrowers cannot obtain the amount of 
credit they desire at the prevailing interest rate, nor can they secure more credit by offering to 
pay a higher interest rate. In such a circumstance, liquidity becomes a binding constraint on 
many farmers’ operations. 
 
Feder, et al., (1990) have revealed that whenever liquidity is constraining, the amount and 
combinations of inputs used by a household will be lower than their notion optimal levels (the 
level that would have been utilized if liquidity was not a binding constraint). Access to credit can 
facilitate levels of inputs closer to their potential levels when capital is not a constraint. Provision 
of production credit can, therefore, lead to higher levels of output per farm and yield given fixed 
resources such as land. Policy makers and financial institutions however need to assess 
accurately the magnitude of the expected gain in welfare resulting from the allocation of credit 
for production purposes. If the marginal contribution of credit is zero or relatively small, then 
158 
 
reallocation of credit to other activities or sectors with higher marginal productivity may actually 
lead to an improvement in the welfare of the rural poor. The assessment of expected productivity 
gain is not trivial as the effect of credit is likely to differ between liquidity constrained and 
unconstrained households. 
 
In this study, the impact of credit constraint on household welfare is evaluated in a developing 
country context where insurance mechanisms are weak and access credit requires that agents 
post collateral, so financing production with credit imply significant risk. The existing literature 
focused on the impact of supply side manifestations of credit market imperfections, namely, on 
the impact of quantity rationing (liquidity constraints) on agricultural productivity (Feder, 1985; 
Foltz, 2004).  
 
This study builds on the existing literature in two ways. First, by defining credit constraint in a 
broader and more theoretical term. In the existing literature, households are classified as 
constrained if they demonstrate an excess demand for credit so that they face a binding supply 
constraint (they are quantity rationed). The second is empirical; the study explores the 
relationship between household welfare and their endowment for constrained and unconstrained 
households using a cross sectional data set collected in the Eastern Cape, South Africa. 
Specifically, the study estimates a switching regression model using the semi-parametric 
technique introduced by Maddala (1986). This technique allows the control both for selection 
into the observed constraint regime and endogeneity of explanatory variables. A detailed 
econometric specification of the switching regression model and other econometric models 
employed in this study is presented in Chapter 6.    
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  CHAPTER 6 
RESEARCH METHODS AND ANALYTICAL TECHNIQUES 
 
 
6.1 The Study Area: Socio-Economic and Demographic Profile of Amathole District 
Municipality 
The study was conducted in the Amathole District Municipality of the Eastern Cape Province. 
The Amathole District Municipality is a Category C municipality, which came into being after 
the local government elections in December 2000, when the Demarcation Act came into 
effect. Its area of jurisdiction is made up of eight local municipalities as follows: Buffalo City 
Municipality, Amahlathi Municipality, Nxuba Municipality, Nkonkobe Municipality, Ngqushwa 
Municipality, Great Kei Municipality, Mnquma Municipality, and Mbhashe Municipality 
(Amathole District Profile, 2007). 
 
The Amathole District Municipality stretches along the coastline of the south-eastern part of the 
Eastern Cape Province taking the former areas of Ciskei and Transkei as well as former Cape 
Provincial Administration Areas. The district is mountainous in the northern and north-western 
parts sloping towards the coast in the east and south-west. It municipality incorporates the former 
magisterial districts of Willowvale, Idutywa and Elliotdale (Mbashe); Butterworth, Nqamakwe 
and Centane (Mnquma); Komga (Great Kei); Keiskammahoek, Cathcart and Stutterheim 
(Amahlati); East London, King William’s Town, Zwelitsha and Mdantsane (Buffalo City); 
Peddie (Ngqushwa); Fort Beaufort, Alice, Middledrift and Seymour (Nkonkobe) and Bedford 
and Adelaide (Nxuba) (Eastern Cape Province, 1995).   
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Amathole has the second largest population in the Eastern Cape after O.R. Tambo and has the 
third largest population density, which is, 70 people in one square kilometre. This varies widely 
across the municipalities, from 172 people per square kilometre in the urban centre of Buffalo 
City, to 6 people per square kilometre in Nxuba (Amathole District Profile, 2007). 
 
The Amathole district is comparatively poor district in terms of poverty measures such as Human 
Development Index (HDI), which is estimated at (0,53), poverty gap (R1 682 million) and 
number of people living in poverty (66, 7 percent). The average income level in the area is US$ 
160 per household per month. Incomes are predominantly derived from social grants such as 
pensions and child support grants, remittances from migrant labour and natural resource use 
(Eastern Cape Province, 1995).   
 
The population is predominantly African (92,49 percent). The white population makes the 
second largest (4,08 percent). Approximately 33, 4 percent of the populations are below 15 years 
of age. Almost 46 percent of the population is below 20 years. This is an indication of economic 
underdevelopment of this district, due to high child dependency. Women outnumber men in the 
Amathole district municipality, 46 percent of the populations are males and 54 are females. In a 
recent survey, 33 percent of all households sampled indicated that the household head was a 
woman while 43 percent of the sample households had no resident male members over the age of 
18 (CSS, 1997). 
 
A number of small state-sponsored irrigation schemes exist across the municipality but these are 
operating well below their potential, with production reduced by lack of supporting infrastructure 
and services, poor maintenance of equipment, lack of management and marketing skills, and 
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political conflicts. The area has a high density of semi-subsistence farmers. Between 50 – 60 
percent of the rural households, enjoy some access to arable land. Somewhere between a quarter 
and a half of households, own cattle, although the great majority of herds are less than ten head. 
Small stock - sheep and goats - are owned by slightly more households than cattle, but average 
herd sizes are not substantially greater (Provide, 2005).   
 
Many rural households are effectively self-sufficient in their staple foods. Small-scale livestock 
farmers sell limited numbers of livestock through private livestock traders for cash needs. 
Estimates of agricultural income, in terms of cash sales and produce consumed within the 
producing household, show great variability, but most studies put it at between 10 percent and 25 
percent of average household income, of which the greater part is accounted for by direct 
consumption (Provide, 2005).   
  
Levels of infrastructure development are well behind national averages. Ten percent or less of 
households have piped water with some 64 percent of the population relying on natural sources 
of water, such as untreated springs, streams, rivers and dams. Sanitation service levels are 
extremely low with more than 51 percent of households having no sanitation. School attendance 
in the area is good, but education levels remain low. There is a shortage of health services, which 
is exacerbated by a high incidence of HIV (Human Immunodeficiency Virus) and AIDS 
(Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome) (Amathole District Profile, 2007). 
 
Access to the area is limited mostly to gravel roads, leading from the N2 towards the coast and 
this seriously hampers development opportunities and provision of services. The economy of the 
Eastern Cape is characterized by uneven development. This is evident in a number of dualisms: 
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between the two urban industrial manufacturing centres and the rural areas of the former 
homelands of Ciskei and Transkei; between a developed commercial farming sector and a 
subsistence agricultural sector; and between concentrations of fairly well developed and efficient 
social and economic infrastructure in the western parts of the province and its virtual absence in 
the East (Provide, 2005).   
 
Figure 6.1 shows the map of Amathole District Municipality.  
    
   
   Figure 6.1: Map of Amathole District Municipality in the Eastern Cape Province South 
Africa. 
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6.2 Sampling Procedure 
A multistage sampling technique was used to select representative households for the study. The 
first stage involved the selection of three local municipalities from the Amathole District 
Municipality. There are eight local municipalities in the Amathole district municipality namely, 
Mbashe, Mnquma, Great Kei, Amahlathi, Buffalo City, Ngqushwa, Nkonkobe and Nxuba. 
Among these, three municipalities were randomly selected for the study in the first stage, 
namely, Ngqushwa, Amahlathi and Nkokonbe. The second stage involved random sampling of 
six villages within these local municipalities. These areas are Peddie and Hamburg for 
Ngqushwa, Stutterheim and Keiskammahoek for Amahlathi, and Alice and Seymour for 
Nkonkobe. A reconnaissance survey was conducted to identify households that have applied for 
micro-credit, in the study period in these rural communities. In the third stage, twenty-five 
respondents were randomly selected to make them representative of the three municipalities. 
Respondents were restricted to those that had applied for credit in the year of the survey. One 
hundred and fifty households were interviewed in the survey exercise. To complement this, lists 
of borrowers was also obtained from Eastern Cape Rural Finance Corporation, (ECRFC) 
otherwise known as the UVIMBA FINANCE.   
 
The factors that were considered in deciding on the size of the sample for the study include the 
following: 
• The degree of precision required between the sample population and the general 
population. 
• The variability of the population. 
• The sampling method. 
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6.3 Collection of Data 
Two major types of data were used for the study; these are the primary and secondary data. The 
primary data were collected by structured questionnaires from a cross section of rural household 
heads who had applied for credit either from the formal or informal sector.  
 
Information collected in the survey include data on household socio-economic and demographic 
characteristics of the household heads, land tenure, livestock ownership, asset ownership, credit 
and savings, income and expenditure variables and household levels indicators. Control 
questions were included in the questionnaire to verify the consistency of the answers. In addition, 
the enumerators were trained to use other control questions not included in the questionnaire 
whenever there seemed to be inconsistencies in a respondent’s answers. 
  
A pilot survey was conducted in order to check the efficacy of the questionnaire. This exercise 
was particularly useful in checking the understanding of the questions by respondents. 
Information collected through these interviews was very helpful also in the development of the 
final questionnaire used for data collection. 
 
A good deal of time was further spent in the field and in the office checking the consistency of 
answers to the questions. Secondary data were also collected from the Eastern Cape Rural 
Finance Corporation, (ECRFC), as a supplement to the data collected on the field.  
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6.4 Analytical Techniques: 
The following analytical tools were used to achieve the stated objectives of the study. 
 
6.4.1 Descriptive Statistics 
Descriptive statistics such as mean, median, percentages and frequency distribution were used in 
describing the socio-economic and demographic characteristics of the households. 
 
6.4.2 Poverty Gap Index/Ratio 
In order to achieve objective one of the study, the mathematical model developed by Foster, 
Greer and Thorbecke (1984), known as the FGT model of poverty decomposition was adopted to 
determine the incidence, depth and severity of poverty in the study area. The use of the FGT 
measures required the definition of a poverty line, which was calculated based on aggregated 
data on household expenditure. 
 
Determination of Poverty Lines  
The poverty line is the level of welfare that distinguishes poor households from non-poor 
households. This is a pre-determined and well-defined standard of income or value of 
consumption (expenditure). Poverty lines are often drawn in either relative or absolute terms.  In 
the former, a proportion of the mean expenditure is taken as the poverty line, usually the one-
third (which defines the core poverty line) and two-third (which defines the moderate poverty 
line) of mean expenditure have been commonly used. The absolute poverty line is a 
predetermined one based on some minimum food and non-food expenditure below which a 
household is defined as poor if its consumption level is below this minimum. In other words, the 
poverty line is fixed in terms of the standard of living it commands over the domain of poverty 
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measurement. The choice of consumption-based rather than an income-based measure of 
household welfare is motivated by the fact that income can be viewed as a measure of welfare 
opportunity or a measure of potential welfare. Consumption, on the other hand, can be 
interpreted as a realized welfare or a measure of welfare achievement (Hentschel and Lanjouw, 
1996; Atkinson, 1989). Since realised rather than potential welfare is the concerned, 
consumption is arguably a more appropriate indicator.   
 
This study was based on relative poverty line approach. Relative poverty lines were constructed 
based on total household per capita consumption (expenditure) as the basic unit of household 
welfare; and the household’s expenditure were corrected for household size and its demographic 
characteristics following Deaton and Muellbauer (1980) as follows; 
 
(1)  θα )( KAE +=  
Where, 
 =E Number of adult equivalents 
=A Number of adults 
=K Number of children 
 
=α Fractional representation of children in adult equivalence i.e. child cost ratio 
=θ Scale parameter 
The adult equivalent conversion formulae of 9.0)5.0( KAE += was adopted for the analysis, 
most poverty studies in South Africa have adopted the values of =α 0.5 and =θ 0.9 (May et al., 
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1995). The sensitivity of the poverty profile to changes in values of α  (from =α 0.5 to =α 0.8) 
and θ (from =θ 0.5 to =θ 0.9), was tested. It was found that the poverty lines were robust at 
=α 0.5 and =θ 0.9. 
 
The mean monthly per adult equivalent household expenditure (MPAEHE) of the sample 
respondents was determined by dividing the total real per adult equivalent expenditure for all 
households by the total number of households sampled. Hence, extremely (core) poor, 
moderately poor and non-poor household were identified. Those households who spend less than 
one-third (1/3) of MPAEHE were classified as extremely poor, less than two-third (2/3) of the 
MPAEHE as moderately poor, while non-poor are those who spend two-third or more of 
MPAEHE. Total per capita expenditure was used as a proxy for the standard of living of the 
household in the study area. From the poverty lines, the poverty profile of different groups in the 
study area was analysed and measured through the FGT model.   
 
The share of the population below poverty line provides a quick indication of the scope of the 
problem within a given setting. In this study, total monthly expenditure was expressed in per 
adult equivalent terms by adjusting for household size as each household size divides its total 
monthly expenditure.  
 
The Poverty Gap Index/Ratio 
The FGT measure, which is an approach to absolute poverty, is expressed as: 
(2)  
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Where;  
 =z Poverty line  
 
=m Number of households below poverty line 
 
=n Number of households in the reference population/total sampled population 
 =iy Per adult equivalent expenditure of thi household 
 
=α Poverty aversion parameter  
 =− iyz Poverty gap of the 
thi household 
 
=
−
z
yz i Poverty gap ratio 
The headcount index is obtained by setting the ,0=α  ,1=α  the yield poverty gap index, and 
,2=α
 
yield the squared poverty gap index.  If  0=α  in equation (2), the expression 
decomposes to 
 
(3)  
n
qq
n
P == )(10  
This gives a measure of the incidence of poverty also known as the headcount ratio or headcount 
index (H) - the percentage of the population living in households with consumption per capita 
that is less than the poverty line, i.e. the proportion of the poor in the total population. 
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When 1=α  in equation (2) the expression becomes: 
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Here the head count ratio is multiplied by the expenditure gap between the average poor person 
and the poverty line. This gives a measure of the depth of poverty or poverty gap index defined 
by the mean distance below the poverty line as a proportion of that line (where the mean is 
formed over the entire population, counting the non-poor as having zero poverty gap). 
When 2=α  in equation (2) the expression is as below: 
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This gives a measure of the severity of poverty and an indication, when multiplied by 100, of the 
percentage by which a poor household’s income should increase to move them out of poverty. It 
is the mean of the squared proportionate poverty gaps, this allows for concern about the poorest 
of the poor by attaching greater weight to the poverty of the poorest than of those just below the 
line, which provides an intensity of poverty for different households. The poverty square index 
also satisfies the Sen-Transfer axiom, which requires that if expenditure is transferred from a 
poor to a poorer household, measured poverty decrease. 
 
6.4.3 The Tobit Regression Model 
This analysis also employed the Tobit regression model, a hybrid of the discrete and continuous 
models, to determine the correlates of poverty. The Tobit model is an econometric model in 
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which the dependent variable is censored; censoring occurs because the values below zero are 
not observed. The Latent variable *iW cannot always be observed while the independent variable
iX  is observable. The model is expressed below, following McDonald and Mofitt (1980):  
 
(6)  iii XWq εβ +== '   If 0* >iW      
  iii Xq εβ +== '0  If 0* ≤iW  150.......,3,2,1=i households. 
 
iq  is the dependent variable, it is discrete when the household is not poor and continuous when 
poor. The welfare indicator *iW  is given as: 
(7)  
Z
YZW ii
−
=
*
 
 
Where Z  is the poverty line and iY  is the consumption expenditure per adult equivalent. 0* >iW
implies that W is observed, while the reverse is the case when 0* <iW . The vectors of 
independent variables are denoted by iX , 'β is the vector of unknown coefficients and iε  is an 
independently distributed error term. 
 
Selection of explanatory variables 
The set of independent variables that are hypothesized to determine consumption and hence 
poverty includes demographic and household level characteristics. They key criterion for 
selecting potential determinants of consumption was exogeneity. Explanatory variables that are 
arguably exogenous to current consumption are selected, as the goal of the model is to infer 
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causality. The values of endogenous variables are assumed to be influenced by exogenous 
variables, but in return are not influence by those variables as no feedback relation between the 
endogenous and exogenous variables is assumed (Judge et. al., 1985).  As a result, explanatory 
variables whose values are determined outside of the current economic system of household, but 
also determine the current level of household welfare were selected (Mukherjee and Benson, 
2003). The selection of these potential determinants is guided by results of the poverty profile of 
the South Africa Poverty and Inequality Report (May, 1998), as well as by those variables 
known to be of considerable interest to South Africa’s policy makers. The set of explanatory 
variables selected as possible determinants of poverty in the study area are presented in Table 
6.1. 
 
6.4.4 The Logistic Regression Model 
To estimate the determinants of household access to credit, the probability of household access 
to credit is assumed to be determined by an underlying response variable that captures the true 
households’ socio-economic status. In the case of credit access status (i.e. with access or without 
access), the underlying response variable *A  is defined by the regression equation: 
 
(8) iii uXA +Σ= β'*  
 
In the equation (8), *A is not observable, as it is a latent variable. What is observable is an event 
represented by a dummy variable A defined by: 
(9) 1=A   if *A > 0  and  0=A  otherwise 
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Table 6.1  Explanatory variable for the determinants of household poverty 
Variable Measurement A priori Expectation 
Age Completed years Indeterminate 
Gender  1 if male; 0 otherwise Male-headed households are 
expected to generate better 
welfare outcomes than female. 
Education 
 
Number of years of schooling Education is expected to lead to 
increase earning potential and 
consequently increase welfare 
Dependency ratio This is measured as the 
number of dependants (aged 0-
14 and over the age of 65) to 
the total household size, 
expressed as a percentage. 
Dependency ratio is positively 
related to welfare. High 
dependency ratio exerts 
consumption stress on the 
household. 
Primary occupation 1 if farming; 0 otherwise Indeterminate 
Land ownership 1 if yes; 0 otherwise Land ownership is expected to 
increase household welfare 
Credit availability 1 if yes; 0 otherwise Credit availability is expected to 
increase household welfare 
Remittance, pension, 
social grants 
Measured as the amount 
received in Rands. 
It is expected to boost 
household welfare 
Per Capita Income (PCI) Amount in Rands. This is expected to negatively 
influence poverty 
Assets ownership (oxen, 
poultry, etc) 
1 if not less than the 75th 
percentile among households 
who owned at least one of that 
type of livestock8; 0 otherwise 
This is expected to increase 
household welfare 
 
From equation (8) and (9), the following expression can be derived: 
 
(10)
  
( ) )(Pr1Pr 'βiii XuobAob ∑−>==    
            = )(1 'βiXF ∑−−  and, 
 
( ) )(,0Pr 'ββ iii XFXAob ∑−==  
                                                 
8
 In practice, the 75th percentile was approximately equal to the mean for all types of livestock. 
173 
 
 
Where F is the cumulative distribution function for iu . 
 
The observed values of A are the realisation of the binomial with probabilities given by 
equation (10), which varies with iX . Thus, the likelihood function can be written as: 
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This can be written as: 
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The log likelihood function for the two equations above (11a and 11b) can be written as: 
(12) ∑
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The functional form imposed on F  in equation (12) depends on the assumption made about the 
error term iu  in equation (8). The cumulative normal distribution and logistic distribution are 
very similar, yielding the same result (Maddala, 1983). In addition, from Amemiya (1981), once 
the parameter of estimates is obtained from the logit model, it is possible to derive the would-be 
estimates of a probit model. Hence, in this study the logit model is used. In this study, the logit 
model is specified by assuming a logistic cumulative distribution of iu  in F  (in equations (11a) 
and (11b). The relevant logistic expressions are: 
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Where β   refers to the vectors of parameters that reflect the impact of changes in X  on the 
probability of having access to credit source. The choice of a particular form for the right hand 
side of the equation (13) leads to an empirical model. Adopting the logit analysis, the probability 
that a household would have access to a formal credit source is given by the regression model: 
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 Equation (8) is a logistic cumulative distributions function where: 
 
(15) iii uXX +∑+= βββ 0'   
And; 
e = base of natural logarithm 
0β = the constant term 
iβ = the vector of coefficients 
iX = the vectors of explanatory variables, and 
iu = the error term 
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The estimation of equation (15) using the maximum likelihood methods helps to identify 
statistically significant explanatory variables. In the preceding discussions, a list of factors were 
identified that influenced accessibility of credit for rural poor households. Some of these factors 
would be used in the analysis. It is hypothesized that household access to credit could depend 
upon the gender, age, educational status, monthly income, land ownership, value of assets, 
savings, remittances and pension, dependency ratio, awareness of credit institution, repayment 
capacity and social capital. 
 
These characteristic are important in two ways: 
 
a) They can influence household demand for credit; and 
b) Potential lenders are likely to base their assessment of borrowers’ creditworthiness on 
these characteristics. 
 
The set of explanatory variables selected as possible determinants of household access to credit 
in the study area are presented in Table 6.2. It is difficult to separate completely the variables 
affecting demand or access because decision-making at both stages is based almost more on 
households’ demand for rather than access to formal credit. These include; age, household 
income, sex of household head, savings and assets. 
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Table 6.2 Data Specifications for the Logistic Regression Model 
VARIABLE SYMBOL TYPE A PRIORI EXPECTATION 
Dependent Variable    
Credit Status: 1= Access to 
credit, 0= otherwise 
 Binary - 
Independent Variables    
Age 
(Age of household head in 
years) 
AGE Continuous Age is hypothesised to negatively affect the 
probability of having access to credit, in so 
far that older clients may not be as active as 
younger ones in their enterprises. 
Gender 
(Male=1,0 otherwise) 
GENDER Binary Male are expected to have greater access to 
credit than female, hence its expected sign is 
positive. 
Education 
(No of years spent in school) 
SCHATTEN Continuous The coefficient is expected to be positive. 
Higher levels of education imply better 
technical knowledge and skills, more 
information on markets and facilities 
provided by financial institutions.  
Monthly income 
(in Rands) 
MINCOM Continuous Monthly income is posited to affect 
negatively access to credit. Its sign is 
expected to be negative. 
Land ownership  LANDOWN Binary Land ownership, as opposed to rental and 
other form of access to land is expected to 
increase the long run investment incentives 
and the collateral value of the land to 
lenders. Its expected sign is positive. 
Assets 
(Estimated value in Rands) 
ASSET Continuous The coefficient is expected to be positive, 
especially if the value is high, it could serve 
as collateral for credit obtained.  
Savings 
(in Rands) 
 
SAVING Continuous The sign is indeterminate. It may influence 
the lender to grant credit or may inhibit 
access.  
Remittance and pension 
(in Rands) 
REMPEN Continuous This is posited to affect negatively the 
probability of access to credit. Its coefficient 
is expected to be negative.  
Dependency ratio DEPRATIO Continuous High dependency ratio is posited to affect 
negatively the probability of access to credit. 
Its coefficient is expected to be negative. 
Repayment record 
(Good repayment record = 1, 0 
otherwise) 
REPYTRCD Binary It is posited that clients who repaid their 
previous loans are perceived as creditworthy 
and are provided with more in the 
subsequent season or year. 
Social Capital 
(A value equal to the Numbers 
of groups belonged) 
SOCICAP Continuous Belonging to a social network may be 
representative of client social relationships 
and may signal his ability to fulfil 
obligations. Its expected sign is positive.  
Awareness 
(Aware of a credit source = 1, 0 
otherwise) 
AWAREN Binary Awareness may have a strong bearing on 
accessibility of credit hence its sign is 
expected to be positive. 
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6.4.5  The Switching Regression Model 
The most natural way to assess the effects of credit constraints on the economic welfare of the 
household would be to run regression of the form: 
 
  iiii XCy εβγ ++= '   
 
Where iy
 
denotes alternative measures of interest on the welfare of household i ; iC denotes 
whether a household is credit constrained or not and iX observable characteristics of the 
household. iε is the unobserved random heterogeneity. While intuitively, this approach will give 
consistent estimates of ,γ  the effect of credit constraints on the welfare of the household. One 
must recognise at the very least that it is not possible to observe a pure random sample of iy , iC
and iX . To illustrate this, imagine a group of households with the same characteristics iX and 
randomly we allow some households to be credit constrained ( 1=iy ) and other to be 
unconstrained ( 0=iy ). Under these circumstances, one could consistently estimate the effects of 
credit constrained by the difference in the estimated means of the household welfares.  
 
Now, for households with different characteristics iX , in as much as the sampling is random, 
Ordinary Least Square (OLS) will yield consistent estimates of the effects of credit constraints. 
The problem at hand now, is that credit constraints condition is indeed determined by the lender, 
and as such, it is quite possible that a set of factors affect both, household welfare and credit-
constrained conditions. Using the previous equation, the problem is that whether a household is 
credit constrained may depend on iX  and iε . Clearly, the major problem is that the 
counterfactual welfare that households that are credit constrained would have had without being 
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constrained are not observed. In addition, we do not observed the welfare that households that 
are not credit constrained would have had if they were constrained. If we could estimate such 
counterfactuals, this problem could be solved.    
 
This is known as the sample selectivity problem and is well known in economics literature. In 
this study, a strategy developed by labour economists is adopted, mostly by Heckman (1979). A 
switching regression model was used to correct for possible sample selection bias, which may 
arise from other interventions that provide multiple services to the households in addition to 
credit (Lee, 1978; Maddala, 1983). Empirical applications of this model are found in studies by 
Feder et al., (1990); Goetz (1992); Fuglie and Bosch (1995) and Freeman, et al., (1998).     
 
The two-stage switching regression model applied in this study uses a probit model in the first 
stage to determine the relationship between households’ credit constraint condition and a number 
of socio-economic and credit variables. In the second stage, different regression equations are 
used to model the households’ welfare conditional on a specified criterion function. The credit 
constraint condition of the thi  household is described by an unobservable excess demand for 
credit *iC , which is postulated to be a function of a vector of exogenous household socio-
economic and credit variables.   
 
The endogenous switching regression model (Maddala, 1986) was to estimate the effect of credit 
constraints on households’ welfare. The switching regression model is because in each period, 
the probability of a household being credit constrained is non-zero.  This probability varies 
according to household characteristics, and only one realisation of these probabilities is possible 
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in one period (Gilligan et al., 2005). Households are categorized into credit constrained and 
unconstrained regimes by directly asking the household whether they needed more credit for 
their investment activities. Whether a household had an excess demand for credit, is established 
through a series of questions. Excess demand for credit is therefore treated as a latent variable for 
each household. However, this procedure does not assess the magnitude of the constraint, but it 
provides an indicator of whether or not a household is credit constrained (Gilligan et al., 2005).  
 
The endogenous switching model allows for a joint estimation of the determinants of 
households’ credit constraint conditions and the household welfare in the two regimes, in this 
case, depending on whether a household is credit constrained or unconstrained. Distinct 
regressions are estimated for credit constrained households and unconstrained households, with 
mean monthly per adult equivalent household expenditure as an explanatory variable. To correct 
for possible self-selection biases, a probit credit constrained criterion function was estimated by 
including the inverse Mills ratio and use to correct the error term in each equation.  These 
equations are estimated jointly using the Maximum Likelihood.  
 
The Model Specifications 
The first step is to estimate the household credit constrained condition by a Probit function with 
the specification: 
 
 (16)  0* >+= iii ZC µα      )1,0(~iµ   
 



=
0
1
iC  
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Where   1=iC   if  *iC  > 0  and 0=iC   if otherwise  
 
The household credit constraint criterion equation is a reduced-form equation, i.e. the condition 
of whether a household is credit constrained or unconstrained, and is given by an index model,
*
iC  which is a latent variable that cannot be observed but being estimated. iZ
 
represents a vector 
of explanatory variables,α  is a vector of estimated parameters, and iµ  is a random error term, 
distributed as a normal function with null mean and the variance normalized to one in order to 
allow for the estimation of coefficients. Finally, a household welfare equation is estimated by the 
following regression equations with regime 1 representing credit constrained households and 
regime 0 representing unconstrained households. 
 
(17a) ii Xy 11'11 εβ += ,  if  1=iC   
(17b) ii Xy 00'00 εβ += , if  0=iC      
 
With: 
∑

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As demonstrated Maddala (1983), the expected values of the error terms i1ε and i0ε
 
are not zero. 
This makes direct OLS estimation of equations (17) inappropriate. This problem is addressed by 
calculating the inverse Mills ratio from equation (16).  
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The expected household’s welfare, conditional to credit constrained regime can be computed as; 
 
[ ]1,1 =iii CXyE  =  [ ]0,1 >+ iiii ZXyE µα  
     = [ ]iii ZEX αµεβ −>+ 111  
(18a)     = [ ])(/)()( 1111 ii ZZX ααφρσσβ µ Φ+    
 
In the same way, the expected household welfare, conditional to the unconstrained regime, is 
given by: 
  
[ ]0,0 =iii CXyE  =  [ ]0,0 <+ iiii ZXyE µα  
     = [ ]iii ZEX αµεβ >+ 000  
(18b)     = [ ])(1/)()( 0000 ii ZZX ααφρσσβ µ Φ−−+    
 
Where y is household welfare, 1X and 0X  are vectors of the explanatory variables for credit 
constrained and unconstrained households respectively, while β  is a vector of the corresponding 
estimated parameters. The terms i1ε and i0ε  are random error terms, distributed as normal 
function with zero means. The terms φ  and Φ  are the probability density function and 
cumulative distribution function of the standard normal distribution respectively. According to 
Greene (2003), the ratio φ  and Φ
 
evaluated at Z'α  is the inverse Mills ratio (λ ). This reflects 
the truncation of a normal distribution at Z'α . 
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Therefore, the variables [ ])()(1 ii ZZ ααφλ Φ=  and [ ])(1)(0 ii ZZ ααφλ Φ−−=  could be added to 
the 1X
 
and 0X vectors respectively in equations (18a) and (18b) to yield; 
 
(19a)  [ ]1,1 =iii CXyE  = iX 111111 )( ελρσσβ µ ++
 
(19b)  [ ]0,0 =iii CXyE  = iX 000000 )( ελρσσβ µ ++    
 
The covariance of the credit constrained criterion equation (16) and the credit constrained 
household welfare equation (19a), and the credit constrained criterion equation (16) and the 
unconstrained household welfare equation (19b), are represented by the multiplicative terms 
11 ρσσ µ  and 00 ρσσ µ
 
respectively. These covariances can be split into the standard deviations of 
the appropriate equations 01 ,, σσσ µ  and the correlations 1ρ and 0ρ . However, µσ cannot be 
estimated and is normalised to 1.0, because of the structure of the model and the nature of the 
derived data (Greene, 2003). 
  
To measure the endogeneity of the credit constrained condition, a test of whether 1ρ and 0ρ  are 
statistically different from zero is required, since estimates of 1ρ and 0ρ  shows the correlation of 
the “unobservables” of the credit constrained criterion equation with the “unobservables” of the 
credit constrained and unconstrained household welfare equations respectively. If 1ρ and 0ρ   are 
zero, then the credit constraint is exogenous, and it would not be necessary to model and include 
the credit constrained criterion equation in estimating the effect of credit constraints on 
household welfare.   
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The software LIMDEP (1998) was used in estimating equations (16), (19a), and (19b). The 
probit function (16) was first estimated by maximum likelihood using OLS estimated starting 
values. The predicted values from the probit function are then used to calculate the inverse Mills 
ratio, which is subsequently included as an explanatory variable when estimating equations (19a) 
and (19b) by OLS. A single parameter is estimated for 11ρσ and 00 ρσ  because of the linear 
structure of these equations. Finally, using previous estimates of ,,1 oββ andα for starting values, 
equations (16), (19a), and (19b) are then estimated jointly by maximum likelihood. With the 
maximum likelihood estimation (MLE) equation, separate estimates for 1ρ and ,1σ and then 0ρ
and ,0σ are possible. The log likelihood function for the model is made up of two components 
and can be written as: 
 
(20)  ( ) ( )∑
=
===
n
i
iii CyfCprobL
1
1 1)log(1log   
   
( ) ( )0)log(0 0 ==+ iii CyfCprob       
With: 
( ) ( )ii ZCprob αΦ== 1  
( ) ( )ii ZCprob αΦ−== 10  
 
(21a)  ( )1)log( 1 =ii Cyf  [ ] ( )( )iii XyZ 11111111 )log()( βσφσα ′−Φ= −−−    x 
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(21b)  ( )0)log( 0 =ii Cyf  [ ] ( )( )iii XyZ 00010101 )log()(1 βσφσα ′−Φ−= −−−    x 
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The maximization of this coefficient allows for the estimation the following parameters: 
 
α : Coefficients of the factors explaining household credit constraint conditions  
1β : Coefficients of the factors explaining household welfare conditionally of credit 
constrained 
0β : Coefficients of the factors explaining household welfare conditionally of non-
credit constrained  
1ρ and 0ρ : Correlation terms between the household credit constraint criterion equation and 
welfare equations 
2
1σ and 20σ :      Households welfare variances in the two states  
 
The data specification for the endogenous switching regression is presented in Table 6.3 
 
6.5. Conclusion 
A detailed description of the study area as well as sampling procedure and methods of data 
collection has been presented in this chapter.  
 
The analytical techniques and the econometric specifications of the various models (which 
includes FGT model of poverty decomposition, the tobit, logit probit and switching regression 
models) employed to achieved the stated objectives of the study were also presented in this 
chapter. This next chapter presents the discussions of the result of the empirical models.  
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Table 6.3 Data Specifications for the Switching Regression Model 
VARIABLE SYMBOL TYPE A PRIORI EXPECTATION 
Dependent Variable 
   
Welfare Status (Per Adult 
Equiv. Household 
Expenditure) 
MPAEHE Continuous - 
Independent Variables 
   
Age 
(Age of household head in 
years) 
AGE Continuous Age is hypothesised to affect negatively 
the welfare, in so far that old household 
head may not be as active as younger 
ones in their enterprises. 
Gender 
(Male=1,0 otherwise) 
GENDER Binary Male are expected to earn greater 
income, hence have better welfare than 
female. Its expected sign is positive. 
Education 
(No of years spent in school) 
SCHATTEN Continuous The number of years of formal 
schooling is an indicator of human 
capital, which positively affects welfare 
status.  
Monthly income 
(in Rands) 
MINCOM Continuous Monthly income is posited to affect 
positively welfare.  
Land ownership  LANDOWN Binary Land ownership – possession of a legal 
title increases ownership security, and 
thereby the increases the incentive to 
invest, which affects welfare positively. 
Assets 
(Estimated value in Rands) 
ASSET Continuous The coefficient is expected to be 
positive. Assets are expected to increase 
the welfare of households.  
Savings 
(in Rands) 
 
SAVING Continuous The sign is posited to be positive. 
Household saving are expected to boost 
its welfare.  
Remittance and pension 
(in Rands) 
REMPEN Continuous Remittance and pension is expected to 
affect welfare positively.  
Dependency ratio DEPRATIO Continuous High dependency ratio is posited to 
affect negatively household welfare. 
Debt  
 
DEBT Continuous It is posited that indebtedness will affect 
household welfare negatively. 
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Social Capital 
(A value equal to the 
Numbers of groups 
belonged) 
SOCICAP Continuous Belonging to a social network may be 
representative of household social 
relationships and may signal his ability 
to fulfil obligations. Its expected sign is 
positive.  
Awareness 
(Aware of a credit source = 
1, 0 otherwise) 
AWARE Binary Awareness may have a strong bearing 
on accessibility of credit hence its sign 
is expected to be positive. 
Probability density 
function or  )( iZαφ  in the 
model 
- Continuous  
- 
Interaction terms of 
variables and cumulative 
density function or 
)( iZαΦ  in the model. 
- Continuous  
- 
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  CHAPTER 7 
 ANALYSIS AND RESULTS OF THE STUDY 
 
 
7.1 Introduction 
In this chapter, the empirical results of the study are presented. The chapter is divided into four 
main sections. In the first section, the data description and analyses are presented. The second 
section deals with the estimates of the incidence of poverty. The third section focuses on the 
accessibility of credit to poor rural households. Indicators and factors influencing accessibility 
are discussed. The last section deals with the estimates of the impact of credit constraints on 
household welfare. 
 
7.2 Data Description and Analyses 
Four main items are considered in this sub-section, namely household access to financial services 
(credit), the household socio-economic and demographic characteristics in the two subgroups 
(i.e. based  on credit accessibility and credit constraint conditions), household source of credit 
and household income and welfare status measured by mean monthly per adult equivalent 
household expenditure (MPAEHE). 
 
7.2.1 Rural Households’ Credit Accessibility 
Credit can be part of a strategy for increasing current income, investing in the future, or coping 
with crises. Table 7.1 presents empirical results from the survey on how poor rural households’ 
are able access the credit markets. 
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Table 7.1 Rural Households’ Credit Accessibility  
Household With Access to Credit  
(n=106) 
Household With No Access to Credit  
(n=44) 
71 percent 29 percent 
Unconstrained 
(n=28) 
Constrained 
(n=78) 
Constrained 
(n=44) 
19 percent 52 percent 29 percent 
Source: Calculated from field survey, 2007 
 
The result of the analysis reveals that during the survey period, 71 percent of the sampled 
households had borrowed from a credit source while 29 percent of the sampled households 
applied to a credit source but were denied access, in other words, they were not able to borrow. 
No households that have no access to credit could proffer reasons why they were not granted 
credit. In all, majority of the households sampled, 81 percent were credit constrained, i.e. they 
were not able to borrow the amount they required from a credit source while only 19 percent of 
the sampled households were not constrained, and accordingly, could borrow the amount they 
wanted at the prevailing market and interest rate. 
 
7.2.2 Socio-Economic and Demographic Characteristics of Households   
Participation in the credit market would depend on household socio-economic and demographic 
characteristics such as gender of the household head, marital status, educational attainment, 
dependency ratio and title deed to land. These characteristics are important as they influence 
household’s demand for credit and potential lenders are most likely to base their assessment of 
borrower’s creditworthiness on such characteristics. The analyses were based on the pooled data, 
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accessibility to credit and credit constraint condition of the household. The socio-economic and 
demographic characteristics of the sample households are presented in Table 7.2. 
 
Education is measured in terms of the years of schooling completed by the household head. 
Education represents both the scope of the productive opportunities open to the household and its 
ability to deal with the formality of loan evaluation procedures. About 26 percent of the 
household heads have either no education or have attended formal school up to Grade 8. Overall, 
households having access to credit tends to have higher education than those without access to 
credit and financial services. Moreover, those that are not credit constrained tend also to a have 
higher education than those who are constrained in the credit market.  
 
Land in most cases, is one of the primary asset of rural households, and as such, the analysis of 
the determinants of access to credit cannot be done independent of the possession of land. The 
majority of the sampled household, about 93 percent, claimed they have title deeds to their land. 
All households having access to credit own their land; 23 percent of those without access do not 
own a parcel of land. Of the constrained households, 92 percent owns their parcel of land and all 
the unconstrained households have title deeds to their land. 
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Table 7.2 Average Socio-Economic and Demography Characteristics of all Sampled Households in the two Sub-groups 
 
 
 
Variables 
All 
Households 
(n=150) 
Households 
with Access 
(n=106) 
Households 
without Access 
(n=44) 
 
t-test 
Credit 
Constrained 
Households 
(n=122) 
Credit 
Unconstrained 
households 
(n=28) 
 
t-test 
 
       
 
Gender of household 
head. 
 
 
       0.64 
   (0.034) 
 
       0.65 
    (0.046) 
 
          0.62 
      (0.074) 
 
 
0.17NS 
 
         0.65 
      (0.043) 
  
 
         0.57 
      (0.095) 
 
 
0.21NS 
 
Age of household head. 
 
 
         44 
   (0.775) 
 
        38 
   (0.459) 
 
            56 
     (0.939) 
 
2.1** 
 
           45 
     (0.888) 
 
          38 
     (0.865) 
 
2.47** 
 
Years of school 
attendance 
 
           8 
   (0.284) 
 
        10 
  (0.150) 
 
              4 
      (0.438) 
 
 
 
0.93** 
 
            8 
     (0.330) 
 
          10 
     (0.298) 
 
 
0.88** 
 
Land ownership 
 
        0.07 
   (0.0204) 
 
     0.09 
  (0.000) 
 
          0.00 
      (0.000) 
 
0.057** 
 
         0.92 
     (0.025) 
 
 
         1.00 
     (0.000) 
 
0.05** 
 
Dependency ratio 
 
 
          50 
    (3.709) 
 
         25 
    (1.571) 
 
          111 
     (5.104) 
 
10.6** 
 
          56 
     (4.321) 
 
            24 
      (3.283) 
 
10.8** 
 
Standard Error of the means are in parentheses  **Significant at 95 percent level of confidence  NS =Not significant 
Source: Calculated from field survey, 2007 
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The average dependency ratio for the sample households is about 50 percent. Dependency ratio 
tends to be lower (25 percent) on average, for households with access than for those without 
access (111 percent). In addition, for constrained households, the dependency ratio is 56 percent 
as against 23 percent for unconstrained households.  The majority of the households sampled (54 
percent) are non-migrant and 85 percent of the households have been living in the study area for 
over 20 years. 
 
Significance t-test was conducted to test for the difference between the means of the various 
variables to ascertain if there is a significant difference between the socio-economic 
characteristics of household having access to credit and those without access, and for those that 
are constrained in the credit market and those who are not. 
 
The result reveals that there is no significant difference between the gender of household head at 
95 percent confidence level for households with access to credit and those without access and for 
those constrained and unconstrained. However, the results shows a significant difference in the 
age of household head at 95 percent level of probability for households with access to credit and 
those without access as well as for those who are constrained and unconstrained. 
 
The result further revealed a significant difference at 95 percent level of probability in household 
heads level of education, land ownership and dependency ratio, for household with access to 
credit and those without  access as well as for those  household that are constrained in their 
access to credit and those that have unconstrained access to credit. 
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7.2.3 Rural Households’ Source of Credit 
The major source of credit for the sample households are presented in Table 7.3. 
 
Table 7.3 Rural Households’ Source of Credit 
Source of Credit Constrained Households 
(n=122) 
Unconstrained Households 
(n=28) 
Formal (ECRFC) 82 percent 100 percent 
 
Informal (friends, relatives 
etc) 
18 percent None 
Source: Calculated from field survey, 2007 
 
The result from the empirical survey suggests that the major source of credit is from the formal 
sector, mainly from the ECRFC. The results show that about 82 percent of the constrained 
households applied for credit from a formal source (i.e. the ECRFC), while all the unconstrained 
households also got their credit from the same source. Only 18 percent of the constrained 
households indicated they seek for credit from an informal source while none of the 
unconstrained households applied for credit from this source. In all, about 85 percent of 
borrowers obtained loans from the formal sources. This may be because the ECRFC was 
established by the Eastern Cape provincial government to meet the financial need of the rural 
populace. No respondent indicated receiving loans from non-governmental organisation (NGOs), 
probably due to logistics and level of funding. Other sources of credit are from the informal 
sector; about 15 percent of the households obtained their loans from friends or relatives. The 
findings of this study are not consistent with the findings from credit studies in most developing 
countries where the informal sector provides the vast majority of credit as compared to formal 
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institutions credit allotment both in volume (i.e. amount advanced) and in the number of credit 
transactions (Deaton, 1991). A possible explanation for this is that the ECRFC is a government 
establishment created as an intervention to assist rural dwellers have easy access to credit for 
investment and production purposes.   
 
About 41 percent of the sampled households said they had difficulties in paying back their loans 
in the previous years. Only about 23 percent of those having access had difficulties in servicing 
their loans in the past while about 84 percent of those without access indicated they had 
difficulties. Of the constrained household, only 46 percent said they had difficulties in paying 
back their loan, while 21 percent of the unconstrained households said they had problems. 
 
Only 19 percent of the households sampled said they were not aware of any credit source while 
overwhelming majority (81 percent) indicated they were aware of credit sources around them, 
and most of them are clients of the Eastern Cape Rural Finance Corporation (ECRFC). The 
ECRFC constitutes the single largest credit provider in the study areas. None of the household 
heads indicated they were asked to provide collateral before getting the loan. The major require 
seems to be the loan contract, which clients have to sign. The long processing period before 
loans can be disbursed was ranked highest among the difficulties in applying for a loan. Thus, it 
could be said that the collateral requirement does not seem to be a major determinant of 
household access to credit in the study areas.  
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7.2.4 Rural Households’ Source of Income 
The source of income for most rural household could be from wages, remittances received or 
pension, savings and from sales of household assets. Empirical results from the survey are 
presented in Table 7.4. 
 
The average monthly income for the sampled households in the study area is R5 245. For 
households with access to credit this average is R6 318, this is higher than for those without 
access, which is R2 659.  For the constrained households, the average monthly income was 
found to be R5 110 while the unconstrained household have average monthly income of R5 829. 
However, there is no statistically significant difference between these amounts. 
 
The average income received monthly as remittances or pension for the sampled households is 
R462. For households with access to credit this average is about R547, this is higher than for 
those without access, which is R258.  For the constrained households, they receive R497 while 
the unconstrained household receive about R311 monthly as remission or pension.  
 
The average savings for the households sampled was found to be R3 089 at the time of data 
collection. For households with access to credit the average savings is about R4 268, this is 
higher than for those without access, which is R250.  For the constrained households, the average 
monthly income was found to be about R2 877 while the unconstrained household have average 
monthly income of about R4 015.  
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Table 7.4 Household’s Average Income in the two Sub-groups 
 
 
Variables 
All 
Households 
(n=150) 
Households 
with Access 
(n=106) 
Households 
without Access 
(n=44) 
 
t-test 
Credit 
Constrained 
Households 
(n=122) 
Credit 
Unconstrained 
households 
(n=28) 
 
t-test 
 
       
 
Monthly Income. 
 
 
5 245.00 
(180.86) 
 
6 317.72 
(159.08) 
 
2 659.09 
(132.43) 
 
413.9** 
 
5 110.32 
(209.73) 
 
5 829.25 
(304.14) 
 
738.9NS 
 
Remittances and 
Pensions. 
 
 
462.00 
(110.19) 
 
566.80 
(154.12) 
 
257.72 
(48.27) 
 
 
323** 
 
496.64 
(134.39) 
 
311.07 
(72.602) 
 
305.5NS 
 
Savings 
 
 
3 089.40 
(166.66) 
 
4 268.01 
(102.11) 
 
250.00 
(38.37) 
 
218** 
 
2 876.88 
(193.14) 
 
4 015.35 
(321.74) 
 
750.5** 
 
Value of Assets 
 
 
24 104.24 
(1, 569.45) 
 
31 518.36 
(1, 771.56) 
 
6 242.95 
(368.53) 
 
3,619** 
 
17 029.81 
(1, 003.41) 
 
54 928.57 
(3, 145.33) 
 
6 603** 
 
Standard Error of the means are in parentheses  **Significant at 95 percent level of confidence  NS =Not significant 
Source: Calculated from field survey, 2007
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The value of the productive asset holdings (mainly oxen, poultry, and livestock) of the entire 
households sampled on the average was estimated to be R24 104. For households with access to 
credit the average value of their assets was estimated at R31 518, this is higher than for those 
without access, which is R6 243.  For the constrained households, the average value of their 
assets was estimated at R17 029 while the unconstrained household the average value is R54 
929. 
 
Significance t-test was conducted to test for the difference between the means of the various 
variables to ascertain if there is a significant difference between the average monthly income, the 
amount received as remittances and pension, their savings and the value of their asset for 
household in the two sub groups.  
 
The result reveals that there is significant difference at 95 percent probability level between 
household average monthly income, remittances/pension, savings and the value of assets for 
household with access to credit and those without. In addition, the result reveals a significant 
difference at 95 percent probability level in the savings and the value of assets for constrained 
and unconstrained households. However, there is no significant difference between their average 
monthly income and the amount received as remittances/pension.  
 
7.2.5 Household Welfare Measured as Mean Monthly per Adult Equivalent Household 
Expenditure (MPAEHE) 
Household welfare was measured by its per capita expenditure. The mean monthly per adult 
equivalent household expenditure from the household survey is presented in Table 7.5.  
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Table 7.5 Mean Monthly Per Adult Equivalent Expenditure of all sampled households in the two sub-groups 
 
 
Variables 
All 
Households 
(n=150) 
Households 
with Access 
(n=106) 
Households 
without Access 
(n=44) 
 
t-test 
Credit 
Constrained 
Households 
(n=122) 
Credit 
Unconstrained 
households 
(n=28) 
 
t-test 
 
       
 
Mean Monthly per Adult 
Equivalent Household 
Expenditure (MPAEHE) 
 
 
334.20 
(6.81) 
 
369.20 
(5.19) 
 
250.00 
(12.50) 
 
 
27.1** 
 
230.75 
(7.69) 
 
379.64 
(11.13) 
 
 
27.1** 
 
Standard Error of the means are in parentheses  **Significant at 95 percent level of confidence   
Source: Calculated from field survey, 2007  
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The average MPAEHE for all the households sampled for the study was estimated to be R334 
per adult equivalent.  For households with access to credit the average MPAEHE was estimated 
at R369 per adult equivalent, this is higher than for those without access, which is R250 per adult 
equivalent.  For the constrained households, the average MPAEHE was estimated at R321 per 
adult equivalent, while for the unconstrained household the average value is about R380 per 
adult equivalent. 
 
7.3 Incidence of Poverty among the Sampled Households 
This section examines the relative poverty status of the respondents in the study area by 
employing the three most commonly used indices of poverty measure, namely the incidence of 
poverty, the depth of poverty and the severity of poverty. Table 7.6 shows the distribution of the 
households falling into each mutually exclusive welfare grouping.  
 
Table 7.6 Household Poverty Classification 
Group Amount (R) Frequency Percent 
Extreme (ultra) poor 
Moderate poor 
Non-poor 
Total 
< 110.28 
110.28 ≤  Z <  220.56 
≥ 220.56 
15 
51 
84 
150 
10 
34 
56 
100 
Source: Calculated from field survey, 2007 
 
The analysis of poverty begins by defining the indicator of well-being. Using consumption 
expenditure as a welfare measure, a poverty line was established. A relative approach in which a 
household was defined as poor relative to others in the same society or economy, as specified in 
the methodology was used to define the poverty status and in classifying the households into 
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poor and non-poor groups. The poverty line defined for the study area was R220,56 per adult 
equivalents per month. This is closer to the Household Subsistence Level (HSL) of R236,95 per 
adult equivalent defined for a rural household of 2 adults and 4 children by May et al. (1995) for 
South Africa, and a poverty line of R259,11 for the Northern Province (Gyekye and Akinboade, 
2001). The core/extreme poverty threshold for the study area was estimated at R110,28. Sixty- 
six (44 percent) of the households fall below the poverty line, while eighty-four (56 percent) of 
the households are classified as non-poor. Of the poor households, fifteen (10 percent) are ultra 
poor, while fifty-one (34 percent) are moderately poor. 
 
7.4 Decomposition of Poverty by Local Municipality 
The incidence of poverty using the monthly household per capita expenditure is presented in 
Table 7.7.  
 
Table 7.7 Decomposition of Poverty by Local Municipality 
Local Municipality Head Count Index  
( 0P ) 
Poverty Gap Index 
( 1P ) 
Severity Index  
( 2P ) 
Nkokonbe 
Amahlathi 
Ngqushwa 
All households 
0.24 
0.46 
0.62 
0.44 
0.13 
  0.21 
0.27 
0.47 
0.07 
0.11 
0.16 
0.039 
Source: Calculated from field survey, 2007 
 
Using the headcount index, the results showed that 44 percent of the rural households are living 
below the poverty line. By decomposing across local municipalities, the incidence of poverty 
indicates that the share of households living in poverty is distinctly the highest in Ngqushwa, 
where 62 percent of households have a monthly expenditure that is less than R220, 56. This 
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municipality is followed Amahlathi and Nkokonbe municipalities with 46 percent and 24 percent 
of their respective households, living below the poverty line.  
 
The poverty gap reflects the total expenditure shortfall of the entire poor household in relation to 
the poverty line (Ravallion and Bidani, 1994). It provides information regarding how far off 
households are from the poverty line. This measure captures the average sum of the differences 
between the poverty line and actual consumption levels of all people living below that line. It 
also reflects the per capital cost of eradicating poverty, in other words, it gives the total resources 
that would be required to bring every poor person up to the poverty line. The survey results show 
that, the depth of poverty is higher  in Ngqushwa followed by Amahlathi and Nkokonbe, 
indicating that more resources is required to bring the poor households exactly up to the poverty 
line in Ngqushwa than Amahlathi and Nkokonbe. An overall poverty depth ( 1P ) value of 0,47, it 
will require R103,66 (i.e. 0,47 multiplied by R220,56) per individual per month to close the 
“poverty gap” in the province. In other words, if the province could mobilise resources equal to 
about 10 percent of poverty line for every individual and were appropriately distributed to the 
poor in the amount needed so as to bring each individual up to the poverty line, then poverty 
could be eradicated, at least in theory. 
 
With the population of the poor in the province estimated at 4.6 million people (HSRC, 2004), 
about R476,84 million per month or about R5,72 billion per annum would be the total minimum 
amount required to eliminate poverty at the poverty line. This estimated minimum resource 
requirement implies that redistribution on its own requires capital that is unlikely to be available 
in the provincial economy in the short term.  
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The severity of poverty ( 2P ), is a measure of a distributionally sensitive index that can detect the 
expenditure distribution among the poor. Its decomposability property allows for the 
investigation of the severity of poverty in more detail. This measure also satisfies most welfare 
axioms, namely, the monotonicity axiom9 and the transfer axiom10. The result in Table 7.7 shows 
that the severity of poverty ( 2P ) among households surveyed is 0.039. Poverty is more severe in 
Ngqusha municipality with a severity index ( 2P ) value of 0.16, while Amahlathi and Nkokonbe 
municipalities have a severity index of 0.11 and 0.07 respectively.  
 
Table 7.8 Geographical Concentration and Average Expenditure Shortfall of the Poor 
Local Municipality Expenditure shortfall 
(%) 
Contribution to poverty 
(%) 
Concentration of the 
poor (%) 
Nkokonbe 
Amahlathi 
Ngqushwa 
All households 
13 
21 
27 
47 
19.96 
31.36 
46.96 
- 
18.18 
34.84 
46.96 
- 
Source: Calculated from field survey, 2007 
 
In Table 7.8, the poverty gap ( 1P ), which is the expenditure shortfall are presented in 
percentages. The poverty gap for the study area was calculated to be 0.47. This means that on the 
average the poor households have an expenditure shortage of 47 percent of their specific poverty 
lines. It can be inferred also from Table 7.8 that if suitable measures are taken to alleviate and 
eventually eliminate poverty in Ngqushwa, Amahlathi and Nkokonbe local municipalities, then 
the severity of poverty would be reduced by about 45, 31 and 20 percent respectively i.e. their 
                                                 
9
 Given other things, a drop in the income of a poor household must increase the poverty measure. 
10
 Given other things, a pure transfer of income from a poor to a less poor household must increase the poverty 
measure.   
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percentage contribution to poverty in the study area. The result also revealed that poverty is not 
only most severe in Ngqushwa, but there is also a high geographical concentration of the poor in 
the municipality as about 47 percent of the poor households sample reside in this municipality.   
 
7.5 Decomposition of Poverty by Socio-economic Characteristics 
The incidence of poverty was also decomposed by different socio-economic characteristics of the 
households, focusing on nine key factors, namely, the gender of the household head, marital 
status, age, education, dependency ratio, occupation, credit constraint status, land ownership and 
social capital. The results are presented in Table 7.9. 
 
The incidence of poverty is higher among household headed by females than for those headed by 
males. In addition, among single parents than for married couples. 
 
Decomposition of poverty by age reveals a higher incidence of poverty among the youth and the 
elderly. This could be a result that most youth in South Africa lack the necessary skills to be 
gainfully employed, while the elderly are too old and fragile to engage in any productive work 
and therefore relies solely on social grants and remittances/pension. 
 
The result of the empirical survey further reveals a higher incidence of poverty among the 
uneducated farming households with high dependency ratios. The incidence of poverty is also 
higher among household who are constrained in their access to production resources such as 
credit and land. There is higher incidence of poverty among households who own no land for 
subsistence production and have no access to credit. Similarly, all household heads that do 
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belong to any social group or organization are all poor, while the incidence of poverty for those 
that belongs to two or more groups is lower.  
 
Table 7.9  Decomposition of Poverty by Socio-Economic Characteristics 
 
Socio-economic Characteristics  
 
(n) 
Head Count 
Index ( 0P ) 
Poverty Gap 
Index ( 1P ) 
Severity Index  
( 2P ) 
Gender of household head  
Male 
Female 
54 
96 
0.41 
0.56 
0.11 
0.10 
0.047 
0.034 
Marital status 
Single 
Married  
56 
94 
0.42 
0.36 
0.09 
0.13 
0.034 
0.087 
Age 
28-39 
40-59 
60-69 
61 
75 
14 
  0.62 
0.24 
0.71 
0.31 
0.15 
0.39 
0.19 
0.08 
0.15 
Education 
 (Illiterate) 0 
Primary (1-5 yrs schooling) 
Middle  (6-9 yrs schooling) 
Matric and above (10+ yrs schooling) 
29 
34 
57 
30 
1.0 
0.73 
0.21 
0 
0.07 
0.17 
0.06 
0 
0.03 
0.09 
0.023 
0 
Occupation 
Farming households 
Others 
134 
16 
0.48 
0.12 
0.24 
0.29 
0.13 
0.11 
Dependency ratio 
0-100% 
Above 100% 
125 
25 
0.33 
1.0 
0.12 
0.45 
0.08 
0.32 
Credit constraint status 
Yes 
No 
122 
28 
0.54 
0.00 
0.29 
0.00 
0.16 
0.00 
Land Ownership 
No 
Yes 
140 
10 
0.60 
1.0 
0.23 
0.08 
0.10 
0.03 
Social Capital 
0 
1-2 
Above 2 
27 
95 
28 
1.0 
0.38 
0.11 
0.09 
0.19 
0.08 
0.04 
0.06 
0.04 
Source: Calculated from field survey, 2007 
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7.6 The Determinants of Household Poverty 
The determinants of household poverty are presented in Table 7.10.  
 
Table 7.10 Tobit Regression Estimates of the Determinants of Household Poverty 
Variables Coefficient Standard Error t-statistics [ ]tP >  
 
Gender 
   
  -0.1986* 
  
 0.1101 
  
 -1.8041 
  
 0.0786 
Age     0.1357*  0.0761   1.7832  0.0694 
Education   -0.0196**  0.0084  -2.3333  0.0341 
Land ownership    0.4390***  0.1390    3.1582  0.0018 
Credit availability   -0.5643**  0.2301   -2.4524  0.0315 
Occupation    0.2473**  0.1063   2.3264  0.0261 
Remittance & pension   -0.0296  0.0285   -10385  0.7545 
Dependency ratio    0.0468**   0.0178   2.6292  0.0401 
Assets  value    0.4518***  0.1261   3.5828  0.0027 
Social capital   -0.3421* 0.1823  -1.876  0.0654 
Constant   -1.9621***  0.4517   -4.3438  0.0012 
Sigma ( )δ    0.2632***  0.1472  17.875  0.0074 
 
No of Observation = 150 
 
LR Chi 2 (1)= 64.01   
Probability > Chi 2 = 0.0000   
Pseudo )( 2R  = 0.78   
Log likelihood = -175.263   
 
***, **, and * denote significance of estimated coefficient at 1, 5, 10 percent levels of probability respectively.  
Source: Tobit regression estimation using the software LIMDEP (1997). 
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The maximum likelihood estimates of the Tobit regression result show that Sigma ( )δ  is 0.2632 
with a t-value of 17.875 and is statistically significant at 1 percent level. This implies that the 
model has a good fit to the data. According to the estimation results, rural poverty is strongly 
linked to household head’s gender, age, education, land ownership, credit availability, 
occupation, dependency ratio and value of assets. 
 
The age of the household head is significant at 10 percent and is positive. This implies that the 
likelihood of a household to remain poor tends to increase with an increase in the age of the 
household head. This could be due to the fact many elder people have to fend for themselves and 
in most cases do not have others on whom to rely for support. Although many receive old-age 
grant, as demonstrated by Roberts (2001), these grants are in no way sufficient to keep a 
household out of poverty. Thus, the degree to which a poor elderly person manages to escape 
poverty, would generally depend on changes in his household circumstances, for instance if a 
child secured a good job, a decline dependency ratios accompanied by some relief of financial 
burdens or if his assets tend to increase with age.   
 
According to the estimation, the gender of the household head is significant at 10 percent level 
and has a negative sign, which implies that female-headed households are more likely to be poor 
than household that are male-headed. This could be because men are more in control of 
production resources than women are. Again, most female-headed households in South Africa 
are the so-called “granny households”, i.e. the female household head is the grandmother rather 
than the mother of the children in her care.  
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The coefficient of the years of formal education of household head is negative and statistically 
significant 5 percent level. Thus implying that, the more educated a household head is, the less 
likely he is to remain poor. Education is expected to lead to increased earning potential and 
improve occupational and geographical mobility of labour. Higher levels of educational 
attainment will provide higher levels of welfare for the household. A study in Malawi, by 
Mukherjee and Benson (2003), demonstrated that raising the maximum level of educational 
attainment by one step, i.e. from Standard 4 to 8, from Standard 8 to JCE, or JCE to MSCE, will 
raise household per capita consumption on the average by 22, 19, 11.5 and 17 percent in 
Southern rural, Central rural, Northern rural and urban centres respectively.    
 
Dependency ratio is statistically significant at 5 percent level and has a positive sign. This 
implies that the larger the dependency ratio, the higher the intensity of poverty in that household. 
This could be because of much pressure exerted on the limited resources at the household level. 
Fewer earners and a large number of dependants provide lesser opportunities to consume and 
gradually reduce the chances of getting out of the lower per capita consumption (poverty). 
Generally, poor household are found with higher dependency ratios. 
 
Household head primary occupation is statistically significant at 5 percent level and has a 
positive sign, implying that household head engaging in other sectors of the economy are less 
likely to be poor as compared to those in the agricultural sector. The vast majority of the 
households are stuck in rural areas and are engaged in agriculture but do not own land and other 
resources to progress as farmers. These would lead one to expect that agriculture in these rural 
areas is unlikely to provide any notable welfare benefits (Aliber, 2003). 
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Land ownership is positively related to household poverty and is statistically significant at 1 
percent level. This could be attributed to the anomalous situation in South Africa presently, 
whereby many rural households do not own land; some who do own land have very small or 
very poor land, or both; and many who own land derives little or no economic benefits from it, in 
terms of subsistence production (Aliber, 2003).   
 
Asset holdings (mainly oxen, poultry, livestock) of households is statistically significant at 5 
percent level and has negative sign, thus implying that, the more the  assets of a household is, in 
form of oxen, poultry, and livestock, the less likely the household is to remain poor. A possible 
explanation for this could be because asset holdings are both an economic resource and a source 
of social prestige especially among poor rural dwellers. In different ways, households draw from 
their assets to carry on with their lives, to make profits in good times and to sustain themselves in 
bad times. More so, assets can help establish whether future generations will continue to be 
trapped in poverty or manage to escape from its hold. 
 
The social capital coefficient has a negative sign and is statistically significant at 10 percent 
level, thus implying that the more social groups/network a household belongs to the less likely 
for it to be poor. A possible is explanation could be those suggested by the Productivity 
Commission (2003) that social capital can generate benefits by facilitating the spread of 
knowledge and innovations. The higher the degree of connectedness of a community the more 
easily its people would be able to transfer information around and the more people the 
information is likely to reach. Also through individual benefits – people with good access to 
social capital tend to be “hired, housed, healthy, happy” than those without.   
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Households with access to credit have lower levels of poverty. Credit availability coefficient is 
statistically significant at 1 percent level and negative. It has been documented that access to 
credit market enhances household welfare through the provision of investment credit to boost 
household income (Adugna and Heidhues, 2000) as well as consumption-smoothing (Zeller et al. 
1994). This could significantly influence a household’s income by helping its members to tap 
economic opportunities, thereby assisting them to get out of poverty (Binswinger and Khandker, 
1995; Adugna and Heidhues, 2000). 
 
7.7 The Determinants of Household Access to Credit 
The task in this section is to determine which specific variables influence households’ access to 
credit. Which economic, demographic and physical factors enhance or inhibits households access 
to credit. Access to credit is explained by using a logistic regression analysis, as the information 
is available only on whether a credit transaction was observed or not, rather than on the amounts 
of credit received. In logistic analysis one can directly estimate the probability of an event 
occurring and identifies the variables that are useful in making such predictions. The results from 
the estimation of the logistic regression are presented in Table 7.11. The coefficients of discrete 
choice regressions are only useful for their sign and significance but not for their magnitude. In 
order to understand the impact of the explanatory variables on the dependent variable, the 
relevant marginal effects are also presented. 
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Table 7.11 Logistic Regression Estimates of Determinants of Household Access to Credit 
 
Variables Coefficient Standard Error t-statistics Marginal 
Effects 
 
Gender 
   
  0.4130** 
  
 0.1640 
  
 2.517 
  
 0.021 
Age   -2.4470  0.4733 -0.517  -0.034 
Education   0.0741  0.0859  0.862  0.004 
Monthly Income   0.4320*  0.2666   1.620  0.026 
Land Ownership   0.2149  3.9072   0.055  0.056 
Value of Assets   0.2537*  0.1366  1.856  0.058 
Savings   0.4565*  0.2705   1.687  0.034 
Remittance & Pension  -0.0058   0.0162 -0.358 -0.006 
Dependency ratio  -0.2883***  0.0677 -4.256 -0.038 
Debt-Income ratio  -1.7921***  0.5841   3.068  0.241 
Social Capital   0.4632**  0.1925  2.405  0.027 
Awareness   0.0096  0.4480  0.214  0.006 
Municipality:     
Nkokonbe  1.6047  47.197  0.034  0.027 
Amahlathi  0.5178  6.997 0.074  0.054 
Ngqushwa  0.5078  7.359  0.069  0.045 
Constant  1.1034***  0.1344 8.209  
 
 
2R  = 0.69 
 
Adjusted 2R = 0.64  Chi-square )( 2χ  = 114.502 
Log likelihood function = -90.510  Degrees of freedom = 14 
Restricted log likelihood = -117.766  Significance level = .00000 
 
 
Marginal effects in percentage points, calculated at sample means.  
***, **, and * denote significance of estimated coefficient at 1, 5, 10 percent levels of probability respectively. 
 Source: Logistic regression estimation using the software LIMDEP (1997). 
 
Gender has a positive sign and is significantly different from zero at the 5 percent confidence 
level. Being male increases the probability of access to credit. This result may suggest that 
females are being discriminated against in the credit markets in the study area. This result 
confirms Zeller et al. (1994), whose results indicated discrimination against women in the 
informal credit markets in Gambia. A possible explanation is that household resources are 
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mainly controlled by men, thus lenders perceived men as more creditworthy. On the other hand, 
in the Xhosa culture men are seen as the head of the households, it could therefore be argued 
that, there is no discrimination against women as they are being effectively represented by men. 
 
Households’ monthly income is positively related to the probability of access to credit and is 
statistically significant at the 10 percent confidence level. Thus implying that the higher the 
households’ monthly income, the more likely that a credit agent will lend to it. A probable 
explanation for this could be that monthly income may serve as a measure of creditworthiness, 
household head with more income are more likely to have their credit demand met and could be 
a measure of repayment capability as they may be seen by the lenders as capable of repaying his 
loan as at when due. 
 
The value of households’ assets, however, has a positive sign and is statistically significant at the 
10 percent confidence level. The greater the assets value, the higher the probability of having 
access to credit. The rationale for this is that since lenders require repayment plus interest in 
cash, they could see the client’s assets as the last resort to liquidate to recover the credit in case 
of loan default. Households saving also had a positive and statistically significant influence on 
access to credit at the 10 percent confidence level. This could be as a result that savings could be 
substituted for collateral, especially if savings are deposited with the financial institution 
providing the credit.  
 
Dependency ratio is negatively related to credit accessibility and is statistically significant at the 
1 percent confidence level. This implies that the probability of having access to credit declines 
with increase in households’ dependency ratio. High dependency ratio exerts consumption stress 
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on the household, and lenders might be averse to lending to these households because of 
fungibility of credit, i.e. the loans might be channelled towards other uses rather than its intended 
productive purposes. Dependency ratio as a proxy for risk-bearing capacity indicator confirms 
that the higher the number of dependant household members, the more likely that the households 
are to suffer risk. By implication household with high dependency ratio would be judged by 
lenders to be less creditworthy. 
 
Loan repayment capacity, measured as debt-income ratio (Zeller, 1994), had a negative sign is 
statistically related to households’ accessibility to credit at the 1 percent confidence level. The 
possible explanation for this result is that the higher the debt-income ratio the higher the 
exposure to loan default risks which reduces the probability of credit access.   
 
Social capital as a social collateral is used to include membership of association where personal 
guarantees or recommendations of potential clients are given, and social networking, where the 
degree of connectedness of a community makes it the more easily for its people to transfer 
information around. The coefficient of this variable has a positive sign, and is statistically related 
to households’ accessibility to credit at 1 percent significance level. A possible explanation is 
that because the guarantors sign an undertaking with the financial institutions, they monitor and 
exert pressure on the borrowers to ensure the full repayment of the loan as at when due. 
Borrowers who have access to this type of social capital are more likely to have credit access.  
 
A more appealing interpretation of parameter estimates in a logit model is explaining the 
marginal effect of each exogenous variable. The marginal effects were an indication of the effect 
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of one unit change in an exogenous variable on the probability that a household would have 
access to credit. A possible interpretation of the results presented in Table 7.11 is that for 
instance, it is expected that an additional year older for the head of the household, with all other 
variables held at their mean values decrease the probability of a household having access to 
credit by about 0.034 percent. Similarly, increasing the household monthly income by one rand 
will increase the probability of the household access to credit by 0.026 percent. An increase in 
household repayment capacity (that is a decrease in debt-income ratio) by one unit will increase 
the probability of access to credit by 0.24 percent. 
 
The estimated coefficients for the municipality dummies are not significant statistically. This 
reflects that household probability to access credit in the credit market in the study area is not 
affected by these location variables. The constant term has been shown to be significantly 
different from zero in the analysis indicating that there might be other factors that influence 
access to credit in the study area, which have not been modelled in this analysis. This is further 
reflected in the 2R
 
value of 0.69, which shows that the estimated equation is explaining only 69 
percent of the variation in the household access to credit. Nevertheless, this value shows a 
reasonably high degree of adequacy of the model in analyzing the determinants of household 
access to credit. 
 
The joint hypothesis that all the coefficients of the logistic equation are zero is rejected at the 1 
percent confidence level. The computed value of -2(log likelihood ratio) is 90.510 and this is 
larger than the P=0.01 value of 2χ  (14 degrees of freedom) which is 29.414. This confirms that 
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the slopes of the coefficients are statistically significant from zero. The alternative hypothesis is 
thus accepted at this level of significance. 
 
7.8 Credit Constraint and Household Welfare 
The analytical technique used is the switching regression model. This model allows for a joint 
estimation of the determinants of households’ credit constraint condition and the household 
welfare in the two regimes, in this case, depending on whether a household is credit constrained 
or not. Distinct regressions are estimated for credit constrained households and unconstrained 
households, with mean monthly per adult equivalent household expenditure as an explanatory 
variable. To correct for potential self-selection bias, a probit credit constrained function was 
estimated by including the inverse Mills ratio and used to correct the error term in each equation.  
These equations are estimated jointly using the Maximum Likelihood. A discussion of this 
modelling approach has been presented in section 6.5. 
 
7.8.1 The Determinants of Household Credit Constraint Condition 
 A probit model was an appropriate choice for this analysis, as information was available only on 
whether a household was credit constrained or unconstrained in the credit market. The set of 
explanatory variables used here included gender, age, years of school attendance, land 
ownership, value of assets, savings, remittance and pension, dependency ratio, repayment 
capacity (debt-income ratio) and social capital. 
 
The maximum likelihood estimates of the probit model showing the determinants of the 
household credit constrained conditions are presented in Table 7.12 
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Table 7.12 Probit Regression Estimates of the Determinants of Household Credit 
Constraints Condition – Switching Regression (Part 1). 
 
 
Variables Coefficient Standard Error t-statistics [ ]zZP >
 
 
Gender 
   
 -0.6785*** 
  
 0.2699 
  
-2.513 
  
 0.0047 
Age   -0.0982***  0.3591 -2.734   0.0001 
Education  -0.0103  0.2873 -0.036  0.1556 
Monthly Income   0.0011  0.0024   0.450  0.1922 
Land Ownership  -0.0675**  0.0343  -1.964  0.0375 
Value of Assets  -0.0014***  0.0007 -1.890  0.0021 
Savings  -0.0001  0.0000  -1.526  0.9644 
Remittance & Pension  -0.0002   0.0001 -1.395  0.1725 
Dependency ratio   0.0042**  0.0026  1.615  0.0424 
Debt-Income ratio   0.1345**  0.0544   2.469  0.0478 
Social Capital -0.3904***  0.1617 -2.414  0.0104 
Constant -5.3653***  0.5066 -10.590  
 
 
2R  = 0.65 
 
Adjusted 2R = 0.61  Chi-square )( 2χ  =23.2636 
Log likelihood function = -160.5712  Degrees of freedom = 10 
Restricted log likelihood = -172.2030  Significance level = .00000 
 
 
***, **, and * denote significance of estimated coefficient at 1, 5, 10 percent levels of probability respectively.  
Source: Logistic regression estimation using the software LIMDEP (1997) 
 
The age, gender of the household head, debt-income ratio, dependency ratio, asset ownership and 
social capital are significant determining factors influencing the credit constraints of households. 
The age of the household head, being male and the social capital variable are negatively related 
to the credit constraint condition. In other words, older, male-headed households and those that 
are members of associations and have guarantors who sign an undertaking with the lenders are 
less likely to be credit constrained in the credit market. The estimated coefficients for these 
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variables are significantly different from zero at the 1 percent confidence level. Indeed, older 
people may have had more opportunities to build social links, may have larger networks and are 
therefore less likely to be credit constrained. 
 
The coefficient of the household dependency ratio is positively related to credit constrained 
condition and is statistically significant at the 5 percent confidence level, which implies that the 
probability of a household being credit constrained increases as its dependency ratio increases. A 
possible explanation is that high dependency ratio exerts consumption stress on the household 
and by implication; household with high dependency ratio would be judged by lenders to be less 
creditworthy and are more likely to suffer risk. 
 
The value of households’ assets and land ownership are also negatively related to the credit 
constrained condition and are statistically significant from zero at the 1 percent and the 5 percent 
confidence level respectively, implying that probability of being credit constrained decreases for 
households with more assets and for those having title deeds to land. This result could be 
explained by the fact that the value of visible assets could be used by lenders as a measure of a 
client’s repayment capacity; and may view assets as last resort to liquidate to recover the credit 
in the event of default by borrowers. Previous studies suggest that clients with fewer assets are 
more likely to have repayment problems (Aguilera and Gonzalez-Vega, 1993; Hunte, 1993; 
Sharma and Zeller, 1997). 
The debt-income ratio was used as a proxy for repayment capacity. The empirical result showed 
repayment capacity is positively related to credit constrained condition and is statistically 
significant from zero at the 5 percent confidence level, implying a higher probability of being 
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credit constrained for households with high debt-income ratio. The possible explanation for this 
result is that the higher the debt-income ratio, the higher the exposure to default risk. This raises 
the likelihood of the household being credit constrained. Ability of the borrower in terms of 
trustworthiness and ability in serving debts is crucial to the lender. 
  
The R2 value for the determinants of household credit constraint condition is 0.65. This indicates 
that 65 percent of the factors explaining household credit constrained conditions are included in 
the probit model. 
 
7.8.2 The Effects of Credit Constraints on Households’ Welfare 
The mean monthly per adult equivalent household expenditure (MPAEHE) is used as a proxy for 
household welfare. The same explanatory variables used in the credit constrained criterion 
equation were used in the credit constrained and unconstrained equations. This is because these 
variables were transformed in the probit credit constrained criterion equation; therefore, 
singularity was not a problem. The effect of credit constraints on household welfare is presented 
in Table 7.13. 
 
Households’ savings, social capital, remittance and pension all have a positive and statistically 
significant effect on household welfare for credit-constrained households. However, dependency 
ratio has a negative and statistically significant effect on household welfare for credit-constrained 
households. 
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Table 7.13 Effects of Credit Constraint on Household Welfare, Estimated by Maximum 
Likelihood Switching Regression - Switching Regression (part 2). 
 
 
Variables  Coefficients  Standard  t- statistics      
       Errors          
Credit constrained equation: 
Gender   -0.1747   0.2877   -0.607        
Age    0.0123   0.1518    0.812   
School attendance  0.0049   0.0317    0.155 
Monthly income   0.0069   0.0076    0.906  
Land ownership   0.1323   0.7782    0.170 
Value of assets  -0.0012   0.0009    -1.212 
Saving    0.0406*   0.0229    1.767 
Remit & pension   0.0017**  0.0007    2.464 
Dependency ratio  -0.0048**  0.0024   -1.960 
Repayment record  0.3245   0.3663    0.886 
Social capital   0.3604**  0.0001    2.414 
 Constant   4.234***   0.2243   18.874 
________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
Credit unconstrained equation: 
Gender    0.3172***  0.1206    2.630        
Age    0.0115***  0.0037    3.066   
School attendance  0.0196**  0.0096    2.024 
Monthly income   0.3242**  0.6438    1.986  
Land ownership   0.3724**  0.1576    2.363 
Value of asset   0.0059*   0.0033    1.737 
Saving    0.0032   0.0025    1.280 
Remit & pension   0.0056   0.0075    0.746 
Dependency ratio  -0.0079**  0.0036   -2.194  
Repayment record  0.1346   0.1178    1.143 
Social capital  -0.0059   0.6189   -0.095 
 Constant   3.896***   0.1134 34.342 
_____________________________________________________________________________________________ 
Variance estimates: 
 
2
1σ
   0.601*   0.3288   1.828   
 
2
0σ
   0.300***   0.2980   10.097 
 1ρ
   0.097*   0.0488   1.987 
 0ρ
                -0.675***   0.1063   -6.345 
_____________________________________________________________________________________________ 
Log likelihood function = -260.3271   Number of observations = 150  
 
***, **, and * denote significance of estimated coefficient at 1, 5, 10 percent levels of probability respectively.  
Source: Switching regression estimation from field survey data using the software LIMDEP (1997). 
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For the unconstrained households, gender, specifically being male, age, school attendance, 
monthly income, land ownership and value of assets, all have a positive and statistically 
significant effect on the household welfare. While dependency ratio, has a negative and 
statistically significant effect on the welfare of the unconstrained households. 
 
The correlation between the credit status equation error and welfare equation for the credit 
constrained regression error is 0.097 and is statistically different from zero. The corresponding 
correlation between the credit status equation error and welfare equation for the credit 
unconstrained regression error is -0.675 and is statistically different from zero. These signs and 
statistical significances agree with the expectation that unconstrained households in the credit 
market have a higher welfare outcome than the constrained households. This result indicates that 
credit constraint is endogenous and shows that it is necessary to model and include the credit 
constraint criterion equation in estimating the effects of credit constraints on household welfare. 
A Wald test of whether the estimated coefficients as a group are different between credit 
constrained and unconstrained equations produced a 2χ value of 32.56 ( 05.0=α ). This value is 
greater than 645.1=αZ . The null hypothesis is therefore rejected, concluding that the 
coefficients are statistically significantly different for credit constrained and unconstrained 
households. 
The switching regression is therefore more robust than simple OLS welfare regressions imposing 
automatically the exogeneity of credit constraint condition. According to the equations of 
expected household welfare conditionally to credit constraint conditions (equation 4a and 4b) 
and the sign of correlation terms ( µρ1 and µρ0 ), neglecting selection would then overestimate 
welfare for both credit constrained and unconstrained households, but this overestimation would 
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be larger for unconstrained households. The switching regression also highlights that the 
predictors of household welfare differs strongly for credit constrained and unconstrained 
households. 
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  CHAPTER 8 
 SUMMARY, CONCLUSION AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS    
 
8.1 Introduction 
Since the advent of democracy governance in 1994, the South African government has put in 
place some policy measures meant to restructure the economy. The democratic government has 
worked hard to reduce poverty by promoting the deepening of the financial market and the 
provision of wide range of financial services, especially credit to the poor. 
 
Thus in this study, the broad objective is to examine the determinants of household access to 
credit and the effect of credit constraints on household welfare in the Eastern Cape Province, 
South Africa. The study specifically estimate the relative poverty status of the rural households, 
it indentified the determinants of household poverty, the factors influencing household access to 
credit as well as the factors influencing that they are credit constrained in the credit market. The 
effect of credit constraints on the household welfare was also assessed.  
 
The summary and conclusions from the study and policy recommendations follows in the next 
two sections. The last section of the chapter provides an outline of possible areas for future 
research.  
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8.2 Summary and Conclusions of the Findings of the Study 
Strategies aimed at poverty alleviation need to identify factors that are strongly associated with 
poverty and are amenable to modification by policy. In this study, an attempt has been made to 
explore the determinants of poverty among rural households in the Eastern Cape Province. It 
sought to identify the poor and evaluate the factors that determine their poverty status. The study 
employs a household welfare function, approximated by household expenditure per adult 
equivalent to explain the incidence of poverty and its correlates.  
 
A poverty profile was constructed by dividing the population into subgroups according to local 
municipality areas and then the proportion of poverty concentrated in each municipality was 
determined using the Foster, Greer, and Thorbecke (FGT) poverty index. The results revealed 
that nearly 44 percent of the sampled households live below poverty line with average poverty 
gap of 0.097. Within these rural households, poverty incidence was more concentrated 
particularly among the agricultural households as compared to non-farm households. This results 
show how severe the poverty is in the rural areas of South Africa. Even though the headcount 
ratio, depth and severity of poverty have shown variation based on the criteria used, all confirm 
that poverty is a problem of major concern. Tobit regression estimates shed light on the 
determinants of poverty. The result shows that rural poverty is strongly linked to household 
head’s gender, age, education, dependency ratio, occupation, land ownership, credit availability 
and assets ownership. 
 
Credit has being identified as an important instrument for improving the welfare of the poor 
directly and for enhancing productive capacity through financing investment by the poor in their 
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human and physical capital. This study further investigates the individual and household 
characteristics that influence credit market access in South Africa. The aim is to provide a better 
understanding of the household level characteristics, not only because they influence household’s 
demand for credit but also because potential lenders are most likely to base their assessment of 
borrowers’ creditworthiness on such characteristics. Sufficient information was not obtained 
from the household level datasets. Even though little is known about the institutions that 
provided the credit and the conditions, under which the credit was granted or refused. The study 
has successfully modelled the determinants of household access to credit using household 
demographic and socioeconomic characteristics. The results of the study had shown that credit 
supplied by lenders is determined largely by crucial factor such as gender, monthly income, 
assets value, savings, dependency ratio, repayment capacity, and social capital. It can be 
concluded therefore that security and guarantee are the main criterion lenders consider in 
granting credit. In other words, credit risk assessment by lenders plays a larger role in 
determining whether an applicant for credit had access.  
 
The current policy emphasis on credit both as a development tool and as an effective strategy for 
poverty alleviation coupled with the limited availability of funds for credit to those that really 
need it has become a crucial issue. Rural households in developing countries may become 
trapped in poverty by lack of finance needed to undertake profitable investments. Improved 
access to credit could generate pro-poor economic growth if the credit constraints that poor 
households faced are relaxed. This study goes a step further to examine the effect of credit 
constraints on household welfare. Identifying credit-constrained households based on direct 
elicitation of credit constrained status from survey questions about restrictions on credit, the 
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study employed an endogenous switching regression model to analyse the effect of credit 
constraints on households’ welfare. Empirical results indicate that increased credit access to 
constrained households could generate improved welfare. 
 
8.3  Policy Implications 
Although a number of specific policy, implications could be drawn from the estimation results. 
The following policy implications of the study stand out, and are suggested in order to improve 
rural households’ access to the credit market and welfare in the Eastern Cape Province of South 
Africa.  
 
The rural poor generally face interlocking barriers to economic, social and political 
opportunities. They lack a political voice because they are located remotely from the seats of 
power. These factors limit their access to infrastructure, and their ability to obtain or utilize 
social services (such as health and education) and, in some cases, reduce their rights to own or 
access land-based resources. Therefore, empowering rural populations of the Eastern Cape 
Province to take charge of their development agenda is essential for poverty reduction. 
 
The empirical evidence suggests that rural poverty is multidimensional and requires a multi-
strategy solution. The decentralized type of planning is required to alleviate rural poverty in 
South Africa in general and the Eastern Cape in particular. There is an ardent need of the 
economic infrastructure with a particular focus on health and education facilities. The result of 
the Tobit regression of the determinants of poverty is in line with the generally accepted theory. 
Having higher dependency ratio is generally correlated to poverty status, as greater member of 
224 
 
the households are dependent on the fewer income earners. This therefore increases household’s 
poverty risk. Measures to reduce the dependency load within households will reduce poverty. 
Population and reproductive health programmes and policies that reduce the unmet need for 
family planning will promote welfare directly will help promote the achievement of reducing 
poverty by half in developing countries as called for by the Millennium Development Goals 
(MDGs). Reproductive health is not only a good in itself but also a factor than can contribute to 
the reduction of poverty. The benefit from the potential effects in terms of poverty reductions in 
fertility should be accompanied by appropriate policies that promote employment creation and 
savings, and that channel savings into productive investment in the rural areas. 
 
Educational attainment is also an important factor associated with the incidence of poverty. It 
should be closely considered in implementing poverty alleviation strategies and programmes. 
Education can be a powerful tool for empowerment and building capacity and capability to 
challenge inequalities. This can often be addressed by policy and practices through informal and 
informal routes and through development organizations and initiatives for which ‘education’ is 
not their core business. Good examples are often multisectoral programmes. They may focus on 
a particular form of poverty reduction (e.g. income, participatory, capability or consequential), 
but usually result in addressing the other aspects through evidence of positive spin-offs. Success 
stories are context specific, though their common feature is usually the adoption of pro-poor, 
participatory strategies. It is this feature, which potentially creates social capacity for 
sustainability.  
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Participatory poverty often requires participatory education strategies to raise awareness of 
rights, responsibilities and potential for change. Models of addressing participatory and identity 
poverty should involve inclusive education practices and reflection-action processes, usually in 
context specific, informal settings. The shared educational approach could be a mixture of 
informal, collectively supportive environments where awareness is raised about the structures 
around the poor that contribute to their disempowerment. Then poor are then supported in 
finding a voice to challenge the systems that created their impoverishment.  
 
Strategies for addressing capability poverty should not focus on narrowly defined skills agenda 
alone, but adopt a context specific and culturally sensitive curriculum, which draws on 
indigenous knowledge and practices as a starting point for enhancing literacy and numeracy 
skills. Education that addresses income poverty amongst adults should be non-formal. For 
example, vocational skill training centres may target rural or otherwise disadvantaged people. 
This should takes a livelihoods approach, by combining vocational skills and literacy training for 
disaffected young females, with participatory methodologies in a multisectoral approach to 
capacity building and awareness raising. 
 
Microcredit forums for women, through targeted informal education, can address both capability 
and participatory poverty by raising awareness of women’s rights and the role of the state in 
limiting the wider benefits of a credit system that controls women’s savings and potential for 
growth. The educational component creates the difference between empowerment and poverty 
reduction or simply a hegemonic reinforcement of the status quo for women. Of special 
importance is female education as the result of the study indicates that female-headed households 
are more likely to be poor than male headed households. Training programmes could be devised 
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in consultation with many stakeholders; that are linked to credit resources that support small 
enterprise start-ups and economic sustainability of small-scale farming through increased 
practical knowledge reinforced by experience and example. An increase in the educational 
attainment of one individual in a household may not only affect that individual’s productivity 
and earnings but consequently on those of others with whom he interacts. 
 
The results also suggest that landlessness in rural areas is associated with poverty. Land remains 
an important component of rural households’ livelihood strategies for those who have it. Secure 
land ownership in addition to inducing investment is likely to increase the supply of credit from 
the formal credit system to undertake such investment. The reason is that, because of its mobility 
and virtual indestructibility, land with secure, clearly defined, and easily transferable ownership 
rights is ideal collateral. The provision of collateral – facilitated by possession of formal land 
title – is generally a necessary condition for participation in formal credit markets for medium 
and long-term credit. Existence of well-documented and transferable property rights and of 
institutional arrangements to facilitate the low-cost transfer of and are likely to make an 
important contribution to the development of financial markets. 
 
However, while use of titled land as collateral can, under the condition that foreclosure is 
socially feasible, reduce a bank’s default risk and thereby enhance credit supply, it will have 
little impact on the transaction costs associated with administering credit to small producers in 
rural areas. In environments where these costs are high, the improved credit-worthiness brought 
about by possession of land title may therefore not be enough to facilitate access to formal credit 
by small farmers. Unless complementary measures to reduce transaction costs and ensure access 
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to credit by this group are undertaken alongside with individualized property rights through 
titling, the benefits from titling programs may accrue only to medium and large landowners. 
 
In an environment such as South Africa where credit markets entail distortions, which put 
smaller and poorer households/farmers at a disadvantage, individual property rights on equity 
and - in the medium to longer term - on the direction and nature of land transfers between 
different size classes of producers, could imply greater inequity. Whether, in the presence of 
heterogeneity in endowments, small producers will benefit from such policies depends critically 
on the ability to reduce, together with titling, transaction costs and policy induced distortions that 
limit access to credit markets. 
 
Financial institutions play an important role in serving the poor. They do this by adjusting their 
traditional mode of operation to curtail the high costs and risk. In managing risk to lenders that 
poor rural household represent, lenders will have to assess risk appropriately, by gathering 
information about the risk status of the individuals concerned, this implies additional costs. 
There is need for government and policy makers to acknowledge that financial institutions will 
only serve the poor if it is profitable to do so. Emphasizing the important role of credit in a 
developing country where most of the rural population are poor. Government has to provide 
incentives for financial institutions in form of subsidies, tax breaks or grants to at least cover the 
initial costs of the financial institutions to enter into the rural finance market, if only they are to 
develop as institutions that can provide credit to substantial proportions of the rural population 
who are presently denied access to credit.  
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Credit policies still have an important role to play in rural development, and additional rural 
finance can enhance productivity and household welfare, thus contributing to pro-poor growth. 
Given the high demand for credit and the limited access of the rural households to both informal 
and formal credit in the Eastern Cape, the degree of effective credit rationing is very high. The 
result of the switching regression implies that there would be substantial impact from providing 
incremental credit to constrained households and from removing the constraints through access 
to sufficient credit.  
 
In addition, there is a need to develop and promote micro and small-scale enterprises relating to 
agriculture and particularly livestock sector in order to create more employment opportunities in 
the Eastern Cape Province. Hence, efforts should be made to raise both farm and non-farm rural 
real incomes through job creation by the setup of micro and small-scale entrepreneurship, with 
the increased provision of education and health, better livelihood conditions, and a variety of 
related social and welfare services for poverty reduction. 
 
An improved welfare outcome is only achieved if credit reaches those households whose 
investment activities are actually constrained. Since many households lacking access to credit are 
also credit constrained, expanded access to credit in the Eastern Cape Province must target those 
households with both investment opportunity and insufficient credit, if it is to generate economic 
welfare. Thus, expanded and incremental access to credit targeted to credit constrained 
households or complete relaxation of the constraint would contribute to improved welfare and 
poverty alleviation. To achieve high economic efficiency in credit allocation, targeting the credit-
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constrained households is essential, by so doing; South Africa’s financial institutions can 
alleviate poverty and enhance economic growth. 
 
In short, the key message of this study is that policy-influenced variables such as education, 
employment creation and land redistribution are crucial factors that can lead to a significant 
reduction in the present poverty levels in South Africa.  
 
8.4 Recommendation for Future Study 
Although the implications of the findings of this study indicate that credit policies still have an 
important role to play in rural poverty alleviation; implying that additional rural credit can 
enhance productivity and household welfare, thus contributing to pro-poor growth. In South 
Africa, research that is more elaborate is recommended to quantify accurately the contribution of 
credit to households’ poverty alleviation over a period. In fact, one area worth further research is 
the households’ vulnerability to poverty. A households’ observed poverty status is an ex-post 
measure of its well-being (or lack thereof). However, in thinking about forward-looking anti-
poverty interventions that aim to prevent poverty, what really matters is the vulnerability of 
households to poverty, i.e. the ex-ante risk that a household will, if currently non-poor, fall below 
poverty line, or if currently poor will remain in poverty.  
 
A further line of research not covered here, but necessary for better understanding of rural 
household credit accessibility vis-a-vis poverty alleviation is the consideration of the impact of 
social capital in household welfare and rural poverty alleviation. Social capital can affect 
economic welfare through many channels including the functioning of credit markets, the 
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performance of education institutions, maintenance of irrigation projects and diffusion of 
technical knowledge, innovation or information (Grootaert et al. 1999). Expectedly, the potential 
role that social capital plays in the facilitation and promotion of well-being and economic 
development, not only at the household level but also at the level of communities and nations at 
large is generating increasing interest and discussions among academic and policy makers 
worldwide. 
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